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P R E F A C E 
A l o t has been v;ri t ten on the foreign po l i cy of 
I n d i a , but so far as I n d i a ' s foreign po l i cy and i t s r e l a t -
ions with na t iona l secur i ty i s concerned very few published 
research vrork i s ava i l ab le on the t o p i c . The presen t d i s s e r -
t a t i o n i s a broad ana ly t i ca l and ob jec t ive study of I n d i a ' s 
foreign po l i cy in the context of na t i ona l s ecu r i ty . 
Ind ia adopted the po l i cy of non-aligrjnent as a 
foreign po l i cy s t r a t egy to r the p r o t e c t i o n of na t iona l 
s ecu r i t y . The secu r i t y of Ind ia has alv/ays been threa tened 
e i t h e r by Pakis tan o r China or by a combination of both 
supported by USA. The main purpose of I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy 
has been the- secu r i ty of the country and the p ro t ec t ion or 
n a t i o n a l ^ i n t e r e s t s . My d i s s e r t a t i o n covers a thorough study 
of India* s foreigo- po l i cy and na t iona l s ecu r i t y from 1971 
to 1980. 
My d i s s e r t a t i o n i s c l a s s i f i e d i n to four chapters . 
The f i r s t chapter dea ls with the background of the 
nature of t h r e a t to I n d i a ' s na t iona l s ecu r i t y and foreign 
po l i cy pursued by the Government of Ind ia to meet the challenge 
to i t s s ecu r i t y upto 1971. 
i i 
The second chapter throvfs l ight on the Bengladesh c r i s i s 
and i t s impact on India 's securi ty. An attempt has been made 
to highlight the consequences which brought fundamental changes 
in India ' s foreign policy after the signing of the Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship of Augvjst 19 71. I t also deals 
with the nature of threat t o India 's security during post 
Simla Agreement and the dJ^lcmacy pursued by India to meet the 
challenges from the side of Pakistan and China. 
The th i rd chapter deals with the foreign policy adopted 
by the Janata Government in the context of major challenges to 
India ' s securi ty. I t examines the s^^er-rpowers mi l i tar isa t ion 
of the Indian Ocean and India 's response to these challenges. 
A comparative study has been made to evaluate the nature of the 
policy of non-alignment pursued by Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her 
successors with special reference to India 's relations with the 
Soviet Union. I t also deals with India 's relat ions with i t s 
immediate neighbours. 
And f inal ly the fourth chapter deals with the nature of 
th rea t t o India 's security because of the supply of sophisticated 
weapons to Pakistan by United States of America; af ter the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 19 79. In this chapter an 
attempt has been made to survey and analyse India 's foreign 
policy actions to safeguard the security of the country and to 
i i i 
p r o t e c t i t s na t ional i n t e r e s t s . 
In the end of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n some suggestions are made 
to t he Government of India t o improve I n d i a ' s secur i ty envirorxnent 
in order t o prevent any t h r e a t t o i t s s ecu r i t y . 
In the preparat ion of t h i s s tudy, I have la rge ly r e l i e d 
on primary sources such as the Government pub l i ca t ions . I have 
t r i e d my bes t to use a l l the e x i s t i n g ava i l ab le mater ia ls on the 
sub jec t . 
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G H A F T E R - I 
Background of I n d i a ' s Foreign Pol icy and 
National Po l i cy 
BACKGROUND OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
AND NATION/^X SECURITY 
I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y and N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y d u r i n g 
Nehru E r a : 
V/hen I n d i a g o t i n d e p e n d e n c e on 15 Augus t 19 4 7 , t h e v .o r ld 
had a l r e a d y b e e n d i v i d e d b e t w e e n two h o s t i l e camps ; t h e US and 
t h e S o v i e t and e a c h camp was e n d e a v o u r i n g t o c o n t a i n t h e o t h e r 
and v;as i n t h e p r o c e s s o f a t t e m p t i n g t o m u s t e r t h e nev; ly 
i n d e p e n d e n t n a t i o n s on i t s s i d e . F o r newly i n d e p e n d e n t I n d i a , 
p r e s e r v a t i o n o f i n d e p e n d e n c e and i t s u s e b o t h i n t h o u g h t and 
b e h a v i o u r was t h e m o s t n a t u r a l and c a r d i n a l o b j e c t i v e . The 
c o l d v/ar v.dth i t s b l o c p o l i t i c s t h r e a t e n e d t o t a k e away 
I n d i a ' s i n d e p e n d e n c e . The c h o i c e b e f o r e I n d i a v/as e i t h e r 
t o a c c e p t a p o l i c y o f a l i g n m e n t , and j o i n o n e o f t h e power 
t l o c s and t h u s be u n d e r i t s p r o t e c t i v e l o m b r e l l a o r a d o p t an 
i n d e p e n d e n t n o n - a l i g n m e n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y and s t a y away from 
b l o c p o l i t i c s . 
Fo r N e h r u , i n d e p e n d e n c e and s e c u r i t y were i n s e p a -
r a b l e . He t o l d t h e C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly on March 8 , 1949 t h a t : 
What d o e s i n d e p e n d e n c e c o n s i s t o f ? 
I t c o n s i s t s f u n d a m e n t a l l y and b a s i c a l l y 
of foreign r e l a t i o n s . That i s the t e s t 
of independence . . . . Once foreign r e l a -
t i o n s go out of your hand, in to the 
charge of somebody e l s e , to t h a t extent 
and in tha t measure you are not indepen-
dent. 
In h i s broadcast to the nat ion of 7 September 194 6, 
Nehru l a i d dovm the ou t l ine of I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy . He 
said : 
We propose, as fa r as poss ib l e , to keep 
away from the power p o l i t i c s of groups, 
al igned against one another, which have 
led in the past to world wars and which 
may again lead to d i s a s t e r s on an even 
waster sca le , Vfe be l i eve t h a t peace and 
war are i n d i v i s i b l e and the denial 
of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom 
elsewhere and lead to c o n f l i c t and war. 
We are p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d in t he 
emancipation of colonia l and dependent 
1, Jawahar Lai Nehru, Speeches, Vol .1 , September 1946 -
May 1949, The Publications Division, Ministry of Infor-
mation and Broadcasting, Government of India , New Delhi, 
1983, 4th edn. , p . 241. 
count r ies and people and in the recog-
n i t ion in the theory and p r ac t i c e of 
2 
equal oppor tun i t i e s for a l l r a c e s . 
Nehru bel ieved tha t India ' s s ize , geos t ra teg ic loca-
t i o n , and h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n s e n t i t l e d i t to play a lead-^ 
/ 
ing ro le in Asia as well as world a f f a i r s . He said t o t4ie 
Const i tuent Assetibly on 22 March 1949 t h a t : 
India i s very curiously placed in Asia 
and her h i s to ry has been governed ^ grea t 
deal by the geographical factor p lus other 
f a c t o r s . Whichever problem in Asia you 
may take up, somehow or other India comes 
into the p i c t u r e , VThether you th ink in 
terms of China or tne Middle East or South 
Asia, India immediately comes into the 
p i c t u r e . I t i s so s i t ua t ed t h a t because 
of past h i s to ry , t r a d i t i o n s e t c , in regard 
to any major problem of a country or a 
group of count r ies of Asia, India has to 
be considered. Whether i t i s a problem of 
defence or t r ade or indus t ry or economic 
3 
pol icy , India could not be governed. 
2 . Jawahar Lai Nehru, India* s Foreign Policy : Select 
Speeches September 1946 - April 19 61, The Publications 
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Sovemmant of India, New Delhi, 19 61, p . 2. 
3 . Jawahar Lai Nehru, n_, 1, p , 253. 
Nehru was aware t h a t India could r e t a i n i t s influence 
and play a meaningful r o l e in maintaining world peace, not 
t>y a l ign ing with any one power b loc , but , by following an 
Independent foreign po l icy . He said before the Consti tuent 
Assembly on 8 March 1949 t h a t ; 
'If by any chance we align ourselves d e f i -
n i t e l y with one Power group, we may perhaps 
from one point of view do some good, but I 
have not the shadow of a doubt tha t from a 
l a r g e r point of view, not only of India but 
of world peace, i t wi l l do harm. Because 
then we lose t ha t tremendous vantage ground 
tha t we have of using such influence as we 
possess (and tha t influence i s going to grow 
from year to year) in the cause of world 
4 peace. 
He continued : 
I fee l t h a t India can play a big pa r t , and 
perhaps an e f fec t ive pa r t , in helping to 
avoid war. Therefore, i t becomes a l l the 
more necessary tha t India should not be 
l i ned up with any group of Powers , . , . That 
4 . I b i d . , p . 246. 
i s t he main approach of our foreign 
po l i cy . 
Nehru be l ieved tha t India was not to be unduly worried 
about ex terna l t h r e a t s to i t s s e c u r i t y . This was a perception 
which governed h i s secur i ty thinking even before independence. 
He also bel ieved tha t big power r i v a l r y would in i t s e l f act 
as an e f fec t ive guarantor of I n d i a ' s s ecu r i t y . 
ThuS/ in a world dominated by contending mi l i t a ry b locs , 
Nehru pursued an independent, non-aligned pol icy , of judging 
every i s sue on the meri ts of the case , to safeguard i t s 
secur i ty and na t iona l i n t e r e s t s and also to maintain i t s indepen-
dent pos i t ion in world p o l i t i c s , 
India in the ear ly years of i t s independent career , 
played a ro le of balancer in world a f f a i r s . The bas ic objec t ive 
of i t s foreign pol icy was to promote the coun t ry ' s secur i ty by 
i n su l a t i ng i t s s t r a t e g i c environment from in te r fe rence by the 
power b l o c s . National secur i ty , in Nehru ideas could be 
safeguarded not.merely by defence, pre par ednes's but also by an 
e f f ec t i ve foreign pol icy . He said : 
Every countiry' s foreign pol icy f i r s t of 
a l l i s concerned with i t s own secur i ty and 
5 . I b i d . . p . 248. 
with p ro tec t ing I t s own progress . Securi ty 
can be obtained in many ways. The normal 
idea i s t h a t secur i ty i s protected by 
armies. That i s only p a r t l y t r ue ; i t i s 
equal ly t r u e t h a t secur i ty i s pro tec ted by 
p o l i c i e s . A d e l i b e r a t e policy of f r i end-
ship with o ther coun t r i e s goes f a r t he r in 
gaining secur i ty than almost anything e l s e . 
India since independence followed the pol icy of non-
alignment and kept i t s e l f away from power b locs . On the 
other hand, Pakistan joined m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s with the 
U.S,A, and o t h e r s . Therefore, India adopted non-alignment 
as a general foreign pol icy s t ra tegy to meet a l l kinds of 
t h r e a t s to i t s na t iona l s ecu r i t y . 
I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy ac t ions , since the beginning 
of independence show t h a t India* s foreign pol icy makaers have 
always been concerned about two kinds of t h r e a t s t o India* s 
secur i ty viz* t h r e a t s from i t s two northern neighbours, Pakistan 
7 
and China, 
6, Nehru, n.» 2, p , 7 9 . 
7, Iqbal Khanam, " I n d i a ' s Policy of Non-Alignment and 
National Secur i ty" , Indian Journal of P o l i t i c s , 
Vol.XVI, Nos. 3-4, 1982, p , 115. 
The most important aspect of foreign pol icy of India 
has been i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with Pakis tan . Pakistan was created 
out of t he t e t r i t 6 t y t ha t was o r i g i n a l l y known as India, 
The borders of the two count r ies are coirmon and i t i s in 
the i n t e r e s t of both the count r ies t ha t they persue a policy 
of f r i endsh ip . But unfor tunate ly , they have not been able 
to e s t ab l i sh f r iendly r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
g 
Kashmir has been a secur i ty issue for India through-
out but af ter i t s t r i b a l invasion, Kashmir has been int ima-
t e l y concerned v/ith the secur i ty and defence of India from. 
the side of Pakis tan . After independence, the pr ince ly states 
were givfen th'e Qhoice to join e i t h e r India or Pakis tan. 
Kashmir i s s i t u a t e d in the North-West of Indian sub-
continent adjoined both India and Pakis tan . The Maharaja of 
Kashmdr, did not take irranediate decision to jo in e i t h e r 
India or Pakis tan . He f e l t t ha t the re was no need to join 
e i t h e r of the dominions. He wanted to maintain the s t a tu s 
quo, there fore , Maharaja Hari Singh inv i t ed both India and 
Pakistan to enter in to S t a n d s t i l l Agreement. Pakistan entered 
into S t a n d s t i l l - Agreement with Kashmir for one year . 
India did not sign the agreement with Maharaja and decided to 
wait u n t i l the s t a t e had made up i t s mind, India did not put 
8 . Nehru, n,.2, p . 17 5. 
8 
the s l i g h t e s t pressure on the s t a t e to accede to the Indian 
dominion because as Nehru said : i t r e a l i s e d t h a t "Kashmir 
was in a very d i f f i c u l t pos i t i on . " Even in regard to 
" s t a n d s t i l l " agreement no speedy s teps v/erer taken by 
9 
India , On the o ther hand soon a f te r the s t a n d s t i l l agree-
ment, ser ious externa l pressure were being applied on Kashmir 
by Pakis tani a u t h o r i t i e s , refusing to send to Kashmir^ supplies 
of v i t a l goods t o t he needs of people of Kashmir, •'•^  
In order to worsen the s i tua t ion in Kashmir a well organised 
r i o t i n g began in Poonch against the Maharaja's administra-
t i o n . Within a short span of tim.e, Pakistan l e f t no stone 
unturned t o force Maharaja for the accession of Kashmir in 
favour of Pakis tan . Meanwhile, towards the end of October 
1947, armed t r i b e s men Invaded Kashmir from the North c r o s s -
ing the t e r r i t o r y of Pakistan. The r a i d s on Kashmir were 
carefu l ly planned and well organized by Pakistan with the 
de l ibe ra t e object of seizing the s t a t e by force and decla-r-
11 iftg i t s possession to Pakistan, This was an act of 
h o s t i l i t y not only t o Kashmir but t o the Indian Union. 
The forces of Jammu and Kashmir were u t e r l y inadequate 
9 . Ib id . , p . 443. 
10. Ib id . 
11 . Ib id . , p . 446. 
12. M.C. Gbagla, Kashmir 1947-19 65« New Delhi, Government 
of India, 19 65, p . 24, 
t o meet the l a rge scale a t t ack . Therefore, Maharaja Hari 
Singh requested the Indian Government to meet the s i t u a t i o n s . 
He also agreed for the accession of Jammu and Kashmir in 
favour of India without any precondit ion and signed the i n s -
trument of Accession. This accession, however, was subject 
to promise to a p l eb i sc i to be held in Jammu and Kashmir, 
The Indian Government sent I t s t roops in October 1947 and i t 
became success in driving out the invaders . As a r e s u l t of 
t h i s c o n f l i c t , about 5,000 sq. miles of I n d i a ' s northern 
t e r r i t o r i e s known as 'Azad Kashmir* were occupied by 
14 Pakistan and the r e s t including Srinagar by India . 
The Government of India repeatedly requested the 
Government of Pakistan to prevent ' t h e use of i t s t e r r i t o r y 
to invade India* but Pakistan paid no heed to i t . Hence, 
India r e f e r r ed the matter to the Securi ty Council of the 
15 United Nations on December 30, 1947. The Security Council 
appointed a comrrdssion to arrange a p l e b i s c i t e . There was 
a cease f i r e in January 1949, The United Nation issued a 
r e so lu t ion on 13 August 1948 tha t Pakis tan i t roops should be 
withdrawn from the e n t i r e s t a t e . Pakistan had not only 
13. Prakash Chandra, Intern at ion Relat ions, Vikas Publ i -
shing House, . New Delhi, 1983, p . 17 5. 
14. Ib id . 
15. United Nation Documents S/628, January, 1948, para 13, 
p . 143. 
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withdrawn i t s forces even 5 years of the reso lu t ion but 
v io l a t ed i t and organised a l a rge and strong force in Kashmir 
1 6 
under the command of i t s army. In the discussion on 
Kashmir i s sue in the Security Council , both U.S.A. and U.K. 
supported Pakis tan , I t was r e a l i z e d by the Indian Govern-
ment t h a t Anglo-American support to Pakistan was mainly to 
17 e s t a b l i s h t h e i r bases in Kashmir because both wanted to 
18 use Kashmir as a mi l i t a ry base against the Soviet Union. 
Kashmir* s geo - s t r a t eg i c importance coupled with the 
perception tha t Pakistan supported by U.S.A. and U.K. in the 
United Nation would pose a grave danger to India* s secur i ty 
led Nehru to devise a s t ra tegy of preempting future Indo-Pak 
c o n f l i c t . For the same purpose, he offered a No-War Pact 
with Pakistan in December 1949. The No-War offer vas a pro-
duct of Nehru's f a i t h in the p a c i f i c sett lement of d isputes 
19 and maintaining peace in the sub-cont inent . 
But the No-War offer was r e j ec t ed by the Prime Minister 
of Pakistan Liaqat Ali Khan on the ground t h a t Pakistan 
16. M.S, Raj an, India in World Affairs 1954-56, Asia 
Publishing House, New Delhi 19 63, p . 445. 
17. K.P. Karunakaram, India in World Affairs : Ajqust 1947-
January 1956, Oxford Univers i ty Press , London 1952, 
p . 136. 
18. Yuri Nasenko, Jawaharlal Nehru's I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy 
S te r l ing Publishing House, New Delhi, 1977, p . 45^ 
19. S.L. Poplai , India ; 1947 - 1950, (ed.), Vol.11 External 
Affairs (London, 1959) , p . 324, 
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would not sign such an agreement unless the Kashmir problem 
20 
was reso lved and thereby Pakistan wanted to r e t a i n the 
m i l i t a r y option to solve the Kashmir problem. 
The question of accession of Kashmir e i t h e r in favour 
of India or Pakistan was to be decided by the people of Jammu 
and Kashmir. The Kashmir Government did not want the acce-
ssion of Jammu and Kashmir in favour of Pakis tan. Therefore, 
the Kashmir Government decided to convene the Const i tuent 
Assembly to draf t a cons t i t u t i on for the Sta te as a pa r t of 
Indian Union. By February 1949, the Consti tuent Assembly, 
r a t i f i e d Kashmir 's i r revocable accession to India , This 
was i n t o l e r a b l e for Pakis tan, Pakistan f e l t t h a t i t could 
not take the Kashmir through nego t i a t ion . Therefore, i t 
moved towards the Western bloc for mi l i t a ry a id . I t entered 
in to a b i l a t e r a l mi l i t a ry pact with United S ta tes of America 
and l a t e r joined SBATO and GENTO in order to get mi l i t a ry 
a s s i s t ance to strengthen i t s e l f p o l i t i c a l l y , m i l i t a r i c a l l y 
and d ip lomat ica l ly v i s - a - v i s India , 
Thus, P a k i s t a n ' s r e j ec t ion of the No-War Pact and the 
pro-Pakis tan s tance of the Western Powers e spec ia l ly the 
20. I b i d . . pp . 324-5. 
2 1 . Yuri Nasenko, n_. 18. 
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United States and Britain, heightened India 's security per-
ception. This created a sense of insecurity to India 
because Pakistan had entered into Western mili tary alliance 
in order to get arms to solve Kashmir dispute with India from 
the position of strength. 
I t was against the background of Pakistani threat 
to India that Nehru told the Indian Parliament on 23 December 
1953 that .' 
"All t h i s arming of Pakistan i s a matter of 
concern to u s , . , . I t i s a matter of concem 
to us because the quintessence of hatred for 
India plus accumulation of arms may lead to 
bad resu l t s . "^^ 
He further added : 
"U.S. mili tary aid to Pakistan produced a 
•qual i ta t ive change* in the existing s i tu -
ation and therefore i t affected In do-Pakistani 
re la t ions , more especially on the Kashmir pro-
23 
blems." 
22. Nehru, n.,2, p . 9 6. 
23 , P a r l i a m e n t a r y DebatesJig,Delhi) 22Feboary , 19S4^Par;t-II, 
V o l . 1 , no. 6, c o l , 435; ^^ 
13 
Pakistan r e a l l y wanted to s t rengthen i t s e l f against 
India . I t needed modem arms in an appreciable quant i ty to 
counterbalance I n d i a ' s power p o s i t i o n . I t jo ined the SEATO 
and CENTO which enabled i t to obtain arms e a s i l y and also 
24 to get U.S. support on the Kashmir i s s u e . This posed a 
ser ious t h r e a t to I nd i a ' s policy of non-alignment and i t s 
na t ional s ecu r i t y . Pakistan' s membership of both SEATO and 
CENTO completely enci rc led India and brought the western 
forces of the ' co ld war* to I n d i a ' s very door s t ep . This 
offensive step of the western bloc d ive r t ed India ' s a t ten t ion 
to r eo r i en t i t s foreign policy and get support from the 
Soviet Union on Kashmir i s sue . This was necessary if India 
wants to survive as an independent nat ion and also to follow 
an independent foreign policy of non-alignment. The govern-
ment and people of India f e l t t ha t the only way to pro tec t 
i t s foreign pol icy was to promote wider r e l a t i o n s with the 
Soviet Union. 
The U.S. a t t i t u d e towards India ' s pol icy of non-
alignment was not good t i l l the end of 1956, In 1953, India 
p a r t i c i p a t e d in the p o l i t i c a l conference on the Par East 
i s sues to defend i t s foreign policy of non-aligrment. The 
Soviet Union supported India' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n but the United 
24. M. Ahsen Choudhry "Pakistan and the U.S . " , Pakistan Horizon 
[Karadhil Vol.IX, December 1956, p . 20. 
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25 S t a t e s opposed i t . The cont inuat ion of the U.S. militoury 
aid to Pakistan was to curb the growing Soviet influence in 
Asia as well as India ' s pol icy of non-alignment. So, the 
U.S. mi l i t a ry aid to Pakistan posed a, grave t h r ea t to peace 
and secur i ty of the people of Asia, 
The Soviet Union opposed the U.S. m i l i t a r y bases in 
Pakistan because these bases were es tab l i shed to prevent the 
Soviet influence in Asia and the Middle East , Therefore, 
both India and the Soviet Union were compelled by t h e i r in te -
r e s t s to come c lose to each other and join hands to counter-
balance U.S. influence in the sub-cont inent . 
I t was under such condit ion t h a t Nehru v i s i t e d the 
Soviet Union in June 1955. Russian had been in consider-
able pain t o demonstrate t h e i r g rea t f r iendship for India . 
Nehru wanted to strengthen Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s but before 
opening a new chapter in Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s , he wanted 
t o make i t sure t h a t the r e l a t i o n s betv/een the two countr ies 
would be based on equal i ty , mutual benef i t , mutual respect 
and mutual t r u s t t ha t was why he r e i t e r a t e d h i s f a i t h in 
Panchsheel as well as in peaceful set t lement of a l l i n t e rna -
t i o n a l d i spu te s . Nehru had several t a l k s with the Soviet 
25. Parliamentary Debates, 6(2) , 1953, Cols , 4059, 4065. 
2 6. Rajan, n_. 16, p . 308, 
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l e a d e r s , e spec ia l ly with Prime Minister Bulganin. and the 
F i r s t Secretary of the Comnnunist Party - Khrushchev, nos t ly 
on world problems and in the j o in t declara t ion issued by 
the two Prime Minis ters on t h e i r t a l k s , they resolved tha t 
the r e l a t i o n s betv/een the two count r ies would continue to 
be guided by the p r i n c i p l e s of Panchsheel."^ 
The Soviet l eaders Bulganin and Khrushchev v i s i t e d 
India in November-December 1955. During t h e i r three weeks 
v i s i t s t o India, they ca l l ed India a great power and supported 
28 India on Kashmir i s sue . I t was an imperative assurance 
of the Soviet recogni t ion of India ' s genuine independent and 
i t s be l i e f in the pol icy of non-alignment. The government 
and the people of India were s a t i s f i e d with them because 
un l ike the West, the Soviet Union did not propose to join i t s 
hands in m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . They ejcpressed t h e i r own s a t i s -
fac t ion t o India ' s pol icy of non-alignment and declared an 
unequivocal support to India and also promised to safeguard 
i t s na t iona l i n t e r e s t s . The open support to India by the 
Soviet Union on Kashmir issue was a landmark in Indo-Soviet 
r e l a t i o n s because the "diplomatic s t rength" which Pakistan 
had sought to achieve by U.S.A. was counterbalanced by the 
27. Foreign Policy of India : Text of Documents 1947-59, 
pp. 185-7; See also The Times (Text of Documents) , 
24 June 1955.(London ) . 
28. The Hindu, 11, 12, 16 December 1955. 
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29 S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l and economic backing t o I n d i a . 
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e Cocnmunist Government in 
China c a u s e d conce rn t o I nd i a about i t s s e c u r i t y i n t h e 
30 
h imalayan zone e a r l y in 1949, Quest ions on T i b e t began t o 
be r a i s e d i n t h e Ind i an C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly. Nehru confessed 
t h i s much l a t e r when he s a i d t h a t : 
"from t h e very f i r s t day t h i s problem 
31 
about our f r o n t i e r s was be fore u s . " 
Even be fo r e t h e Communist Government was e s t a b l i s h e d 
i n China , I n d i a had no t ed t h a t Kuomintang China c l imbed 
32 
T i b e t as he r e x c l u s i v e c o n c e r n . I t v.as a l s o f a m i l i a r wi th 
t h e r e p e r c u s s i o n s of C h i n a ' s embroilment i n t h e c i v i l war in 
T i b e t and , t h e r e f o r e , had a l r e a d y bothered abou t i t s s e c u r i t y 
33 
on t h e Indo-T ibe tan border and i t s i n t e r e s t s i n T i b e t . 
The emergence of t h e P e o p l e ' s Republic of China l e d Nehru t o 
d e c l a r e soon whi le Ind ia would r e p r e s e n t Q i i n a ' s s u z e r a i n t y 
29 . Raj an , ji . 16, p . 513. 
30 . Nehru, a . 2.' P» •^'^» 
3 1 . I ^ j ^ ^ 
3 2. P a n i k k a r , Ip Two China Memories of a Dinlomati. 
London, 1955, p . 102. 
3 3 . K .p , Karunakaran , Q* 17 , p . 5 . 
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over Tibet , i t would l i k e i t s pas t r e l a t i o n s with Tibet and 
34 Tibet autonomy t o be continued. But I n d i a ' s publ ic opinion 
began becoming r e s t i v e . China compelled India to 
consider t h e fu tu re of Indo-Tibetan r e l a t i o n s . Some mode-
r a t e c i t i z e n s of India have l iked India to press China to 
respect Tibe t ' s i n t e r n a l sovereignty and to p e r s i s t with 
i t s ex t r a t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s , but Panikkar suggested tha t 
pressing China for such terms was ne i the r advisable nor 
use fu l . The Government of India f e l t perturbed about 
I n d i a ' s f r o n t i e r s , but thought i t was to wait basing i t s 
cons idera t ions on the reac t ions of raniKkar to Peking. Accor-
dingly, the Indian Prime Minister , Jawahar Lai Nehru sought 
to claim h i s country* s public opinion and avoided antagoni-
sing China and provoking the communist b loc as a whole in 
37 order t o keep India* s non-alignment safe. I t was sugges-
ted t h a t India should have stood for Tibet* s independence by 
backing on the Anglo-American support, making use of China' s 
38 
embroilment in Korea, But t h a t would not only cut , across 
34. Jawahar Lai Nehru Inside America, Compilation of 
Nehru's Speeches and Press Conferences repor ted in 
India during h i s v i s i t to the U.S.A. in 1949, New 
Delhi, p . 226. 
35. Cons t i tuent Assembly of India Debate, 6(1), 1949, 
Co l s . 25, 54 6. (New Delh i ) . 
36. Panl3dcar, n_.32, p . 102. 
37. D.N. Mallik, The Development of NOD-Alignment in 
India* s Foreign Policy, Chat any a Publishing House, 
Allahabad, 19 67, p . 79. 
38. Ib id . 
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India* s non-alignment, but would suggest t h a t India was 
playing the B r i t i s h imper i a l i s t r o l e and i t should thus 
arouse Asia ' s suspic ion. Moreover, China was ready to 
y i e ld the nK>ve, which would not only be f u t i l e for i t s e l f 
but would harm India at a d e l i c a t e stage of i t s independent 
career mult iplying by i t s secur i ty needs. I t appears t ha t 
the Government of India considered i t unavoidable to bear 
39 caut iously with the dormant r i s k to i t s secur i ty with a 
view of keeping China f r iendly , as long as poss ib le , and 
I n d i a ' s non-alignment i n t a c t . 
After Chinese occupation of Tibet , India took s teps to 
strengthen i t s p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i c pos i t ion in Himalayas, In 
December 1950, India concluded a P ro tec to ra te Treaty with 
Sikkim whereby India assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for Sikkim 
40 defence. On 31 July, 1950, India signed a t r e a t y with 
Nepal s t i p u l a t i n g among other th ings the ob l iga t ions of the 
p a r t i e s to inform each o the rs of any ser ious f r i c t i o n with 
any neighbouring count r ies which might affect f r iendly r e l a -
41 t i o n s between India and Nepal. 
39. Prime Minister on Sino Indian Relat ions , Vol. I , In 
Barliaraent ( E x t e m a f P u b l i c i t y Division, Ministry of 
External Affairs , Government of India, New Delhi) , 
pp. 248-9. 
40. Indian Lok Sabha S e c r e t a r i a t e , Foreign Policy of India; 
Text of Documents. 1947-1951, 2nd Edit ion, New Delhi, 
1959, pp. 37-40. 
4 1 . I b i d . , pp . 31-33. 
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AEtsr the Tibetan question was closed the r e l a t i o n s 
between India and China were improved. In the Treaty of 
April 29, 1954, India ofEic ia l ly recognised Tibet as ' t h e 
Tibet region of China*. The Chinese in ten t ion was c l ea r 
but India was calm and while i t s l ep t i t s land was being 
42 
occupied. %)art from "brief" and " b i t t e r " episode about 
Tibet the re was p a r t i c u l a r l y no point of d isputes between 
India and China u n t i l the end of Korean V7ar in July 1953. 
China emerged as a new powerful country with formidable 
power, able to face the American challenge in Asia. India was 
to hold a middle ground in the new power balance. At 
the i nv i t a t i on of the government of India, Ghou-En-Lai vis i ted 
India on June 25, 1954. India and China concluded 
'Panchsheel ' which became the guiding p r i n c i p l e s in the 
44 
r e l a t i o n s between the two coun t r i e s . But the r e l a t i o n s 
between the two count r ies were broken a f te r the Chinese 
challenge of mapm.anship. On 18 October 1954, Peoples 
China, a fo r tn igh t ly paper published a map of China which 
Included about 50,000 square miles of the Indian t e r r i t o r y in 
North East F ron t i e r . Indian Gowemment consequently enquired 
42. Satyanarayan Sinha, China S t r i ke s , Blanford Press, 
London, 19 64, pp. 61-2, 
43. Karunakaran Gupta, "India-China Relat ions" , Seminar 
No. 50, October 1963, (New-Delhi) p . 15. 
44. "Foreign Policy of India" Text of Documents* n..33, 
p . 104. 
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about t h i s car tographica l aggression and the Chinese Govern-
ment put for th i t s lame excuse tha t the survey . were not 
undertaken by the Chinese Government, they were the legacy 
45 of the p a s t . In reply to a question in the Indian P a r l i a -
ment whether the Chinese Government had not recognised 
Ind i a ' s F ron t i e r s ? Prime Minister Nehru said : 
"There was no question about any body* s 
46 recognising absolute f a c t . " 
The border between India and China was the Mc^ fc)han 
Line. The l a t t e r being the r e s u l t of Simla Conference of 
1913-14. Therefore, Nehru saw no reason to d iscuss the 
question of f r o n t i e r s with Chinese Government because he f e l t 
47 
tha t " there was nothing to be d iscussed ." In 1954, China 
lodged a complaint t h a t Indian t roops had entered Barahoti . 
Meanwhile, Chinese had s t a r t e d "building a road" connecting 
48 
"Sinkiang to T ibe t " . On July 1959, China asser ted tha t 
the Spanggura areas were Chinese t e r r i t o r i e s . In Aagust 
1959, the Chinese armed forces crossed the Thagla-Ridge. In 
45. VJhite Paper No. l , New Delhi, 1959, p . 47. 
46. Ra1va Sabha Debates (10 March 1955), Vol. IX, No. 12, 
Col . 1434. 
47. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, September 1957-April 1963, 
Publ ica t ions Division, Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, Govt, of India, 19 64, Vol.4, p . 20 6. 
48. Mahendra Kumar, "Sino-Indian Relations"* The Indian 
Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science, Vol.XXIV, No. l , January-
December 19 61, p . 110. 
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restrospect, these incrusions seems to had been a smoke-
screen to their major aggressive design in the Aksaichin 
49 
area. 
T h i s ejqDlains why S ino- Ind ian r e l a t i o n s s h i f t e d from 
f r i e n d s h i p t o e n i m o s i t y . The r e l a t i o n s between t h e two 
c o u n t r i e s f u r t h e r d e t e r i o r a t e d when in March 1959/ Ind ia gave 
p o l i t i c a l asylum t o Dala i l ama . The Chinese a t t i t u d e s t i f - ' 
fened and b o r d e r c l a s h e s on t h e S ino- Ind ian f r o n t i e r became 
50 
more f r equen t in t h e summer of 1959. 
These e v e n t s made i t neces sa ry fo r I n d i a t o s t r e n g -
then i t s de fences a l l along t h e Chinese b o r d e r in t h e Hima-
l a y a ' s; and New Delh i t h e r e f o r e , loolced around fo r h e l p . 
S ince t h e U.S .S .R . too was a v i c t i m of Chinese t e r r i t o r i a l 
c l a i m s and p r o v o c a t i v e a c t s . New Delhi and Moscow tended t o 
g e t c l o s e r and t h e Sovie t Union began t a k i n g more i n t e r e s t 
in India* s economic and s e c u r i t y needs , Moscow took a 
number of s t e p s t o s t r e n g t h e n India* s hand. F i r s t l y , i t 
a u t h o r i s e d a loan worth about $ 378 m i l l i o n f o r I nd i a ' s 
Th i rd F ive Year Plan in September 1959. Secondly, i t r e fused 
49 . Satyanarayan Sinha, n_.42, p . 7 2. 
50 . VIjay Sen Bhudra j , "China as a Fac to r in Indo-Sovie t 
R e l a t i o n s " , in Surendra Chopra, S t u d i e s in I n d i a ' s 
Fpre iqn P o l i c y (ed.) Department of P o l i t i c a l Sc ience , 
G.N.D. U n i v e r s i t y , Amri tsar , 1983, p . 132. 
5 1 . I b i d . , p . 133. 
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t o suppor t t h e Chinese p o s i t i o n on t h e S ino- Ind ian bo rde r 
c l a s h e s , and e j ^ r e s s e d ' r e g r e t a t t h e u s e of f o r c e and 
adv i s ed Peking t o s e t t l e t h e b o r d e r d i s p u t e s through fr iendly 
n e g o t i a t i o n s ' , T h i r d l y , i t s tepped - - up i t s d ip lomat i c 
r e l a t i o n s wi th I n d i a . Sov ie t d e l i g a t s s headed by P r e s i d e n t 
K.E. VorsVkilov a r r i v e d in ir^dia on 20 Jar/car-v? I960, t o r a 
l 6 - d a y s o f f i c i a l v i s i t . In t h e fo l lowing month, t h e Sovie t 
Prime M i n i s t e r Khruschev v i s i t e d New Delhi fo r f i v e days . 
F o u r t h l y , Moscow agreed t o h e l p I n d i a in enhancing i t m i l i -
52 t a r y c a p a c i t y in Himalayas, 
On 14 May 19 62, Nehru r e i t e r a t e d I n d i a ' s demand fo r 
t h e Chinese wi thdrawl from Ijadakh c r e a t i n g a no man' s l a n d 
53 
of approx imate ly 11,300 square m i l e s . The Galwan Val ley 
i n c i d e n t was r e g a r d e d as t h e t u r n i n g p o i n t in t h e h i s t o r y of 
54 t h e S i n o - I n d i a n c o n f l i c t in LadaJch. Meanwhile, China 
a t t a c k e d Ladakh and t h e r e a f t e r North East F r o n t i e r Agency on 
Oc tober 20, 19 62 .^^ 
The Chinese i nvas ion was a s e r i o u s t h r e a t t o I n d i a ' s 
s e c u r i t y as we l l as I n d i a ' s p o l i c y of non-al ignment ans i t s 
52 . I b i d . 
5 3 . The Hindu (Madras) 22 Ju ly 19 62. 
5 4 . I b i d . 
5 5 . Sa tyanarayan Sinha, n_.42, p . 77 , 
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eg 
c r e d i t a b i l i t y t o defend i t s b o r d e r . The Chinese a t t a c k 
was t h e s a d e s t c h a p t e r of Jawahar L a i ' s l i f e and a f f e c t e d 
h i s f a i t h in non-a l ignment . Nehru r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e 
Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y should be a defence o r i e n t e d p o l i c y 
in t h e p e r s u i t of non-a l ignment . He was fo rced by e x i s t i n g 
s i t u a t i o n t o make c e r t a i n changes in India* s fo re ign p o l i c y 
not in t h e sense of al ignment in p l a c e of non-al ignment bu t 
non-a l ignment wi th adequate defence of t h e c o u n t r y . 
Af ter t h e Chinese i nvas ion , t h e r e a c t i o n a r y f o r c e s 
in I n d i a launched an a l l - o u t o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t t h e Govern-
ment and i t s f o r e ign p o l i c y . In t h e i r propaganda they 
l i n k e d t h e f r o n t i e r c o n f l i c t and t h e defea t of t h e Indian 
t r o o p s on t h e b o r d e r wi th t h e p o l i c y of non-a l ignment , and 
in t h e speeches of every Right-wing p a r t y l e a d e r , of what-
ever s t and ing and s t r i p e , some p o i n t s were o b s e r v a b l e : 
( i) There could g e n e r a l l y be no such p o l i c y as non-a l ignment ; 
if i t e x i s t e d a t a l l , a l l t h e same i t was not f o r a weak 
coun t ry l i k e Ind i a t o pursue i t , ( i i ) There was no o t h e r 
way f o r I n d i a b u t t o sc rap non-al ignrrent and j o i n t h e b l o c 
57 
of Western powers . 
But Nehru was f u l l y aware of t h e s i t u a t i o n and had 
5 6. C h a l a p a t h i Rau, J awaha r l a l Nehru (Delh i , 1973) , p . 4 0 0 . 
57 . Yuri Nasenko, n.. 18, p p . 292-3 . 
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deep f a i t h i n t h e p o l i c y of n o n - a l i g n m e n t b e c a u s e he f e l t 
t h a t i f I n d i a would d e v i a t e from n o n - a l i g n m e n t i t would b e 
ha rmfu l f o r t h e c o u n t r y i n t h e f u t u r e . So he s a i d t h a t i t 
would b e a f o l l y f o r I n d i a t o abandon i t s p o l i c y of n o n -
a l i g n m e n t and t h a t any p o l i c y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t I n d i a was 
58 f o l l o w i n g would b e d i s a s t r o u s f o r t h e c o u n t r y . 
Although^ Nehru was f o r c e d b y t h e r e a c t i o n a r y f o r c e s 
t o move t o w a r d s t h e Western b l o c i n o r d e r t o r e c e i v e m i l i t a r y 
a s s i s t a n c e t o d e f e n d I n d i a ' s b o r d e r . And Ind i a* s n o n - a l i g n -
ment w i t h b l o c s was g r a v e l y t h r e a t e n e d by t h e d e c i s i o n of 
t h e I n d i a n Government t o a c c e p t l a r g e m i l i t a r y a i d from 
i m p e r i a l i s t p o w e r s . 
In l a t e O c t o b e r 19 62, I n d i a h a d t o t u r n t o many count r ies 
f o r a i d , • S i n c e November 3 , 19 63 I n d i a began t o r e c e i v e 
arms from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s . On 
November 14, 19 62, hov/ever, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and I n d i a 
s i g n e d an ag reemen t on m i l i t a r y a i d . Under t h e ag reemen t 
I n d i a c o n s e n t e d t o a l l o w American a d v i s e r s and o b s e r v e r s t o 
e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e u s e of t h e arms and a l s o a g r e e d t o 
make a v a i l a b l e t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a c e r t a i n amount of m i l i -
59 t a r y i n f o r m a t i o n . 
5 8 . I b i d . , p . 2 9 5 . 
5 9 . I b i d . , p p . 2 9 5 - 6 , 
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The U.S.A. o f f e r ed t o b u i l d more a i r f i e l d s i n I n d i a , 
i n s t a l l a system of r a d e r s t a t i o n s a t t h e border and e s t a b l i s h 
communication with U.S. a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s which would be 
60 
ordered / a cco rd ing ly / t o t h e s t a t i o n in the Bay of Bengal. 
At a conference a t Nassau in December 1962, U.S. P r e s i d e n t 
Jc*in Kennedy and B r i t a i n ' s Prime M i n i s t e r Harold McMillan 
agreed t o g ran t Ind ia urgent m i l i t a r y a id t o an amount of 
61 
120 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . 
Now t h a t Ind ia had accep ted m i l i t a r y a i d from t h e 
Western powers , and i t in f luenced I n d i a ' s fo re ign p o l i c y . 
I t was s imply t h a t t h e American i m p e r i a l i s t s chose o t h e r ways 
of i nvo lv ing Ind ia in t h e i r m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c p l a n s . They were 
not going t o miss such a good chance of pushing Ind ia from 
t h e p a t h of non-a l ignment . Not on ly Ind ia but a l l t he 
non-a l igned c o u n t r i e s faced grave t h r e a t t o the p o l i c y of 
non-a l ignment . They were t o be d i s appea red from t h e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene because t h e U.S. a t t i t u d e towards them was 
not good. The American A d n i n i s t r a t i o n was aware t h a t t h e 
conclus ion of a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e wi th India would impose on 
them t h e immense f i n a n c i a l burden of r e - e q u i p p i n g t h e Indian Army. 
The I n d i a n came t o r e a l i s e more c l e a r l y the dangers 
60. Ibj.^^ . p . 296. 
6 1 . Ibi^. . 
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involved in the foreign policy l i n e advocated by the Right, 
and stepped up t h e i r support of Nehru's po l icy . The CPI 
Central S e c r e t r i a t e published a reso lu t ion analysing in 
depth^the American plan for j o in t a i r defence exercise and 
showing t h a t the country ' s sovereignty was gravely t h r ea -
tened. The resolut ion of the CPI National Council suggest-
ing the proposal of an eight na t ions Colombo Conference 
of December 19 52, tha t India and China should be held to 
break the deadlock on the Sino-Indian border dispute had 
CO 
strong repercussions among the p u b l i c . 
All t h i s made, Nehru follow the course of non-
alignment more cons i s ten t ly and simultaneously to bu i ld up 
the count ry ' s defence capacity by u t i l i s i n g in te rna l resour-
ces as well as ge t t ing outs ide aid without mi l i t a ry of p o l i -
t i c a l s t r i n g s . 
Nehru signed the Moscow Treaty of Banning Nuclear 
Weapon Test in 19 63, The Indian Government saw the signing 
of the Treaty as "a turning point in recent human h i s to ry , 
opening the way to disarmament and to secure a peace a l l 
64 over the world. This step taken by the Indian Government 
6 2 . New Age, J u l y 14, 19 6 3 . 
6 3 . A. I . C . C , Sconomic Review, August 15, 19 63,(Nejw D e l h i ) p , 16. 
6 4 . Nev; Age, 4 August 19 6 3 , 
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towards strengthening f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet 
Union was very important for India. 
The new approachment betvjeen India and the Soviet 
Union s t a r t e d in May 19 63, when the Soviet Government offered 
to help India to construct an in tegra ted iron and s t ee l 
works at Bokaro. The Soviet Government also agreed to 
extended aid to bu i ld up the defence capacity of India. 
The Indian Government then took fur ther step to s t r e g -
then Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s h i p . In July 19 63, Indira Gandhi 
paid a v i s i t to the Soviet Union. She said at a press confe-
rence during the t a l k s and s ta ted regarding the a i r defence 
exerc ise involving some Western powers t h a t the re could be no 
question of any foreign bases or strong po in t s being set up 
on Indian s o i l . She said, "the exerc i ses wi l l not held 
near the border but in Delhi and Ca lcu t t a area and they are 
temporary, t h e i r purpose being to t r a i n our people in the use 
of radar a i r defence,'* She also said : "We need powerful 
t r a n s m i t t e r s . But we are not going to allow foreign countries 
to use them. We shal l not take the equipment o the r -
wise . " 
Close f r iendship between India and the Soviet Union 
65. Yuri Nasenko, n_. 18, p . 315. 
66, New J^e, 4 i^gust , 19 63. 
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was e s t a b l i s h e d in Apri l 19 64 at J a k a r t a in a Conference of 
Afro-Asian c o u n t r i e s . The Indian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . Foreign 
Min i s t e r Sardar Swaran Singh sugges ted t h a t t h e Soviet 
Union, which was an Asian power and which ever s ince t h e 
3andung Conference had suppor ted t h e Afro-Asian c o u n t r i e s 
and given them much a s s i s t a n c e , should be i n v i t e d t o t a k e 
p a r t in t h e con fe rence . But t h e Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Chen Yi 
objec ted t o t h e Indian p r o p o s a l , saying t h a t China 
was a g a i n s t i t because t h e Sovie t Union v/as not an Asian 
SI 
coun t ry . 
After J a k a r t a Conference , t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , 
Jawahar la l Nehru reviewed t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y of I n d i a , He 
r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e p o l i c y of non-a l ignrrent must be fo l lowed. 
He a s se s sed t h a t t h e r e would be a new age in t h e fo re ign 
po l i cy of non-a l ignment . 
'//hile c o n t i n u i t y with t h e p a s t remained in t h e shape 
of non-al ignment a s i g n i f i c a n t change came about in t h e form 
of much g r e a t e r emphasis than ever be fo r e on meeting t h e 
68 
needs of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . Before Chinese aggress ion 
Ind ia was ready t o face t h e t h r e a t from. P a k i s t a n in f u t u r e . 
67. Yuri Nasenko, n,. 18, p . 316. 
68. Bimal Prasad , "An Overview", I n t e r n a t i ona l S t u d i e s , 
Vo l .17 , no . 3-4, Ju ly December 1978, (New Delhi) p . 8 8 1 , 
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I t was f e a r l a s s from C h i r a ^ b u t a f t e r t h e C h i n e s e a g g r e -
s s i o n I n d i a s t a r t e d f u l l d e f e n c e p r e p a r e d n e s s a g a i n s t b o t h 
69 P a k i s t a n and C h i n a , 
Ind ia* s F o r e i g n P o l i c y Dur ing L a i Bahadur 3 h a s t r i and 
Mrs . I n d i r a Gandh i R u l e s : 
C h i n e s e n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n of 16 O c t o b e r 19 64 o n c e 
aga in h e i g h t e n e d I n d i a ' s p e r c e p t i o n of t h r e a t from C h i n a , 
I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y makers o r i e n t e d t h e i r d i p l o m a t i c 
e f f o r t s t o w a r d s e x p l o r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of o b t a i n i n g 
j o i n t g u a r a n t e e s from t h e n u c l e a r weapon pov;ers i n o r d e r 
t o s a f e g u a r d t h e c o u n t r y ' s s e c u r i t y . At a P r e s s C o n f e r e n c e 
in London on 4 December 19 64, t h e P r ime M i n i s t e r L a i Bahadur 
S h a s t r i s t a t e d t h a t : " I t was f o r t h e n u c l e a r power t o p r o -
v i d e some k i n d of g u a r a n t e e s which was n e e d e d n o t o n l y by 
7 1 I n d i a b u t a l s o by a l l o t h e r non n u c l e a r c o u n t r i e s . " L a t e r 
i n an a n o t h e r p r e s s C o n f e r e n c e , he s t r e s s e d t h e a t t i t u d e of 
n o n - n u c l e a r c o u n t r y in r e s p o n s e t o i t s s e c u r i t y n e e d . 
S9. I b i d . , p p . 8 8 1 - 8 2 , 
7 0 . P , S , Jaya Ramu, I n d i a ' s Na t iona l Secvirity and Foreign 
Pol i cy , ABC Pub l i sh ing House, New De lh i , 1987, 
pp , 53-54, 
7 1 . Foreign Af fa i r s Record, Vol . 10, no . 12, December fo re ign Art a i r s Kecoi 
19 64,(^N.. Delhi |p . 329 . 
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He said: 
I could not put in more p rec i se terms. 
I wanted to throw t h i s idea out for the 
considerat ion of the big nuclear pov/ers 
l i k e the U.S.A. and the U . S . S . R . . . . I 
have not suggested any kind of special 
guarantee, but i t i s for the nuclear 
powers to consider hovj tc iraintain peace 
72 in the world. 
In the context of Chinese nuclear t h r e a t to India* s 
securi ty in a pol icy statement on 4 May 1965, B.N. Chakravart i , 
an Indian delegates to the United Nations Disarmament Com-
mission proposed a f ive-point plan which included: (l) an _ " 
undertaking not t o use nuclear weapons against count r ies which 
do not possess them; and (2) an undertaking through the 
United Nations to safeguard the secur i ty of count r ies who may 
be threatened by powers having nuclear weapons capab i l i ty ; 
(3) an undertaking by non-nuclear pov/ers not to acquire or 
73 
manufacture nuclear weapons. India ' s support to the 
Gromyko proposal for the reduction of inte imat ional tens ions 
should also be viewed from the perspec t ive of I n d i a ' s i n t en -
t ion to work for el iminating the nuclear menance and to 
7 2. The Hindu (Madras) , 7 December 19 64. 
73. Fore'ign Affairs Record^ Vol. I I , no. 5, May 19 65, 
p . 88 . 
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strengthen i t s own nat ional secur i ty in the process , 
China* s nuclear explosions r e su l t ed in a pro-bomb 
thought in India . External Affair Minister Swaran Singh' s 
statement in the Lok Sabha on the subject : "the policy of 
making a bomb i s kept under constant reviev;." In any such 
reviev/, account has to be taken not only of the Chinese 
tes ts^ but also other re levant f ac to r s , e spec ia l ly the prog-
ress made in the discussions r e l a t i n g to nuclear disarmament 
74 in which many count r ies were p a r t i c i p a t i n g . He also noted 
that India was pushing ahead with and giving top p r i o r i t y to 
the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 
Re i te ra t ing India ' s option for nuclear weapons plan, 
Swaran Singh' s idea was tha t non p r o l i f e r a t i o n was not nece-
ssary for non-nuclear powers. The non-nuclear power would 
be agreed if the nuclear powers assured to give up t h e i r 
such p lan . In t h i s context he said before the Rajya Sabha: 
"To bring about an atmosphere of non-
pro l i fe ra t ion^ i t i s necessary t h a t the 
non-nuclear powers, should be assured by 
the miain nuclear powers tha t if they 
forego the programme of going ahead 
74. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.55, 10 May 19 66, (New Delhi) , 
Cols. 15712-13. 
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w i t h t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons, 
t h e y would not s u f f e r . U n l e s s t h a t 
a s s u r e n c e i s for thcoming and t h e r e i s 
conf idence and s a c r i f i c e on t h e p a r t of t h e 
n o n - n u c l e a r powers i n s t e p s t owards d i s a rma-
75 
m e n t / . . . n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s no t p o s s i b l e , » 
There was a change i n I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y d o c t r i n e when 
M,C, Chagla succeeded Swaran Singh, I n d i a under Chagla , 
gave up t h e p roposed g u a r a n t e e t h rough t h e U,N, s t a t i n g t h a t 
"before t h e S e c u r i t y Counci l even c a l l e d a meet ing we might 
be d e s t r o y e d . He announced t h a t I n d i a now hoped t o 
o b t a i n a j o i n t g u a r a n t e e from t h e U, s , and t h e U ,S , S,R, 
a g a i n s t n u c l e a r a t t a c k and s a i d t h a t P r e s i d e n t J o h n s o n ' s 
77 
s t a t e m e n t i n t h e t r e g a r d was no t enough. I n t h i s c o n t e x t , 
t h e Pr ime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a s t a t e d on 17 J u l y 1967 : 
We must r e a l i s e t h a t i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , 
t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of any such s h i e l d i n t h e 
f i e l d of s e c u r i t y would depend no t on t h e 
s p i r i t i n which p ro tec tec f power a c c e p t s 
75, Ra iva Sabha Deba t e s , Vol . 56 , n o , 7 , 1 1 May 1966 (New Delh 
Co l s , 1043-5 . 
76, The Hindus tan Times ^New D e l h i ) , 13 Apr i l 1967. 
77, A.G, Nooran i , " I n d i a ' s Quest f o r a Nuc lea r G u a r a n t e e " , 
Asian Survey, V o l , 7 , n o , 7 , J u l y 1967, p . 4 9 3 , 
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such a s h i e l d but on t h e n a t i o n a l and 
78 
v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of t h e g i v e r . 
Prom the above s ta tement given by t h e Prime I>linister, 
i t i s c l e a r t h a t i f t he n u c l e a r s h i e l d were t o be a v a i l a b l e 
t o Ind i a , i t would have been l a r g e l y t o se rve t h e i n t e r e s t s 
of t h e g i v e r c o u n t r i e s . I t i s a l so meant t h a t t h e r e would 
be demands on I n d i a t o allow a d i l u t i o n in i t s p o l i c y of 
non-al ignment which was not a c c e p t a b l e t o I n d i a . The u n w i l l -
ingness of support by both t h e U.S.A. and t h e U.S.S.R. t o 
I n d i a on i t s s e c u r i t y t h r e a t and a l so i t s own unpreparedness 
al lowed a d i l u t i o n of i t s p o l i c y of non-a l ignment which 
brought t o an end, I n d i a ' s search fo r s e c u r i t y g u a r a n t e e s . 
Thus, I nd i a ' s nuc l ea r op t ion s t r a t e g y impl ied c l e a r l y 
i t s r i g h t to make t h e bomb in t h e event of a n u c l e a r t h r e a t 
t o i t s s e c u r i t y . The r e j e c t i o n of t h e N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n 
Trea ty by Ind ia was not j u s t due t o t h e t r e a t y ' s unequal and 
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c h a r a c t e r but a r e sponse t o i t s s e c u r i t y 
t h r e a t e n e d by t h e Chinese n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n . 
The Kashmir i s s u e was r a i s e d again in t h e Uni ted 
Na t ions in 19 62 and 19 64 by Z a f a r u l l a h Khan and Z.A. Bhut to , 
7 8 . Lok Sabha Debates , Vol . 7, 7 J u l y 19 67, C o l s . 12422. 
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r e s p e c t i v e l y , M.C. Chagla r e i t e r a t e d t h a t Kashmir was 
a l r e a d y a p a r t of I n d i a and t h a t Ind ia would not pe rmi t t h e 
u n i t y , i n t e g r i t y and s o l i d a r i t y of t h e coun t ry t o be s a c r i -
f i c e d . He a l s o p o i n t e d out Pak is tan i i n f i l t r a t i o n wi th 
China . He s t r e s s e d t h e importance of Kashmir in t h e 
80 def©:ice s e t up of I n d i a . 
With t h e emergence of Qiina as a major power, Pak i s t an 
i n f i l t r a t e d wi th Peking. P r i o r t o 1963, t h e r e was a S ino-
Pak-Axis and t h e U.S.A. s i d e d t h e P a k i s t a n ' s s t and on ^ko. 
81 
Kashmir i s s u e i n t h e S e c u r i t y Counc i l . Both China and 
P a k i s t a n s i g n e d t h e boundary agreement on March 1963 vAxich 
marked t h e beginning of t h e i r s t r a t e g i c l i n k a g e s v i s - a - v i s 
I n d i a . By s i g n i n g t h i s agreement , P a k i s t a n ' s main o b j e c t i v e 
was t o e a rn C h i n a ' s suppor t t o i t s s t a n d on t h e Kashmir 
i s s u e . 
I t was a g a i n s t t h i s background t h a t Chou-Enlai 
v i s i t e d Pak i s t an in 1964 and made a d e c l a r a t i o n of Ch ina ' s 
suppor t t o P a k i s t a n ' s p l e a for s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r t h e 
79. Prakash Chandra, a* 13 . 
80 . Yuri Nasenko, ji . 18, p , 9 1 , 
8 1 . Ifeifil.' P» 92 , 
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82 people of Jamnu and Kashmir. Vftien Ayub Khan v i s i t e d 
Beijing in March 1965, the Chinese l eaders repor tedly assurence 
him of t h e i r suport to Pakistan in the event of an 
S3 Indian a t tack on them. Meanwhile, on 9 April 19 55, two 
Pakis tan i army b a t t a l i o n s advanced in to the Indian t e r r i t o r y 
84 at 3ardar Post in a massive way. Again on 2 6 April , 
Pakistan armed forces attacked the Indian border post at 
85 3iarbet with tanks and armoured veh ice l s . 
The Rann of Kutch incident crea ted considerable security 
tension in India , I t was under such circumstances 
t ha t Prime Minister Shastr i declared in the Lok Sabha : 
'^If Pakistan continues to discard reason 
and p e r s i s t s in i t s aggressive a c t i v i t i e s , 
our Army wil l defend the country and i t 
wi l l decide i t s own s t ra tegy and the employ-
ment of manpower in the manner in which i t 
, , .»8 6 
deems b e s t . 
B2. G.VJ. Choudhry, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the 
Ma-jor Powers ; P o l i t i c s of Divided Sub-Continent 
(New York,"" 1975), p". 181. 
23 . Ibi.d., p . 184. 
84. Russel Brines, Th,e _Indo::iP_al^lstani Confl ic t (London, 
19 68) , p . 288. 
S5, Ib id . 
8 6. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.42 (Third Se r i e s ) , 28 April 
19 65, ~ GolT 11579. 
36 
P a k i s t a n ' s s t r a t e g y f o r t h e s o - c a l l e d l i b e r a t i o n of 
Kashmi r was e x e c u t e d on 5 August 19 65 . -^Jhen P a k i s t a n 
87 
i n v a d e d Kashmi r i n T i t w a l , and K a r g i l s e c t o r s t h e P a k i s t a n i 
s t r a t e g y was t o i n f i l t r a t e t h e armed r a i d e r s i n t o 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n and i n t h e name of t h e p e o p l e of Kashmi r , 
s t a g e a r e b e l l i o n and o v e r t h r o w t h e Government and i n s t a l l 
88 i n i t s p l a c e a p r o - P a k i s t a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . P a k i s t a n i 
armed f o r c e s a t t a c k e d I n d i a n b a t t a l i a n h e a d q u a r t e r i n t h e 
K a r g i l - F o o n c h s e c t o r s on t h e I n d i a n s i d e of t h e c e a s e - f i r e 
89 l i n e . In t h e month of Sep tember 19 55, P a k i s t a n i t a n k s 
90 
r o l l e d i n t o t h e s o u t h e r n a r e a of Kashmiir. 
I t was u n d e r such a s i t u a t i o n t h a t I n d i a n d e f e n c e 
p o l i c y m a k e r s c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e o n l y way of s a f e g u a r d i n g 
t h e c o u n t r y ' s s e c u r i t y was t o c r o s s t h e c e a s e - f i r e l i n e and 
c h a s e away t h e i n v a d e r s . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e I n d i a n Army crossed 
t h e c e a s e - f i r e l i n e and c a p t u r e d P a k i s t a n i s t r a t e g i c 
9 1 p o s i t i o n s i n K a r g i l , T i t w a l and t h e K a j i p u r P a s s . By 
8 7 . D.R. Kankeka r , Twenty Tv/o F a t e f u l Days t P a k i s t a n Cu t 
t o S i z e (Bombay, 19 66) , p p . 184-9 6. 
8 8 . L . P . S i n g h , I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y : S h a s t r i P e r i o d 
(New D e l h i , 1 9 8 0 ) , p p . 7 0 - 7 1 . 
8 9 . D.R. h iankekar , 1^.87, p p . 1 9 4 - 6 . 
90. See the Head of the U.N. Observers Group Gen Kimmon* s 
report to the U.N. Secretary General, 8 September 
19 65, pp. 194-6. 
9 1 . Mankekar , n . 8 7 , p p . 7 1 - 7 5 and s ee a l s o Defence M i n i s -
t e r Chavan ' s s t a t e m e n t i n t h e Lok S a b h a . Lok Sabha 
D e b a t e s , V o l . 4 4 , 25 August 19 65 , C o l . 1778 . 
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capturing Pakis tani mi l i t a ry posts* Indian armed forces 
removed a constant t h r e a t t o I nd i a ' s s ecu r i t y . I t was a 
landmark improvement of the count ry ' s s ecu r i t y s i t u a t i o n 
I t had come to the not ice of the Government of India 
t h a t Pakistan was t ry ing to acquire and had received U.S. 
92 
arms, p a r t i c u l a r l y F-86 Submarine j e t f i g h t e r s . Pakistan 
had a l s o received 200 tanks from China. China a l so provided 
f inanc ia l ass i s tance t o Pakistan to obta in la rge quan t i t i e s 
of arms and ammunition. China a l so t r i e d i t s bes t t o help 
Pakistan by threatening to open another f ron t in the North-
East F ron t i e r across Sikkim. I t has acquired a number of 
F-86 a i r c r a f t from United Sta tes of America and MIG-19 and 
93 
MIG - 15 a i r c r a f t from China. 
Under such circumstances. Foreign Minis ter Swaran 
Singh t o l d the Rajya Sabha on 9 August 19 65, tha t the 
resumption of U.S. arms supply t o Pakistan was t o encourage 
Pakistan in i t s aggressive and h o s t i l e design agains t India. 
The supply of arms t o Pakistan, the re fore , posed a ser ious 
9 2. A^ian Recorder. 27 August, 2 September 1966 
(New Delhi) , p . 7254. 
93 . Foreign Affairs Recor^^. August 1966, pp. 214-15. 
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94 
t h r e a t to I n d i a ' s s ecu r i t y . 
The cen t r a l problem t o the Indian dec i s ion makers 
was how to deal with Pakistan. Due to l a rge ly i n t e r -
nat ional pressure and the hec t ic e f fo r t s of the '^^  
95 
Secretary General U-Thant/ the war came t o an early end. 
The cea se - f i r e came in to being on 22 September 1965. India 
held 750 sq. miles of Titwal , Kargil and Hajipur Pass, as 
aga ins t 210 sq. miles of Indian t e r r i t o r y held by 
96 
Pakis tan . Both India and Pakistan were in a pos i t ion to 
withdraw t h e i r forces from the borders . Mrs. GancJhi 
offered a no-wac-pact to 'Pak i s t an on 15th August 196-5, in 
order to r e l i e v e the tens ion and encourage a re turn to the 
process of de ten te . But Pakistan re jec ted i t on the ground 
t h a t Pakistan would have nothing t o do with a no-war-pact 
unless the outstanding issues were resolved. The continuatic 
of U.S. arms supply to Pakistan i n t ens i f i ed the tension 
between the two countries* 
The Soviet Government was fu l ly aware t h a t Pakistan 
94. T^X^ 
9 5. L.P. Singh, jx- 88, pp, 85-9 7. 
96 . Foreign Affairs Record. January 19 66, pp. 7-10. 
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had joined hands with the U.S. bloc as well as with China 
in order to make i t s e l f stronger v i s - a - v i s India and to 
solve the Kashmir issue with India from the pos i t ion of 
s t reng th . Against the background, Soviet Union f e l t i t 
necessary tha t in order to win the f r iendship of Pakistan 
97 
i t s pro-Indian stand on Kashmir i ssue was to be changed. 
That i s why during the Indo-Pak war of 19 65, Soviet Union 
adopted an a t t i t u d e of impar t i a l i t y towards the two countrias. 
Soviet Unior made an appeal to both count r ies on 
4 September 19 65 to stop mi l i t a ry operat ion and s e t t l e the 
98 dispute by peaceful means. The Soviet l eader Kosygin 
consulted Indian Prime Minister Shas t r i and Pakis tani President 
Ayub Khan to s t a r t negot ia t ion for the peaceful s e t t l e -
ment of d i spu te . He inv i ted them to meet in the Soviet 
Union and offered h i s good of f ices to bring rap id end of the 
99 
c o n f l i c t . The Taskhent Declaration was signed on January 
10, 19 66 for the termination of war and r e s t o r a t i o n of peace 
between India and Pakis tan. In t h i s way, the Soviet Union 
t r i e d i t s bes t to bring the two count r ies c lose r to each 
other and for t h a t i t adopted p o l i c i e s t ha t v;ould maintain 
i t s r e l a t i o n s with both coun t r i e s . At t ha t time the main 
97. Soviet News, September 21, 1964, (j-ioscow ) p . 186, 
98. Ministry of External Affairs Documents on China ' s 
Ultimatum to India, (New Delhi, 19*6^ , p . 12. 
59. Soviet Nev/s- September 20, 19 65, p . 125. 
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ob jec t ive of Soviet policy towards South Asia was to bu i ld 
up both India and Pakistan . a s tab le peace area as a 
counterpoise to China. But Pakistan i n s i s t e d tha t to improve 
i t s r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan ^ the Soviet Government was 
to stop mi l i t a ry ass is tance to India . The Soviet Gcvernn-ient 
did not want to take any action to improve i t s r e la t ions 
with Pakistan at the cost of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with India but 
at the same time they did not wish to undermine the i r newly 
e s t a b l i s h fr iendship with Pakistan, therefore , they thought 
t h a t an arm.s deal with Pakistan -.vould permit them to maintain 
t h e i r bridges with tha t country ser iously j o l t i n g the i r r e l a -
t i o n s with India . That i s why Soviet Government concluded 
an agreement for Soviet m i l i t a ry aid to Pakistan in July 19 68. 
The Soviet mi l i t a ry aid to Pakistan caused conceim to 
India because t h i s move was beyond I n d i a ' s expectat ions. But 
India did not question the Soviet Union' s r igh t fcr such 
action because i t r ea l i zed tha t the U.S. mi l i t a ry aid to 
Pakistan or Pak i s t an ' s f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with U.Si was more 
dangerous to India as Pakistan ' s r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet 
Union. India did not oppose the Soviet decision tc rearm 
Pakistan because India did not break i t s re la t ionsh ip with 
the Soviet Union. India r ea l i zed tha t the Soviet-?ak friend-
ship was not against India but as a counterpoise to China, 
41 
and Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s have remained co rd i a l . The v i s i t 
by Air Marshal Noor Khan, Chief of Pakistan Air Force to 
Peking in July 19 69 caused alarm both in India and Soviet 
Union. They r ea l i zed as well as strengthened the i r old deep 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
While non-alignment continued but new defence conscioas-
ness made ' India ' 6 foireign pol icy mora and more pragmatic 
and l e s s d o c t r i n a i r e . I t v/as a new trend which brought 
India much c lose r to the Soviet Union tha t ever before. Indo-
Soviet r e l a t i o n s had already became qui te friendly and 
during the Chinese aggression Soviet Union adopted an a t t i -
tude of i i n p a r t i a l i t i e s . which became the main stay of Ind ia ' s 
po l icy of non-alignment, Br i t a in and the United States, of 
course immediately offered t h e i r support to India, but in the 
configurat ion of in te rna t iona l p o l i t i c s in 19 62, t h i s was 
101 only to be expected. China and the Soviet Union were 
moving towards a s p l i t , but t h i s was not known tc others 
and in 19 62 the world expected them to pu l l together as the 
leading communist count r ies , bound by the clossest f ra ternal 
t i e s , when one of them became involved in a confl ict with a 
10 2 t h i r d country. However, the Soviet Union did not support 
100. Bimal Prasad, ji. 68, p . 882. 
101. Ib id . , p . 883. 
10 2. Ib id . 
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China aga ins t I nd i a and by providing ass i s t ance and supporrt 
to I nd i a proved t h a t the Soviet Union would continue f r iendly 
with Ind ia i n s p i t e of Chinese h o s t i l i t i e s to Ind ia , 
After 1965 war, na t iona l s e c u r i t y became the dominant 
104 
among I n d i a ' s foreign po l i cy o b j e c t i v e s . When af ter 1965, 
I nd i a prepared a long term plan to improve and modeniize i t s 
defences, i t f i r s t turned to the United S t a t e s , However, 
the United S t a t e s showed i t s unwi l l ingness towards India 
because of t he pleading of Pakis tan and i t s supporters in 
Pentagon, though i t continued to provide such mi l i t a ry weapons 
105 to Pakis tan , The a t t i t u d e of B r i t i s h Government tc 
Indian reques t was a lso more o r l e s s the same. The Government 
of I nd i a then out of sheer nece s s i t y turned to the Soviet 
Union and asked the Soviet Government for some sophis-
t i c a t e d weapons. The Soviet Union gave Ind ia not only t h a t 
what i t wanted but much more to s t rengthen and modernize i t s 
defence capac i ty . This put the Indo-Soviet friendship 
103, Devendra Kaushik, Soviet Re la t ions with Ind ia and 
Pak is tan , Vikas Publ ish ing House, New Delhi, 1974, 
pp.69-72, 
104, Dr. Iqbal Khanam, "Indo-Soviet Re la t ions" , Indian 
Journal of P o l i t i c s , Vol. ' -VIII, no, 3-4,September-
December 1984, p ,122 , 
105, Bimal Prasad, n. 68 ,p .883 , 
1C6, K,P, S, Menon, The Indo-Soviet Treaty.. Vikas Public-
a t i o n s , New Delhi , 1972, pp, 149-55. 
43 
107 
on more s o l i d f o u n d a t i o n . 
The S v i e t s u p p o r t t o I n d i a was n o t t o l e r a b l e f o r 
P a k i s t a n . I t movad t o U . S . A . f o r t h e same. The US P r e s i d e n t 
Nixon showed g r e a t e r sympathy t o P a k i s t a n ' s a p p e a l f o r p a r i t y 
i n d e f e n c e w i t h I n d i a . In O c t o b e r 1970; P r e s i d e n t Nixon 
announced t o s u p p l y arms t o P a k i s t a n . The o f f i c i a l e x p l a n a t i o n 
f o r t h e c h a n g e i n US p o l i c y was t h a t t h e w i t h o l d i n g of a i d s t o 
108 
P a k i s t a n had n o t b r o u g h t p e a c e i n t h e f ' t i b - c o n t i n e n t . The 
a s s i s t a n c e of arms t o P a k i s t a n by t h e U . S . A . was m o t i v a t e d t o 
c o u n t e r - b a l a n c e S o v i e t s u p p o r t t o I n d i a , P a k i s t a n h e l p e d t o 
n o r m a l i s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a . In J u l y 1 9 7 1 , Henry K i s s i n g e r 
109 
v i s i t e d P e k i n g v i a R a w a l p i n d i . P a k i s t a n p l a y e d a r o l e 
of middleman i n i m p r o v i n g S ino-US r e l a t i o n s v/hich c u l m i n a t e d 
i n S i n o - U S - P a k i s t a n a l i g n m e n t a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t Union and 
I n d i a . 
East Pakistan Crisisi 
Meanwhi le i n 1 9 7 1 , t h e r e d e v e l o p e d a c i v i l war i n 
E a s t P a k i s t a n a g a i n s t t h e gove rnmen t o f V/est P a k i s t a n . 
1 0 7 . Khan am, n_. 10 4, p . 122 . 
1 0 8 . The Dawn, O c t o b e r 7 , 1 9 7 1 . 
1 0 9 . Lok Sabha D e b a t e s , V o l . I l l , n o . 7 , 10 ^ g u s t , 1 9 7 1 . 
110 . Khanam, n_. 104, p . 1 2 3 . 
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The Sovie t Union was t h e f i r s t among t h e major powers which 
condemned P a k i s t a n ' s army a c t i o n in East Pak i s t an and t o 
i n d i c a t e t o Pak i s t an of i t s d i s app rova l of t h e a t r o c i t i e s 
which P a k i s t a n i s o l d i e r s were i n f l i c t i n g on t h e c i v i l i a n s of 
East P a k i s t a n . But t h e appeal of t h e Sovie t Union was 
ignored by t h e P a k i s t a n i m i l i t a r y r u l e r s and they con t inued 
t h e i r o f f e n s i v e s t e p s wi th t h e h e l p of U.S.A. and China . In 
East Pak i s t an t h e r e was an open massac re . An i n f l u x of 
112 
P a k i s t a n i r e f u g e e s . ( sho -^m below In t h e t a b l e ) in I n d i a 
put a heavy burden on t h e Indian economy and t h r e a t e n e d t h e 
peace and s e c u r i t y of t h e coun t ry which was not p o s s i b l e t o ba 
b e a r . 
j S t a t e s 
L _ 
1 
j West Bengal 
T r i p u r a 
Meghalaya 
Assam 
1 
Bihar 
To ta l 
In Gamp 
4,948,598 
879,746 
573,630 
20 6,278 
9,282 
6,17,534 
Out of Camp 
2,224,560 
523,630 
73,325 
85,289 
-
2,926,478 
1 
Tota l in S t a t e s 
7 , 193, 158 
1,403,046 
4 64,9 65 
291,561 
9,282 
9 ,544 ,012 
111 . Pravda, (Moscow), April , 4 , 1 9 7 1 . 
112. R.C. Gupta, U^S.__PoJL_icY.jrqwards._In_^^ 
B.R. P u b l i s h i n g Company, New I ^ l h i , 1*97 2, p . 7 9 . 
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There was an urgent need to stC3p the bloodshed or suppres-
s ion aga ins t humanity. There was no choice but t o act^ 
but i t would have been unwise t o a c t without support 
from a super power because Pakistan had threa tened to 
go t o war with India and United Sta tes had warned 
India t h a t i t would not si:5>port India in the event because 
113 
China was helping Pakistan in such war." 
The Conclusion of the Inc^o-Soviet Treatv of 19 71: 
I t was under such condit ions t ha t India contacted 
t h e Soviet Union for he lp . The Soviet Government were fu l ly 
aware of Indian d i f f i c u l t i e s and r ea l i zed the need to help 
Ind ia . The Soviet Foreign Minis ter , Andre Gtoroyko a r r ived in 
New Delhi on 8 August and on 9 August I971^the Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded between the two 
114 
c o u n t r i e s . 
The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 19 71 was p a r t l y pra i sed and 
p a r t l y c r i t i c i s e d . I t was warmly welcomed in India by publ ic 
opinion. The Chr i s t i an Science Monitor wrote in an e d i t o r i a l 
113. Vijay Sen Ehudraj, "Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh", 
Asian Survey. May 1973, (Berkeley), pp. 486-87. 
114. The Statesman. 10 August 1971 (New Delhi ) . 
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with h e i g h t e n i n g " t e n s i o n on t h e b o r d e r between I n d i a and 
Eas t P a k i s t a n , Russ i a had now warned Pek ing t h a t i f open con-
f l i c t s were t o e r u p t i t would be s q u a r e l y on I n d i a ' s s i d e , "-
The G u a r d i a n ' s o p i n i o n was t h a t i t ha s r a i s e d i r o n i c a l l y 
o n l y t h e p r o s p e c t of more enmity , war and d i s a s t e r t o t h e 
..117 
s u b - c o n t i n e n t . The I n d i a n Express s a i d i t "a r e s p o n s e 
t o t h e deve lop ing s i t u a t i o n i n t h e I n d i a n s u b - c o n t i n e n t . 
The Hindus tan Times adv i sed t h a t bo th I n d i a and USSR should t r y 
118 t o **dissolve t h e v;ar c l o u d s o v e r hanging t h i s c o n t i n e n t . " 
K. KamaraJ, a Congress l e a d e r s a i d , " i t vrould no t o n l y 
c o n s o l i d a t e t h e f r i e n d s h i p between t h e two c o u n t r i e s b u t he lp 
119 t h e cause of peace i n Asia and t h e World," C. Raj agopafecbari 
welcomed t h e T r e a t y and b e l i e v e d t h a t P r e s i d e n t Yahya Khan 
120 
could n o t f a i l t o be impres sed by t h i s development . 
The J a n a Sangh was doub t fu l whether I n d i a would be 
121 
a b l e t o t a k e a c t i o n i n E a s t P a k i s t a n . The E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s 
115. C h r i s t i a n Sc ience Monitor^ "With Eyes of Pek ing" 
11 August , 1971 . 
116. The Guardian (London) "On t h e Bengal Border" 10 August 1971, 
117. I n d i a n Express "Indo - S o v i e t T rea ty"10 August 1971. 
118. The Hindus tan Times "A T r e a t y of P e a c e " , 10 August 1971. 
119. P a t r i o t , 10 August 1971 (New D e l h i ) . 
120. I b i d . 
121. A,B, Vajpayee , "Doubt E x p r e s s e d " , Times of I n d i a , 
10 August 1981( New D e l h i ) . 
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M i n i s t e r of India^Swaran Singh tolf i t h e Lok Sabha on' 10 
August t h a t t h e Trea ty d id not debar I nd i a from t a k i n g any 
12? 
u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n on Bangladesh. 
Jayaprakash Narayan h a i l e d t h e Trea ty as t h e s u r e s t 
p o s s i b l e g u a r a n t e e of peace in South Asia . "The powerful 
b a s t i o n of peace w i l l ac t as a c e r t a i n d e t e r r e n t t o warmon-
123 g e r s in Islamabad o r t h e i r a l i e s " he s a i d . A former Foreign 
M i n i s t e r , .M.G. Ghagla , d e s c r i b e d i t as " t h a t b e s t news we have 
had for a long t i m e . " An o p p o s i t i o n l e a d e r , S.N, Mishra 
s a i d in support of t h e Trea ty t h a t " I n d i a had been dr iven to 
t a k e t h i s s t e p because of t h e s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e d by Pak i s t an 
backed by U.S.A. and China . ""^^^ 
The S o c i a l i s t viewed t h e s i ' jn i i ig of t h e Trea ty a " h i s -
t o r i c d e v i a t i o n " from t h e p o l i c y of non-a l ignment . The t r e a t y 
migh tg ive Russia a scope fo r ex tend ing i t s b a s e s in t h e Indian 
Ocean, The p a r t y doubted t h e long term goal of Indo-Sovie t . 
T rea ty and h e l d i t an ano ther Tashkent f o r I nd i a wi thout 
122. kQ.^_2.abh,a_Debat_es., Vol . 7 , no . 57, 10 August 1971, 
Cof s . 3 fo ' -43 . "~ 
123. P a t r i o t , 10 August 1971. 
124. The Times of Ind ia , 10 August 197 1. 
125. I b i d . 
12 5, Samar Guha, Speeches in Lok Sabha, J a n a t a , 19 Sep-
tember, 1971, (New Delhi) p . 12. 
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1 71 f i g h t i n g a war o r p a r t i a l l y w i n n i n g i t . 
The I n d o - 3 o v i e t T r e a t y of p e a c e and F r i e d n s h i p was 
c r i t i c i s e d b o t h i n P a k i s t a n and C h i n a . Former P a k i s t a n i Pr ime 
M i n i s t e r , Z.A. B h u t t o d e s c r i b e d i t " a p a c t of a g g r e s s i o n 
a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n and C h i n a . " He a l s o s t r e s s e d t h a t ' • I s l amabad 
128 
s h o u l d t a k e s e r i o u s n o t i c e of i t . " P a k i s t a n ' s Ambassador 
t o t h e U . S . , Agha S h a h i d e c l a r e d i t an " a t t a c k on P a k i s t a n " 
and s t a t e d t h a t i t was a ' d e f e n c e p a c t ' be tween t h e two 
129 
c o u n t r i e s which would p r o v i d e arms t o I n d i a a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n . 
The P a k i s t a n Times d e s c r i b e d i t a s : 
"a d e l i b e r a t e move t o c r e a t e s i t u a t i o n i n 
which I n d i a may f e e l f r e e t o a t t a c k P a k i s t a n 
w i t h t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h e S o v i e t Commitment 
t o go t o t h e a i d of I n d i a would p r o v i d e a 
d e t e r e n t t o any C h i n e s e i n t e r v e n t i o n on o u r 
b e h a l f . "^^° 
C h i n a a l s o d i d n o t l i k e t h e T r e a t y . To t h e P e o p l e s 
R e p u b l i c of C h i n a i t was n o t a ' f r i e n d l y a c t ' a s f a r a s i t 
127 . B r i j Mohan Toofan , "The Die i s C a s t , L a n e n t i s of no 
a v a i l " , J a n a t a , 24 O c t o b e r 197 1, p p . 8 - 9 . 
1 2 8 . S a s t A f r i c a n S t a n d a r d ( N a i r o b i ) , 12 Ajgus t 197 1. 
1 2 9 . The Hindu, 17 August 1 9 7 1 . 
130 . The P a k i s t a n Times 11 Augus t 19 7 1 . 
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was concerned. •"• ^ The U.S.S.R. was not worried by the r e -
act ion of Pakistan and China. The Soviet Premier A. Gromyko 
warned them in a meeting of the Supreme Soviet t h a t they 
would in future have to reckon with the Indo-Soviet Treaty 
with a l l i t s impl ica t ion .^ 
I t was f e l t t ha t the Treaty was signed to meet the 
t h r e a t of war from Pakistan and to f ind a solut ion of the 
East-Pakistan c r i s i s . China as a common foe of both the 
U.S.S.R. and India had prompted the signing of the Treaty. 
Thus, the Indo-Soviet Treaty was not a defence pac t . 
Swaran Singh, the Defence Minister said : 
"This should act as a deterent to any pov/ers 
t h a t may have aggressive designs on our t e r r i -
t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and sovereighty. "''••^  
Y.B. Chavan declared i t "a valuable fac tor in s t reng-
thening the forces of peace and s t a b i l i t y in our reg ion . " 
According to him i t was the deep commitment to peaceful 
13!• The Hindu, 4 October 197 1. 
13 2, The Times of India, 17 October 1971. 
133. D.R. Mankekar, " . . . S t a y s our hand on Bangladesh. . . " in 
A.P. Ja in , ed. . Shadow of the Bear ; The Indo-Soviet 
Treaty, Vikas Publ ica t ions , New Delhi, 1971, p . 5 1 . 
134. The Times of India, 10 Ajgust 1971. 
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exis tence and the determination to char t out an independent 
course of our own tha t had found i t s expression in India ' s 
135 pol icy of non-alignment. In fac t , i t respected our 
pol icy of non-alignment and affirmed tha t i t c o n s t i t u t e s an 
important fac tor in the maintenance of universa l peace,^^^ 
Therefore, i t helped to end the war- l ike atmosphere 
in the Indian sub-continent and also checked the Indo-Pakistan 
c o n f l i c t of December 1971, I t had assured India of tim.ely 
helped if some foreign powers would intervene in the c r i s i s 
and take step against India, 
The main purpose of the Treaty was to safeguard 
India* s s ecu r i t y . I t was not contrary to India' s policy of 
137 
non-alignment. Ar t ic le IV of the Treaty has e n t i t l e d ' 
India to follow i t s pol icy of non-alignment. I t was not a 
m i l i t a r y option against Pakistan but a r e f l ec t ion of the 
degree to which i t was widely perceived as serving the country's 
v i t a l nat ional i n t e r e s t , . I t helped India to e s t a b l i s h 
specia l r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet Union to counterbalance the 
Washington - Beijing Axis to Islamabad. 
135. Y.B. Chavan, India* s Foreign Policy, Somaiya Publ i -
ca t ions New Delhi , p . 210. 
13 6. Ib id . 
137. K.P. Misra, "The Treaty and I n d i a ' s Securi ty Problem", 
Indian Express, 25 Ajgust 1971, 
C H A P T E R - I I 
The Indo-Fal: VJar of 1971 and I n d i a ' s 
Foreign Pol icy i n the Context of 
Na t iona l .Secur i ty , 
CHAPTER - I I 
INDO.PAK WAR OF 19 71 AND INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COKIEXT 
OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
Pre-war .Situation, : 
The East Pakistan c r i s i s of 1971 escala ted in to a war 
between India and Pakistan and resu l ted u l t ima te ly in the 
emergence of an independent nation i . e . Bangladesh. India 
emerged as an eminent power in South Asia, and the period of 
197 1 became a landmark in Ind i a ' s foreign pol icy and i t s 
secur i ty environment. This was sought to be done by ending 
Pak i s t an ' s quest for p a r i t y with India ar>r\ a l t e r ing the balance 
of power in the region in I n d i a ' s favour Jy signing the Indo-
Sovlet Treaty o£ Peace and Friendship of 1971. 
The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship provided to India 
the necessary s t r a t e g i c reassurance at a tima when a s t r a t e g i c 
t r i a n g l e cons i s t ing of China, the Unitad Sta tes and Pakistan 
posed a ser ious th rea t to i t s s ecu r i t y . 
I n d i a ' s concerns about Pak i s t an ' s in t en t ions began to 
come t rue in l a t e October when massive war prepara t ions were 
seen by India in Pakis tan. Pakistan had every in tent ion of 
waging a war on India but India t r i e d i t s bes t to avoid a war. 
Mrs. Indi ra Gandhi in a Press Conference on 19 October 1971 
said tha t ' t h e s i t ua t i on on border i s 'grave one' but India 
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w i l l do everything to avoid war with Pakis tan. 
The v i o l a t i o n of border by Pak i s t an i so ld i e r s and clashes 
between the forces of the two count r ies increased day by day. 
Pakis tan r e so r t ed v i o l a t i o n by an a i r a t t ack in Punjab on 
2 November. The Governinent of India p ro tes ted agains t the 
2 
Pak i s t an i a i r a t t a ck . 
Pakistan wanted to get help from China in i t s war with 
I n d i a . Therefore, Z.A. Bhutto went to Peking on 6 November to 
d iscuss b i l a t e r a l matters with Premier Chou-Knlai. The v i s i t 
was a p a r t of a chain in the regular consu l t a t ion between China 
3 
and Pakistano The main purpose of the v i s i t was t o get an assu-
rance from the Peoples Republic of China for the simply of 
weapons in case of Indo-Pak war and to consul t whether war should 
4 
be s t a r t e d or not . Z.A. Bhutto, during h is v i s i t to Peking, t o l d 
Chinese new r epo r t e r s t h a t : 
"If a war did break out between India and 
Pakis tan, i t would be t o t a l v;ar and ' house 
to house con f l i c t ' , and the water of Indus 
5 
would be red as a r e s u l t of the bloodshed." 
!• The Statesman, 20 October 1971, 
2. The Statesman, 2 November 19 71; see also the Hindustan Times 
"Pacing upto Danger", 3 November 1971, 
3 . The. Statesman, 6 November 19 71 . 
4 . Ibi<a, 
5. I b i d . , 9 November 19 71. 
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On his re turn from Peking, Z.A. Bhutto sa id t h a t he was 
"more than s a t i s f i e d " and announced t h a t : 
"Vfe are in fu l l p repara t ion to maintain 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y agains t foreign 
6 
aggress ion." 
Meanwhile» Pres ident Yahya Khan, in an interview with the Columbia 
Broadcasting System sa id t ha t in the event of an a t tack; China 
7 
would ce r t a in ly intervene and help Pakistan in every poss ib le way. 
By making such statements the Pak i s tan i leaders wanted to harass 
I nd i a t h a t the Sino - Pakistan Axis v;as s t rong . He also wanted 
to boost the morale of the people of Pakistan by giving them the 
impression tha t China was with Pakistan and if the Indo-Pakistan 
8 
war break out* China would help Pakis tan . 
Skirmishes continued between the two countr ies* India too 
r e p l i e d to the Pakis tan i a i r a t t ack and p ro t e s t ed aga ins t i t s 
a t t a c k . But Pakis tan continued i t s e f fo r t s to cowdown India, On 
15 November* Pak i s t an i troops f i r e d from Alinagar on border areas 
in Tripura. On 17 November^they intruded into the eas t e rn 
and western borders and k i l l e d many c i v i l i a n s in these a r ea s . 
They also f i r ed on eas te rn border areas in F^mghat, West Bengal, 
6 . The Statesman, 9 November 19 71 . 
7* Incg i^an^ Express, 9 November 19 71. 
R.S. Shanna, '^Peking-Pindi", The P a t r i o t , 27 November 1971. 
8. S.S. Bindra, Indj -Pakis tan Relat ions Tashkent to Simla 
Agreement, Deep and Deep Publ ica t ions , New Delhi, 1981.p. 172. 
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But on 22 November, the Indian Air Forces chased away Pak i s t an i 
i n t rude r s when they were crossing in to the Indian a i r space over 
Boyra/ in West Bengal and l a t e r on they were shot down by the 
9 Ind ian t roops . 
On 23 November 1971, Pres ident Yahya Khan proclaimed a 
s t a t e of emergency in the country to face the t h r e a t from the 
s i d e of Indie to gain the sympathy of the world opinion t h a t 
10 
Pakis tan was to face an undeclared war from Ind ia . 
In Ind ia , on the same day the P o l i t i c a l -Afifairs Committee 
11 
of the Union Cabinet reviewed the s i t u a t i o n , and Mrs. Ind i ra 
Gandhi declared in Parliament t h a t her Government would not declare 
a s t a t e of emergency unless fu r ther aggressive ac t ion by Pakistan 
compelled her to do so. She sa id tha t troops coxald novj cross the 
12 
border i f necessary in se l f defence. 
On 25 November, President Yahya Klian said tha t "current 
s i tue. t ion" had brought h i s count ry ' s r e l a t i o n s with India to the 
po in t of no r e tu rn . He accused India of having dis turbed the 
peace in the sub-cont inent and declared tha t the Chinese Govern-
ment had assured the Government of Pakistan for i t s ' f u l l support* 
9 . Indian Express, 18 November IP71. 
10. The Statesman, 24 rtovember 19 7 1 . 
1 1 ' Ib id . 
12. Daily Telegraph,f Calcut ta)25 November 1971. 
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1 3 
a y a i n s t any iforciyn a g g r e s s i o n i on the same day i " ^^  r ad io 
b r o a d c a s t / Yahya Khan s a i d : " i f Mrs. Gandhi t h i n k s t h o t she i s 
going t o cow me dov/n I r e fuse to t ake i t . " He a l s o t o l d newsmen 
t h a t in t e n cays " I might not be in Ravjalpandi, but w i l l be off 
14 
f i g h t i n g a war . " Radio P a k i s t a n c a l l e d and addressed the s o l d i e r s 
as Mujahids of P a k i s t a n t h a t to be ready fo r ' j e h a d ' and a l s o 
15 
a d v e r t e d t h a t \%>e have many debts ro repay tl^iem. 
I t was under such c o n d i t i o n s t l ia t Mrs. Gandhi i n a b roadcas t 
to the n a t i o n d e c l a r e d : 
" t h a t today a var in East Bengal has become 
a war on I n d i a . This h?s been imposed upon 
me/ my Government and the peop le of Ind ia a 
g r e a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . We have no o t h e r o p t i o n 
but t o p u t our c o u n t r y on a war f o o t i n g . Our 
brave o f f i c e r s and jav^ans ^^ ^ t h e i r pos t a re 
mob i l i s ed for the defence of t h e c o u n t r y , . . . We 
are p r e p a r e d for a l l e v e n t u a l i t i e s . " 
13 . The Hindus_tan Times/ 26 November 19 7 1 . 
14 . The Hi.nd_U? t^an Tim^j?. 2R No'vember 19 7 1 . 
1 5 . The Hindustan Times, 4 November 197] . 
1 6 . Mrs. Gandhi, The Years of Endeavour Sele.cted _Spe.e.ch$^S/ 
August 1969-1972, P u b l i c a t i o n s D i v i s i o n , M i n i s t r y of"* 
In format ion and Broadcas t ing , Government of I n d i a , New 
De lh i , 1975, p . 590. 
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Pakistan had already posed a war on India, but India t r i e d 
i t s best to avoid a war. India was ready to accept any offer of 
good of f ices to diffuse tens ion. But a fu l l f ledged war s t a r t e d 
between India and Pakistan on 3 December 1971 v^hen the Pakis tani 
A i r Force and ground t r o o p s launched a massive a t tack on the 
Western Front of Indian border. An emergency was declared in the 
17 
n ight of 3 December 1971, in India . All the three forces viz 
Indian Army, The Air Force and the Navy were able to check the 
1 8 P a k i s t a n i offensive ac t ion e f f ec t i ve ly . 
The Role of US and China in the War of 1971 : 
The U.S. s ided with Pakistan during the war in 
and ou ts ide the United Nations. When the war began the U.S. 
cance l led arms" s ipply to India and Pakis tan. But during the 
war the U.S. arms continued to be suppl ied to Pakis tan through 
Jordan and Gulf coun t r i e s . The American Aai:iinistration a lso 
19 
suppl ied 30 mi l l ion worth m i l i t a r y aid to Pakis tan . 
17o Mrs. Gandhi, _nu. 16. 
18. Mo ha mn ad Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, The Libera t ion pf Mar 
Bombay 1972, pp. 213-38. 
19» Vinod Gupta, Anderson Papers - A Study of Nixon's Blg^ckmail 
of Ind ia ,De lh i , 1972, pp. 91-2. 
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T h e r e were so many r e a s o n s o f N i x o n ' s s i p p o r t t o P a k i s t a n . 
20 
F i r s t l y / he wanted t o make a s u c c e s s o f h i s China v i s i t . S e c o n d l y , 
U . S . p l a y e d s u c h a r o l e b e c a u s e o f t h e S o v i e t m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l 
s u p p o r t t o I n d i a and t h e S o v i e t ' s s u c c e s s i n n e u t r a l i s i n g China 
21 d u r i n g v/ar. T h i r d l y * a g a i n s t t h e b e c k g r o u n d of P a k i s t a n ' s 
e f f o r t s t o m e d i a t e b e t w e e n U.S . and China i n n o r m a l i s i n g t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s , U .S . w a n t e d to p l e a s e P a k i s t a n . F o u r t h l y , U . S . w a n t e d 
t o a v o i d i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e I n d i a n s u b - c o n t i n e n t . S i n c e t h e U .S . 
e n t e r a n c e i n t o m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h P a k i s t a n i n 19 54 , i t h a d 
a d o p t e d an a t t i t u d e of e q u a l i z i n g P a k i s t a n w i t h I n d i a t o c h e c k 
22 
t h e i n f l u e n c e of co imiun i s t powers i n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t . F i f t h l y , 
U . S . d i d n o t l i k e t o d i s a r m P a k i s t a n b e c a u s e s i n c e 19 54, P a k i s t a n 
h a d been l e n d i n g s ^ p o o r t t o U.S . on v i t a l i s s u e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
23 
p o l i t i c s b o t h i n and o u t s i d e t h e U.N. S i x t h l y , U.S . d i d n o t 
w a n t I n d i a t o emerge a s a s t r o n g power and t h e r e f o r e had t o have 
24 
some o t h e r s t a t e t o b a l a n c e i t s p o w e r . 
2 0 . S.M. Burka, " I n d o - P a k i s t a n F b s t War Dip lomacy" , A s i a n S u r v e y , 
V o l . X I I I , No. 1 1 , November 1 9 7 3 , ( B e r k e l e y ) , p . 1047 . 
2 1 . Khursheed Hyder , " U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e I n d o - P a k War of 19 7 1 " , 
P a k i s t a n H o r i z o n , V o l . XXI, No. l , 1972 , p p . 6 7 - 7 1 . 
2 2 . R.C. Gup ta , U.S.. Poj. i c y Towards I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , B.R. 
P u b l i s h i n g Conpany, D e l h i , 1977 , p . 104 . 
2 3 . I b i d . 
24« L e e l a Yadava, " U . S . A t t i t u d e Towards t h e B e n g l a d e s h War", 
K u r u k s h e t r a U n i v e r s i t y R e s e a r c h J o u r n a l . Vo l . IX, No. i & 2 , 
1 9 7 5 , p . 216 . 
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The U.S. Task Force was s e n t t o t h e Bay of Bengal on 
14 December 1971 a t a c r i t i c a l phase of the I n d o - P a k i s t a n War 
25 
and i t v/as a show of f o r c e . The U.S. evacua ted i t s n a t i o n a l s 
from Bangladesh. Anderson s a i d , " the e v a c u a t i o n of American 
c i t i z e n s was s t r i c t l y a secondary mi s s ion , adopted t o j u s t i f y the 
r e a s o n f o r t h e naval move i n t o the Bay of Bengal ." He b e l i e v e d 
t h a t t h e mi s s ion was a p a r t of t h e American des ign and meant t o 
26 
s c a r e I n d i a . The main aim of the Task Force was t o f r i g h t e n 
I n d i a and t o lower the morale of t h e Ind i an Armed F o r c e s . I t was 
r e p o r t e d t h a t even the U.S. ambassador t o I nd i a was not aware of 
. 27 
t h e movement of t h e E n t e r p r i s e . 
The U.S. p o l i c y towards Indo-Pak v;ar of 19 71 was desc r ibed 
by C . P . I , l e a d e r , Hiren Mukherjee as "mischlr vious a r r o g a n t and 
28 
i n s o l a n t . " R.K. S inha , S e c r e t a r y of t h e Congress P a r l i a m e n t a r y 
P a r t y , d e c l a r e d 'we w i l l no t be cov;ed down by the Sino-American 
29 
c o l l u s i o n . Jyo t i rmoy Basu (C.P.M.) d e s c r i b e d Nixon ' s move as 
" m i s c h i e v i o u s " . He s a i d , " t h i s was a very s e r i o u s m a t t e r and 
30 
p o s e d a t h r e a t to I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . " 
25 . I n t e r n a t i o n a l Herald Tr ibune , Washington, 21 Apr i l 1972. 
26 . Washington P o s t , 21 December 1971. 
2 7 . The Mother land, 1 Jamuary 197 2 
2 8 . Lok Sabha Debates , Vol. X, no. 23, Dec. 1971; Co l s . 13 . 
2 9 . I b i d . , Co l s . 15-17. 
3 0 . I b i d . , Co l s . 2 - 3 , 
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The U.S. a t t i t u d e dur ing t h e war was most r e p r e h e n s i v e . 
The s e l f s t y l e d defender of democracy- t h e United S t a t e s of 
America suppor t ed P a k i s t a n m i l i t a r y j un t a who were c rush ing 
democracy by a l l means in the c o u n t r y . 
China was t h e o t h e r f r i e n d o r s u p p o r t e r of P a k i s t a n dur ing 
t h e 1971 War. China d e c l a r e d t h e E a s t - P a k i s t a n c r i s i s as an 
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of P a k i s t a n . Bbth U.S. and China coopera ted wi th 
each o t h e r to ex tend t h e i r suppor t t o P a k i s t a n . There were movements 
of Chinese t r oops near t h e Indian borders whi le t h e U.S. Seventh 
F l e e t was s e n t to the Bay of Bengal. Thus, both U.S. and China 
31 
were a c t i n g a g a i n s t I n d i a ' s l and and sea f r o n t i e r s . 
China openly denounced S o v i e t - I n d i a n c o l l u s i o n and accused 
Moscow of s u p p o r t i n g I n d i a wi th " m i l i t a r y p r o v o c a t i o n s " and 
32 
" s u b v e r s i v e a c t i v i t i e s " towards P a k i s t a n . 
The U.N. ' s General Assembly and the S e c u r i t y Council were 
q u i c k l y t ransformed i n t o a hub of Chinese p r o t e s t on behalf of 
33 
P a k i s t a n . China d e c l a r e d i t s open s i p p o r t to P a k i s t a n on 
3 1 . Mehrunnisa A l i , "Ch ina ' s Diplomacy during the Indo-Pak-War 
1971" , P a k i s t a n Horizon, Vol. XXI, no. 6, 19 72, (Karachi) p . 56, 
3 2 . The Dawn, 6 December 19 7 1 . 
3 3 . Mohd. febib Sidky, "Chinese World S t r a t e g y a n d South Asia : 
The China Fac to r i n I n d o - P a k i s t a n R e l a t i o n s , " A s i a n Survey, 
Vol. XIV, no. 10, October 1976, p . 9 7 1 . 
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16 December 19 7 1 . I t s a i d : 
The S o v i e t Government h a s p l a y e d a shmful 
r o l e i n t h i s war of a g g r e s s i o n l a u n c h e d by 
I n d i a a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n . Tine whole w o r l d 
h a s c l e a r l y s e e n t h a t i t i s t h e back s t a g e 
34 
manage r of t h e I n d i a n e x p a n s i o n i s t s . 
P e k i n g Peop^-es D a i l y a b u s e d I n d i a a s e x p a n s i o n i s t , 
r e a c t i o n a r y , naked a g g r e s s o r and a r r o g a n t and a s s u r e d t h a t t h e 
C h i n e s e p e o p l e r e s o l u t e l y s u p p o r t t h e P a k i s t a n i Government and 
p e o p l e . 
S i n c e t h e c i v i l war in Eas t P a k i s t a n s t a r t e d , t h e S o v i e t 
Union s u p p o r t e d t h e I n d i a n s t a n d . When t h e war b r o k e o u t t h e 
S o v i e t l*iion was in f a v o u r of e n d i n g t h e war . The S o v i e t P r e m i e r 
K o s y g i n e x p r e s s e d h i s d e s i r e t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be a p o l i t i c a l 
3 6 
s e t t l e m e n t be tween West P a k i s t a n and E a s t P a k i s t a n . £j;jayacl§ 
b l a m e d P a k i s t a n f o r t a k i n g no s t e p s f o r t h e " p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t 
i n E a s t P a k i F t a n and c o n t i n u e d t o b u i l d up m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s 
a g a i n s t India.** I t a l s o s a i d t h a t t h e U. S .S .R . was i n f o r m e d 
b e f o r e t h e o u t b r e a k of war t h a t ; "an armed a t t a c k a g a i n s t I n d i a 
by P a k i s t a n , u n d e r w h a t e v e r p r e t e x t was m i g h t be made would evoke 
3 4 . Pekj.ra Rev iew. 17 December 19 71 (Pek ing) 
3 5 . The Hipiplypjiiqi T^mep. 7 December 19 7 1 . 
3 6 . i feid* ' 6 December 1 9 7 1 . 
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37 the most r e s o l u t e condemnation in the Soviet Union," I t c a l l e d 
for t h e immediate ces sa t ion of bloodshed and implementation of 
p o l i t i c a l se t t lement in East Pakis tan based on respec t for the 
38 
l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s of the people . The Soviet Union 
warned the o the r coun t r i e s t h a t they should not be involved in 
the a f f a i r s of Ind ia because i t might l ead to a fu r ther d e t e r i o -
39 
ra t ion of the s i t u a t i o n in the Indian subcont inent . The 
Soviet warning was for China and an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t in the 
United Nat ions , Soviet Union would support Ind ia , 
The A r t i c l e IX of the Indo-Soviet Treaty was used p r ac -
t i c a l l y in t he form of a t a l k betv/een T.N. Kaul, Indian Foreign 
Secre tary and the Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Pegov, on 3 December 
40 1971, The Soviet Deputy Min is te r , Nikolai Firyubm assured 
D.P. Dhar an Indian P len ipo ten t ia ry of the External Affairs 
Minis t ry t h a t : "in these th rea tened hours , the Soviet Union, 
j u s t as i t has always been and wi l l remain your s incere 
37. Current Digest of the Soviet P res s (Tass) , V o l , x : a i I , 
no. 49,4 January 1972, p , 1. 
38. I b i d , p , 2 
39. I b i d . 
40. The Hindustan Times , 5 December 1971; See also A r t i c l e IX 
of the Indo-Soviet Treaty says,"Each of the High Contract ing 
P a r t i e s under takes to r e f r a i n from giving any a s s i s t ance to 
any t h i r d p a r t y tak ing p a r t in an armed c o n f l i c t with the 
o the r p a r t y . In the event t h a t any of the p a r t i e s i s 
a t tacked or th rea tened with a t t a c k , the High Contract ing 
p a r t i e s wi l l immediately s t a r t mutual consu l t a t i ons with a 
view to e l imina t ing t h i s t h r e a t and taking appropr ia te 
e f f e c t i v e measures to ensure peace and secu r i t y for t h e i r 
c o u n t r i e s , " 
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41 f r i e n d " . The S o v i e t ' s s i n c e r e suppo r t was no t o n l y v o c a l bu t 
a l s o m a t e r i a l . 
The S o v i e t Union was h i g h l y c r i t i c a l of t h e 'Gunboat 
Diplomacy' of t h e U.S . and took s t e p s t o p r e v e n t t h e Seventh 
F l e e t from o p e r a t i n g i n t h e Bay of Bengal because i t was 
c o n s i d e r e d by t h e S o v i e t Union a " g r o s s b l ackma i l and p r e s s u r e 
a g a i n s t I n d i a " , The S o v i e t Union d e s p a t c h e d i t s powerful nava l 
42 f l e e t i n t o t h e Bay of Bengal t o p r e v e n t t h e U,S . o p e r a t i o n . 
Sov ie t suppor t t o I n d i a was i n t h e c o n t e x t of I n d o - S o v i e t 
T r e a t y of Peace and F r i e n d s h i p and I n d i a ' s f r i e n d s h i p v/ith t h e 
Sov i e t Union was w i t h i n t h e framework of t h e p o l i c y of non-
a l ignmen t . 
I n d i a ' s Stand i 
I n d i a had no m i l i t a r y d e s i g n s on P a k i s t a n , excep t t h a t 
of l i b e r a t i n g Bengladesh was c l e a r when t h e I n d i a n Government 
announced fo r an u n i l a t e r a l c e a s e f i r e on 17 December 1971, A day 
a f t e r t h e P a k i s t a n i armed f o r c e s s u r r e n d e r e d t o t h e I n d i a n f o r c e s 
43 i n t h e E a s t e r n s e c t o r . Pr ime M i n i s t e r I n d i r a Gandhi d e c l a r e d : 
We want t o a s s u r e t h e p e o p l e of P a k i s t a n t h a t 
We have no enmity t owards them. There are more 
t h i n g s common t h a n t h o s e which d i v i d e u s . Vie 
s h o u l c l i k e t o f a s h i o n our r e l a t i o n s wi th t h e 
peop le of P a k i s t a n on t h e b a s i s of f r i e n d s h i p 
44 
and u n d e r s t a n d i n g , 
4 1 . The Sta,tesm,an, 15 December 1971. 
42. The Times of I n d i a . 15 December 1971. 
43 . Fore ign A f f a i r s Records V o l . 1 7 , n o . 1 2 , December 1971 , 
p . 387, 
44. I b i d , 
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I t tray be p o i n t e d o u t t h a t I n d i a ' s involvement i n t h e 
Bangladesh c r i s i s was m o t i v a t e d not j u s t by t h e o b j e c t i v e of 
overcoming t h e economic consequences of t h e re fugee i n f l u x i n t o 
i t s t e r r i t o r i e s bu t by such broad g o a l s as p u t t i n g an end t o the 
P a k i s t a n i si:5)port t o the i n s u r g e n t s i n n o r t h e r n I n d i a . The 
c r e a t i o n of Bangladesh became a s t r a t e g i c a s s e t f o r I n d i a i n 
n o r t h - e a s t e r n p a r t of I n d i a . I n d i a wanted to u t i l i s e the 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o shape t h e s u b - o o n t i n e n t a l ba lance of power i n i t s 
f a v o u r . 
I n d i a ' s Diplomacy and t h e Simla Agreement : 
The main problem before I n d i a a f t e r the Indo-Pak War of 
19 71 was t o promote t h e s e c u r i t y env i ronuen t on t h e one hand and 
a l s o to d i v e r t i t s r e s o u r c e s to economic development on the o t h e r 
hand . For t h i s g o a l , Mrs. Gandhi v i s i t e d Bangladesh i n March 1972 
45 
and s i g n e d a f r i e n d s h i p t r e a t y with t h a t c o u n t r y . I nd i a a l s o 
v;anted t o t a l k wi th P a k i s t a n a t any t ime/ a t any l e v e l t o ma in t a in 
p e a c e i n t h e s u b c o n t i n e n t . Defence M i n i s t e r ^ J a g j i v a n Ram 
e n v i s a g e d the d e s i r a b i l i t y and p o s s i b i l i t y of a t r i p a r t i t e mutual 
46 
s e c u r i t y a r rangement i n t h e s u b c o n t i n e n t . 
4 5 . Fo re ign A f f a i r s Record. Vol . 18, no. 3 , March 1972, p p . 6 0 - 6 5 . 
I n t h i s t r e a t y two c o u n t r i e s ag reed , i n t h e e v e n t of an a t t a c k 
on e i t h e r , to e n t e r i n t o mutual c o n s u l t a t i o n i n o r d e r to t a k e 
e f f e c t i v e measures t o e l i m i n a t e the t h r e a t and ensure t h e 
peace and s e c u r i t y t h e i r c o u n t r i e s ( A r t i c l e 9 of t h e t r e a t y ) . 
4 6 . C i t e d in W. Simon Sheldon, "China, t h e Sovie t Union ahd t h e 
S u b - c o n t i n e n t a l Balance" , As ian Survey, Vol. 13 , no. 1, 
J anuary 19 73, p . 655. 
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Under such s i t u a t i o n the Simla Agreement was s igned by 
M r s . Gandii and Bhutto on J u l y 1972. According to para 1, 
claxose 2 of t h e Agreement/ t he two c o u n t r i e s committed themselves 
48 
t o s e t t l e t h e i r d i s p u t e s by peaceful means. Renunc ia t ion of 
t h e use of f o r c e by P a k i s t a n in t h e s e t t l e m e n t of d i s p u t e s * 
a l o n g w i t h i t s accep tance of the p r i n c i p l e of b i l a t e r a l i s m meant 
n o t on ly a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e from Bhutto*F e a r l i e r pronounce^ 
ments t h a t c o n f r o n t a t i o n was the o n l y means of s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s 
v?ith I n d i a , bu t a l s o a v i n d i c a t i o n of I n d i a ' s long p r o j e c t e d s t a n d 
t h a t t h e involvement of e x t e r n a l powers i n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t 
had h i n d e r e d the p r o c e s s of c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n and peace-making 
49 i n t h e r e g i o n . 
However, t h e main o b j e c t i v e of I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y in 
t h e c o n c l u s i o n of Simla Agreement was t o s a f egua rd i t s n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t . The Simla Agreement c o n f e r r e d two s i g n i f i c a n t advantages 
on I n d i a which he lped I t t o r e a l i z e i t s o b j e c t i v e s (a) i t checked 
t h e i n t e r f e r e n c e of o u t s i d e power i n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t a l 
d i s p u t e s ; and (b) by ooimii t t ing P a k i s t a n t o the non-use of f o r c e , 
I n d i a has i n d i r e c t l y succeeded in making P a k i s t a n accep t i t s 
50 
no-war p a c t p r o p o s a l . Paragraph 4 , c l a u s e 2 of the Simla Agreement 
s t a t e d t h a t t h e two c o u n t r i e s s h a l l r e s p e c t t h e a c t u a l l i n e of 
c o n t r o l i n Jammu and Kashmir r e s u l t i n g from t h e c e a s e f i r e of 
4 7 . For t h e t e x t of t he Agreement, s ee Fore ign A f f a i r s Record, 
v o l . 8, no . 7, J u l y 1979, p p . 192 -3 . 
4 8 . I b i d . 
4 9 . Lok Sabha Debates , Vol. 17, 31 J u l y 1972, C o l s . 246-8 . 
50. See Mohanniad Ayoob, n. 18, p p . 9 1 - 9 4 . 
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December 19 71 and s h a l l no t a l t e r i t u n i l a t e r a l l y . I n d i a ' s 
s t r a t e g y and i t s succes s of l i n k i n g up the d e l i n e a t i o n of the 
new l i n e of c o n t r o l i n t h e Jammu and Kashmir a r ea wi th the 
v?ithdrawal of f o r c e s t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l boundary and i t s 
s u c c e s s i n making P a k i s t a n to v a c a t e Lipa Val ley and T i t v a l / 
t h e two p o s t s c a p t u r e d by PaVcistan in May 19 72 i n the Kashmir, 
s e c t o r a f t e r t h e c e a s e - f i r e and a l s o the s t r a t e g i c a l l y 
i m p o r t a n t Thako Chak i n r e t u r n fo r I n d i a ' s d e c i s i o n to g ive 
away 1.2 mi l e s of a rea t o P a k i s t a n in the Uri Sec tor were 
52 
I n d i a ' s d ip lomacy ' s aim t o improve i t s s e c u r i t y p o s i t i o n . 
I t c a n ' t be s a i d t h a t what were the P a k i s t a n ' s i n t e n t i o n s 
towards s i g n i n g the Simla Agreement. But P a k i s t a n ' s i n t e n t i o n 
may be t e s t e d on t h e ground of B h u t t o ' s s t a t e m e n t . Ha i l i ng 
t h e Agreement as t h e r i g h t s t e p i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of promotion 
of peace i n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t , Bhut to s a i d : 
" . . . t h e Agreement we s igned l a s t n i g h t 
r e p r e s e n t s a b reak th rough i n ou r r e l a t i o n s . 
I r e t u r n home wi th firm c o n v i c t i o n t h a t we 
can embark on a new e r a of p e a c e . I f we 
inplement t h e Agreement wi th s i n c e r i t y and 
goodwi l l / v;e can g ive t o our peop le t h e 
^ 1 * Fo re ign A f f a i r s Recor^ , n. 45 , p . 193. 
52 . Ayoob, n. 18, pp . 93-100; See a l s o Surendra Chopra, 
" i n d o - P a k i s t a n i R e l a t i o n s " Punjab Jou rna l of PojLitics» 
Vol. 4 , no. 1, J anua ry - June 1983. 
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peace with honour and progress which we 
have not found so long. I have no doubt 
t ha t we can se t the foundation of a durable 
53 
peace which we owe to our people ." 
ThuS/ during 19 72 the foreign pol icy of India was 
cha rac t e r i s ed by a peaceful course^ cons i s t en t ly following 
the p r i n c i p l e of non-adherence with v;ar b locs . The most 
important aspect of I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy for t h i s era was 
t he search of r e l a x a t i o n of tens ion and normalisat ion of 
r e l a t i o n s among the nations of South-Asian sub-cont inent . 
I n pursuance of t h i s objec t ive Ind ia wanted t o normalise 
i t s r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan and withdraw a l l i t s t roops from 
i t s borders . The Prime Minis ter Mrs. I nd i r a Gandhi persuaded 
Pres ident Bhutto to accept t h e actual l i n e of control in 
Kashmir because she wanted to end the war through nego t i a t ions . 
The Nature of Threat t o I n d i a ' s Secur i ty After 19 71 War; 
The most se r ious gap i n I n d i a ' s foreign po l icy continued 
t o be the absence of normal or cord ia l r e l a t i o n s with China. 
India welcomed China's en t ry i n t o the United Nations and 
assured tha t the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 19 71 was not d i rec ted 
aga ins t i t . In the l i g h t of Indo-Soviet Treaty India v.'as ready 
53 . Foreign Affairs, Recpr^ n. 45, pp.192-3. 
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f o r a d i a logue wi th Chine w i thou t any pre-con<ii«-ions. Af ter 
t h e emergence of Bangladesh t h e r e s t a r t e d a p r o c e s s of 
reapproachment between U.S.A. and t h e P e o p l e ' s Reptiblic of 
Chine wi th t h e he lp of P a k i s t a n . Nixon v i s i t e d China in 
F e b r u a r y 19 72. The Shanghai Communique i s s u e d a t t h e end of 
t h e v i s i t of P r e s i d e n t Nixon i n c o r p o r a t e d a r e f e r e n c e t o the 
p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t of the Indo-Pak d i s p u t e as a c h a l l e n g e 
and re sponse t o t h e change power e q u a t i o n s in South Asia l e a d i n g 
54 
to t h e emergence of I n d i a as the p r e - e m i n e n t power. B e i j i n g 
c r i t i c i s e d I n d i a ' s Pokhran Atomic Explos ion of 1974 because 
i t i n d i c a t e d t h e emergence of I n d i a as a nuc l ea r pov;er i n Asia 
55 
which c h a l l e n g e t h e C h i n a ' s s t a t u s . 
C h i n a ' s d e c i s i o n t o l aunch a programme of modern iza t ion 
of i t s defence f o r c e s caused a n x i e t y t o I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y 
p l a n n e r s . I t was conceded t h a t i n i t s d r i v e towards m i l i t a r y 
m o d e r n i z a t i o n , China was g e n e r a l l y guided by i t s p e r c e p t i o n of 
t h r e a t from the Sov ie t Union. C e r t a i n c a t e g o r i e s of weapons 
sys tem in C h i n a ' s p o s s e s s i o n l i k e the a i r to a i r H a r r i e r , 
s u r f a c e t o s u r f a c e and a i r t o s u r f a c e m i s s i l e s which cou ld be 
e f f e c t i v e l y used a g a i n s t I n d i a i n t h e event of a c o n f l i c t 
54 . U.S. Vajpayee, I n d i a ' s S e c u r i t y : The P o l i t i c o - S t r a t e g i c 
Environment, Lancer PiAblishers , New D e l h i , 1983, p . 9 1 . 
5 5 . Ibid« 
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between India and China and t h i s c e r t a i n l y heightened I n d i a ' s 
t h r e a t percept ion from China. 
China's success in the development of In te r -con t inen ta l 
B a l l a s t i c Miss i les was another dimension of i t s defence 
c a p a b i l i t y which caused concern to Ind ia , According t o a 
r epo r t of In t e rna t iona l I n s t i t u t e for S t r a t eg i c Studies (London) 
China t e s t e d in 19 76 mul t i - s tage ICBM with a l imi ted range of 
57 
3000-35000 mi les . China has one G-class submarine with m i s s i l e 
launching tubes . MRBMs with a range of some 500-700 miles are 
opera t ional but may be phased ou t and replaced by IRBM, a l so 
opera t iona l now/ with a range of 1500-1750 miles . The miss i les 
forces seemed to be con t ro l l ed by the second A r t i l l e r y / 
58 
apparent ly the mis s i l e s anns of the People 's Libera t ion Army, 
Thus/ the s t r a t e g i c impl icat ions of China's defence 
modernisation caused concern to I n d i a ' s foreign and defence 
p o l i c y makers. India in response to Chinese defence modernisa-
t i o n , took several s teps t o p ro tec t i t s nat ional s e c u r i t y . 
The i n t e g r a t i o n of Sikkim to Indian Union was one of them. 
56. K.N. Ramchandran, Peking's Mi l i t a ry Modernisation; 
Impl icat ions for India" , S t r a t eg i c Anaj^vsis (New Delhi) 
Vol. 2, no. 8, November 19 78, p . 302. 
57. The Mi l i t a ry Balance 19 79-80 (London, IISS) , p . 59; See 
a lso , The Times of Indian 21 May 1980. 
58. I b i d . , p . 9 . 
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The in t eg ra t i on of Sikkin with Indian Union has s t r a t e g i c 
impl ica t ions to Ind ia . I n d i a ' s s ecu r i t y s i t u a t i o n in the Tibet -
Sikkim region improved considerably . With Sikkim as a pa r t of 
I n d i a , any future m i l i t a r y th rea t in the region could be handled 
•with g rea t e r ease and e f fec t iveness . The in t eg ra t i on of Sikkim 
with India made i t d i f f i c t d t for China to continue with i t s 
59 
a n t i - I n d i a n a c t i v i t i e s . This development deal t a ser ious blow 
t o the Chinese pol icy in the region, 
China's continuing refusal to accept the i n t eg ra t i on of 
Sikkim with India in 19 75 and the bui lding of the Korakoram 
High Way by Cliina which could be used for m i l i t a r y purposes 
were two o the r major i ssues before I n d i a ' s fore ign and secu r i t y 
po l i cy makers. In s t r a t e g i c terms, i t meant that Beijing sought 
t o employ Sikkim as an instrument to p re s su r i se India and 
p r o j e c t i t s image in the Himalayan Kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal 
60 
as a guardian of small coun t r i e s . 
China 's pol icy towards Nepal can be understood in the 
context of the dis turbances in the region which caused concern 
t o I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . One of the important occurrences which 
59. R. S. ClTouhan, India and SikJ-.im : The Background to the 
Merger", Foreign .Affairs Reports_, vol . 24, no. 9, 
September 19 75, pp. 140-56, 
60. I b i d . , pp. 93-4. 
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encouraged China to a c t i v i ze i t s pol icy of weaning Kepal away 
from I n d i a ' s sphere of influence was the neutral posture 
adopted by Nepal in the Sino-Indian c o n f l i c t of 1962, From 
the mid-50's onwards/ Nepal began a r t i c u l a t i n g i t s des i re 
61 
f o r an autonomous and non-aligned ro le in the region. China's 
p o l i c i e s were to i ssue statements from t ime to time expressing 
i t s support for an independent and sovereign ro l e for Nepal 
62 
in t h e p o l i t i c s of the region. Such p o l i c i e s of China were 
to damage I n d i a ' s power-posi t ion in the reg ion . 
In ea r ly 70*s, China took an attempt to encourage the Pro-
Chinese elements in Nepal in order to e s t a b l i s h the GNF 
(Greater Nepal Federation) cons i s t ing of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan 
63 
and Darjeeling Hill a r eas . But China f a i l e d to do so due the 
l a c k of si^^port wi thin the reg ion . 
Chinese s ippor t to the insurgency in North-eastern 
Ind i a was a t h r e a t to I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y a f t e r i t s independence. 
I n mid 60 's China i n t ens i f i ed the Naxalite movement in the region 
v;hich afforded an exce l l en t opportunity to People Republic of China to 
overthrow the Indian p o l i t i c a l system through revolut ionary means. 
6 1 . R.K. Ja in . ed . / China-South Asian Relat ions (Documents) 
(New Delhi, 1981) , Vol. 2, pp. 426-7. 
62 . I b i d . / pp. 381-2, 411-12, 414-15, 423-6 and 429-30. 
63. The Times of India and Patriot, 23 July 1^73. 
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Around the same period the Naga insurgency problem and 
t h e Chinese s ippor t to i t was a l so assuming ser ious proport ion 
causing concern to I n d i a ' s s ecu r i t y . The Revolutionary 
Government of Nagaland se t up by the rebel Nagas in 1967 posed 
a ser ious t h r e a t to I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y because the rebel were 
t r a i n e d by the Chinese experts in g u e r i l l a warfare and provided 
64 
arm and ammunitions. 
The insurgency problem however began t o subside by the 
mid-sevent ies . The Naga insurgency \%as subsided by the 
Shi l long Accord on 1 November 1*^ 75 between the Government of 
65 
Nagaland and the underground Naga l e a d e r s . The main objec t ive 
of the Accord was to bring out the arms from t h e i r possession. 
The Mizo insurgency a lso came t o l i g h t but was subsided 
by Lai Denga, when he acknowledged t h a t the Mizoram was an 
i n t e g r a l p a r t of the Indian Union and the MNF accepted i t 
wi th in the framework of the Indian c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The Korakoram High Way j o i n t l y b u i l t by Pakistan and 
China though the Pakistan occupied Indian t e r r i t o r y of Kashmir 
had not r e s u l t e d in a dramatic increase in Sino-Pakis tani 
64. Report 19 68-69, Minis t ry of External Affairs (Govt, of 
India / New Delhi) , p . 13, 
6 5. Dawn of Peace in Nagaland* (The Director of Information 
Pub l i c i ty and Tourism, Nagaland, Kohima, 19 75) , p , 3 , 
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b o r d e r - t r a d e a l t h o u g h i t h a d p r o v i d e d g r e a t e r a c c e s s t o 
I s l a m a b a d t o t h e i n t e r i o r r e g i o n s o f o c c u p i e d Kashmi r . I n 
s e c u r i t y t e r m s , i t means t h a t t h i s High Way p r o v i d e d Ch ina 
w i t h a s c o p e f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e e v e n t o f any major c r i s i s 
66 
i n Kashmir r e g i o n . 
C h i n a ' s a t t i t u d e t o t h e I n d o - P a k d i s p u t e o v e r Kashmir 
i t s e l f h a s s e c u r i t y d i m e n s i o n . From t h e 1960s o n w a r d s when 
i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h I n d i a d e t e r i o r a t e d / t ^ i j i n g a d o p t e d t h e 
p o s t u r e of s i p p o r t i n g s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o t h e p e o p l e of J & 
K a s h m i r a c c o r d i n g t o U.N. r e s o l u t i o n s . T h i s p o s t u r e a p p e a r e d 
t o had u n d e r g o n e some s u b t l e c h a n g e s i n 7 0 s . Ch ina t h e n 
a c c e p t e d Kashmir a s a b i l a t e r a l p r o b l e m be tween I n d i a and 
67 
P a k i s t a n . 
Ch ina c o n t i n u e d t o h e l p P a k i s t a n and i t welcomed t h e 
S i m l a A g r e e m e n t , b u t b l o c k e d B a n g l a d e s h a d m i s s i o n i n t o t h e U.N, 
68 
u s i n g i t s v e t o i n t h e s e c u r i t y c o u n c i l . When I n d i a d e c l a r e d 
a s t a t e o f emergency i n 1Q75/ t h e B e i j i n g d i d n o t show any 
e n t h u s i a s m on t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of emergency i n I n d i a and c r i t i -
c i s e d i t . B e s i d e s a l l t h e s e , a p r o c e s s was g o i n g o n t o 
e s t a b l i s h norrwal r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n I n d i a and C h i n a , a l o n g w i t h 
some p u b l i c e x e r c i s e o n t h e p a r t of B e i j i n g o f P e o p l e t o p e o p l e 
69 
d i p l o m a c y . 
6 6 . R . s . Chauhan , n_. 59 , p . 9 4 . 
6 7 . I b i d . 
6 8 . V .P . D u t t , I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n Policy, Vikas P u b l i s h i n g 
House , (New D e l h i , 1 9 8 4 ^ , p . 2 1 8 . 
6 9 . I b i d . / p . 2 1 3 . 
73 
Thus/ the Chinese challanges to I n d i a ' s power and 
in f luence pos i t i on in t he seven t i e s , was l e s s menacing because 
of a marked improvement in I n d i a ' s power pos i t i on and s t r a t e g i c 
influence due to such developments as the signing of the Indo-
Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1^71, and a f t e r the war 
i t s emergence as a pre-eminent power in South Asia, s t rengthening 
of i t s r e l a t i o n s with South-east Asian count r ies spec ia l ly 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the at tainment of nuclear 
s t a t u s i n 19 74, China a l so subsided the insurgency problems 
c rea ted by Naga and Mizo r e b e l s . China took adequate note 
of these developments and responded to the Indian i n i t i a t i v e s 
f o r normalisat ion of r e l a t i o n s . The two count r ies resumed 
ambassadorial r e l a t i o n s in 19 76, 
The break up of Pakistan and emergence of a new t r i a n g u l a r 
balance of power Pakis tan China U.S.A. changed the nature 
and dimensions of t h r e a t to Ind i a ' s nat ional s e c u r i t y . Although 
Pakis tan affirmed i t s commitment t o ensure peace and cooperation 
in the subcont inent , but i t s t a r t e d to s t rengthen i t s m i l i t a r y 
power with the help of the United S t a t e s , the Islamic nat ions 
of VJest Asia and China. Pakis tan pursued the pol icy of rearmament 
and s t a r t e d t o get arms from a l l corners : the United S t a t e s , 
France, China and the Arab na t ions . The massive rearmament 
programme of Pakis tan heightened I n d i a ' s percept ion of t h r e a t 
from Pakis tan . 
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Z.A, B h u t t o d e c i s i o n i n 1972 , t o c o n t i n u e w i t h P a k i s t a n ' s 
CENTO membersh ip and s t r o n g f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h I r a n were 
i m p o r t a n t f o r h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n . R e f l e c t i n g on t h e u s e f u l n e s s 
o f t h e I r a n c o n n e c t i o n , i n a s t a t e m e n t o n P a k i s t a n ' s f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y i n t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly o n 13 December 19 7 3 , B h u t t o 
s a i d : 
. . . t h e p o s i t i o n h a s c h o s e n t o p i c k o n I r a n 
b e c a u s e I r a n s v p p o r t e d us i n 19 65 c o n f l i c t / 
b e c a u s e I r a n h e l p e d P a k i s t a n i n t h e 1971 
c o n f l i c t / b e c a u s e I r a n h a s s i d e d w i t h us o n 
t h e B a n g l a d e s h i s s u e , b e c a u s e I r a n h a s v e r y 
^ o d r e l a t i o n s v j i th P a k i s t a n i n a l l f i e l d s -
7© 
e c o n o m i c / s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l . 
Shah o f I r a n a l s o d e c l a r e d t h a t i n c a s e of an a t t e m p t f o r 
f u r t h e r dismemberment o f P a k i s t a n , I r a n would c e r t a i n l y 
71 
i n t e r v e n e . And i t was c l e a r t h a t I r a n was g o i n g so f a r a s t o 
72 
g u a r a n t e e P a k i s t a n ' s s e c u r i t y . P a k i s t a n and I r a n s t r e n g t h e n e d 
t h e i r m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c l i n k a g e s unde r B h u t t o and Shah by 
n a v a l e x e r c i s e s i n t h e P e r s i a n Gulf i n 1973 and i n t h e A r a b i a n 
73 
Sea i n 19 7 4 . 
70. I-iatlonal Assembly of P a k i s t a n Debates / F r i d a y / 
21 December 19 73, p . 210, 
7 1 . Quoted in Dawn, 1 J u l y 19 74, 
72. P a k i s t a n Horizon (Karachi) , Vol. 32/ no. 4 , Four th Qr t .1979 . 
7 3 . Zubeida Mustafa, "Recent Trends in P a k i s t a n ' s P o l i c y Towards 
t h e Middle Eas t " / P a k i s t a n Horizon/ Four th Quar te r 1975, 
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Improvement of P a k i s t a n ' s r e l a t i o n s wi th I r a n , as mentioned 
above and h o s t i n g of the I s l a m i c Conference a t Lahore in 
February 19 74 were t h e e f f o r t s of Hiu t to to r e s t r u c t u r e t h e 
r e g i o n a l ba l ance of power i n f avour of P a k i s t a n and t o s t r e n g t h e n 
and n u r t u r e P a k i s t a n ' s I s l amic c o n n e c t i o n wi th o t h e r I s l a m i c S t a t e s . 
Bhu t to s o l d the idea of the I s l a m i c Bomb t o Saudi Arabia and 
L ibya ; bo th were ready t o f i n a n c e P a k i s t a n t o make an I s l a m i c 
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Bomb. Bhutto a l s o made p l ans t o promote m i l i t a r y c o l l a b o r a t i o n 
between Pak i s t an and f r i e n d l y Muslim c o u n t r i e s w i th emphasis 
75 
on t r a i n i n g a s s i s t a n c e and j o i n t v e n t u r e s i n armament i n d u s t r i e s . 
Bhut to launched a s t r a t e g y of seek ing arms from t h e United 
S t a t e s and F rance . The U.S. Cbnyress decided on 14 March 19 73 
t o l i f t t h e arms embargo imposed on P a k i s t a n a f t e r t h e December 
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19 71 war. 
Commenting on the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the U.S. Government 's 
d e c i s i o n on I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y and t h e peace p r o c e s s a t work in 
t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t , I n d i a ' s Fo re ign M i n i s t e r Swaran Singh s a i d : 
The United S t a t e s d e c i s i o n to resume t h e 
arms s u p ' - l i e s t o P a k i s t a n w i l l j e o p a r d i s e 
the p roces s of norr 'al i s a t i o n and a d v e r s e l y 
e f£oc t t h e chances of e s t a b l i s h m e n t of 
74. D.K. F a t i l and P .K.S . Nemboodiri, Pak,ista„n' s I s 1 amic^ FP^P* 
Vikas P u b l i s h i n g Ffonse (New Delh i , 19 79) , p . 32"; See a l s o 
Sun<^av Times (London) 28 November 19 79. 
75 . The Hindu (Madras) / 19 February 19 74. 
76. Fo re ign A f f a i r s Record/ Vol. 1 9 , n o . 3 , March 19 73, p . 1 3 2 ; See 
a l s o , Stephen Cohen/ "U.S. ^-^eapons and South As i a : A P o l i c y 
A n a l y s i s " , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Vol. 4 9 , n o . l , Spr ing 19 76,pp 49-69 . 
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d u r a b l e p e a c e i n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t . I n 
t h e l i g h t o f t h e p a s t r e c o r d of P a k i s t a n ' s 
a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t I n d i a ; arms s h i p m e n t t o 
t h a t c o u n t r y w i l l o n c e a g a i n p o s e a g r a v e 
77 
t h r e a t t o I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . 
I n 1975 t h e Amer ican A d m i n i s t r a t i o n c l e a r l y a n n o u n c e d i t s p o l i c y 
d e c i s i o n t o l i f t t e n y e a r s arms embargo and r e s u m e d arms s i j p p l i e s 
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t o P a k i s t a n on r e g u l a r b a s i s . I t v/as j u s t i f i e d o n t h e g r o u n d 
t h a t i t was n ^ t m i l i t a r y p a r i t y w i t h I n d i a , b u t a m i l i t a r y 
b a l a n c e b e t w e e n I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . As t h e b a l a n c e o f power 
was n o t i n f a v o u r of U n i t e d S t a t e s of Amer ica due t o t h e S o v i e t 
i n f l u e n c e i n t h e r e g i o n . The U n i t e d S t a t e s d i d i t s b e s t t o 
a l t e r t h e b a l a n c e of power i n i t s f a v o u r . I n d i a ' s n u c l e a r 
e x p l o s i o n of 1974 was a l s o c i t e d a s o n e of t h e r e a s o n s f o r 
79 
t h e c h a n g e i n t h e U .S . arms s u p p l y p o l i c y t o w a r d s P a k i s t a n . 
T h i s U .S . a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s P a k i s t a n c a u s e d c o n c e r n t o I n d i a . 
P r i m e M i n i s t e r I n d i r a Gandhi r e a c t e d t o t h e U .S . d e c i s i o n and 
s a i d t 
. . * t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e U.S .A. to r e s u m e 
a r m i n g P a k i s t a n shows t h a t t h e p o l i c y make r s 
of t h a t g r e a t c o u n t r y c o n t i n u e t o s u b s c r i b e 
7 7 . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s R e c o r d / V o l . 1 9 , n o . 3 , March 19 7 3 , p . 132 . 
7 8 . W a s h i n q t 6 n P o s t , 26 F e b r u a r y 19 7 5 . 
7 9 . Ife)id. , See a l s o F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r C h a v a n ' s s t a t e m e n t i n t h e 
Lok S a b h a , Lok Sabha D e b a t e s , V o l . 4 8 , n o . 7 , 25 F e b r u a r y 
1 9 7 5 , C b l s . 2 8 1 - 2 . 
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to the f a l l acy of equating India with 
Pakis tan. I t i s t h i s pol icy which has 
80 
caused tens ion in the sub-cont inent . 
Pak i s t an i Kuclear isa t ion : A Threat to I n d i a ' s Naticral 
Secur i ty : 
Pak is tan i nuclear programme has been in prac-ice from 
t h e l a t e s i x t i e s onwards* Z.A. Bhutto in July 1972 disclosed 
the Pak i s t an ' s decis ion on a nuclear programme. Bhutto no doubt 
argued tha t Pak i s t an ' s nuclear programme was for peaceful 
purposes; a s imi l a r Indian explanat ion made in 19 74 af ter i t s 
Pokhran Nuclear Explosion. He was unprepared to accept 
under the argument t h a t the re was no such thing as oeacef ul 
81 
explosion and so on. Bhutto was ser ious about Pakistan 's 
acqui r ing the c a p a b i l i t y t o make the bomb and i t became 
c l e a r from his book If I am Assassinated : 
Due to my s ingula r e f f o r t s , Pakistan 
acquired the i n f r a s t ruc tu re and the 
po ten t i a l of nuclear capab i l i t y . . . When 
I assumed charge of atomic energy, Pakistan 
was about twenty years b ^ i n d I n d i a ' s 
80. India and Foreign Review, ^fol. 12, no. 11, 15 March 1975, 
i,Hew Delhi) p . 6 . 
8 1 . See the t e x t of Bhutto 's repl^.;to-M«*»-.^andhi's l e t t e r 
Foreion Affairs Record, VoW^^V^^bC'^'iS^^^feLvember 19 74, 
pp. 19 4-6 , 
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programme. When I c e a s e d t o b e Pr ime 
M i n i s t e r . . , P a k i s t a n was f i v e t o s i x 
y e a r s b e h i n d I n d i a . I f t h e i n t e r n a l 
o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e n u c l e a r programrne had 
n o t cotne from t h e b e g i n n i n g from c e r t a i n 
p o w e r f u l m i n i s t e r s and b u r e a u c r a t e s / I 
82 
c o u l d h a v e f u r t h e r n a r r o w e d t h e g a p . 
He a l s o b r o u g h t i n t h e b r o a d e r I s l a m i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; t h e 
n e e d o f a n I s l a m i c bomb. He varote : 
We know t h a t I s r a e l a n d S o u t h A f r i c a have 
n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y . The C h r i s t i a n s , J e w i s h 
and Hindu c i v i l i z a t i o n s have t h i s c a p a b i l i t y . 
The communis t powers a l s o p o s s e s s i t . Only 
t h e I s l a m i c c i v i l i z a t i o n was w i t h o u t i t » bu t 
83 
t h a t p o s i t i o n was a b o u t t o c h a n g e . 
The c o n s e q u e n c e s o£ t h e p o s s e s s i o n of bomb by P a k i s t a n 
w o u l d be a s e n s e of p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n s e c u r i t y t h a t i t would 
i n j e c t i n t o t h e I n d i a n d e c i s o n - making e l i t e . The 
a c q u i s i t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons by P a k i s t a n would upse t t h e 
8 2 . Z .A. B h u t t o . Thp HYth o£ Indei?gnden<;?fi (OUP, London) 
K a r a c h i , 1969 , p . 1 3 7 . 
83 . I b i d . , p . 138. 
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m i l i t a r y ba lance and t h e r e s u l t a n t n u c l e a r a sy i re t r i ca l 
s i t u a t i o n would make i t d i f f i c u l t for Ind ia to safeguard i t s 
s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t any p o s s i b l e use of nuc l ea r weapons by 
84 
P a k i s t a n , 
The Kashmir q u e s t i o n might be a c t i v i s e d . Pak i s tan might 
use t h e bomb to s e t t l e t h e Kashmir d i s p u t e o r t o get more 
c o n c e s s i o n from I n d i a going a n u c l e a r power. Thus the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of P a k i s t a n i nuc lea r t h r e a t would be understood 
in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e h e i g h t e n e d s e c u r i t y concerns of I n d i a ' s 
d e c i s i o n makers as a r e s u l t of t h e narrowing down of the gap 
85 
between t h e two count r ies^ conven t iona l m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h . 
I n d i a ' s R(^l^ti9n^ wi th U.S.S^R^ * An Opt ipn for i t s Secu r i t y ; 
I n d i a ' s r e sponse to t h e S ino-U.S . -Pak axis i n t h e 
p o s t 1971 has been e s s e n t i a l l y f o r m i l i t a r y and diplomatic 
p r e p a r e d n e s s . I t was a g a i n s t t h e background of these deve-
lopments t h a t I n d i a has to s t r e n g t h e n i t s f r i e n d s h i p with t h e 
S o v i e t Union. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between I n d i a and the S o v i e t -
Union has always been dominated by I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y needs . 
The s e c u r i t y of I n d i a has always been t h r e a t e n e d e i t h e r by 
P a k i s t a n o r China o r by a combinat ion of P a k i s t a n China and 
U.S.A. Whenever P a k i s t a n j o i n e d hands wi th U.S.A. o r China, 
84. U.S. Ba jpa i , n. 54, pp . 77-78. 
8 5 . K. Subrahmanyam, " I n d i a - P a k i s t a n M i l i t a r y Leve ls : 
F a l l a c i e s of Mutual Forces Reduc t ion" , Times of I ^ d i a , 
26 May 1980. 
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I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y was t h r e a t e n e d . That i s why I n d i a 
had t o come c lo se t o t h e Sov i e t Union t o ge t i t s help for 
t h e defence of i t s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and to p r o t e c t i t s t e r r i -
t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . 
In 19 73, t h e S o v i e t Chief Brezhnev v i s i t e d New Delh i . 
T h i s v i s i t v-as a i iother l i n k t o e s t a b l i s h s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s 
between t h e two c o u n t r i e s . His v i s i t was most s i g n i f i c a n t for 
Moscow proposa l fo r a p l a n f o r an Asian C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y . 
Moscow had s o l i c i t e d s u p p o r t from I n d i a f o r i t s proposal and 
had made a s t r o n g e f f o r t a t b u i l d i n g yjp op in ion wi th in t h e 
c o u n t r y i n i t s f avour . The S o v i e t p roposa l f o r c o l l e c t i v e 
s e c u r i t y i n Asia was r e g a r d e d by the West and China as a move 
d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t B e i j i n g , b u t t h e Sov i e t Union denied t h a t they 
exc luded any Asian c o u n t r y from t h i s a r r angemen t s . I n d i a ' s 
view was to emphasize independence of Asian c o u n t r i e s , t o 
encourage b i l a t e r a l and mutual c o o p e r a t i o n among them, and to 
s t r i v e fo r uhe d e f i n i t i o n and obse rvance of norms and p r i n c i p l e s 
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t o goverr t r . e i r mutual r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
At t h e end of Brezhnev v i s i t , a j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n was 
i s s ued which r e f l e c t e d t h e I n d i a n p r i n c i p l e s and norms for 
govern ing r e l a t i o n s h i p between Asian c o u n t r i e s which could s e t 
8 6 . C i t e d in V.P. Dut t ; n . 68 , p p . 125-26. Proposal given by 
t h e Exte rna l A f f a i r s M i n i s t e r Swaran Singh a t t h e meeting 
of Par l i ament C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee fo r External A f f a i r s . 
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t h e p a t t e r n fo r the fu tu re . I t adso s t r e s sed detente r a the r 
than s e c u r i t y , and freedom of Asian countr ies rather than any 
m i l i t a r y arrangement. I t advocated growing economic cooperation 
on a mutually advantageous bas is to reduce tensions and bui ld 
87 
up an environment of peace and confidence. 
India and the Soviet Union re-affirmed tha t they attached 
p a r t i c u l a r s ign i f icance to a broad development of mutually 
benef ic ia l cooperat ion and s t rengthening of peace and s t a b i l i t y 
in Asia through common e f fo r t s by a l l s t a t e s of t h i s l a rges t 
and most populated area of the world. They wanted to create 
such an environment i n v*iich people could l i v e peacefully with 
good ne ighbour l iness . They bel ieved t h a t the re la t ions between 
a l l Asian count r ies should be based on the pr inc ip les of 
r enunc ia t ion of the use of force , respect for sovereignty and 
InviDlabili ty of borders , non- interference in in te rna l a f fa i rs 
and broad development of economy on the basis of equal and 
mutual b e n e f i t s . They a l so affirmed tha t they v»ere ready 
t oge the r with o the r s t a t e s on t h e basis of equal i ty to find 
88 
a f a i r so lu t ion of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. 
The Soviet help in building iqp Ind i a ' s defence capabi l i ty 
has been s u b s t a n t i a l . India has received considerable success 
in i t , attempt to work towards g r ea t e r independence through 
87 . I b i d . , p . 126. 
88 . I b i d . , pp . 126-27. 
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expans ion of i t s domest ic defence i n d u s t r y , through d i v e r s i -
f i c a t i o n of i t s s o u r c e s of arms s imply , and through p roduc t i on 
of s o p h i s t i c a t e d defence equipment under f o r e i g n l i c e n c e , i t s 
main a i r and naval s t r i k e f o r c e s a r e of Soviet a c q u i s i t i o n s . . . . 
Moreover , t h e m a j o r i t y of nev/ a c q u i s i t i o n s cont inued t o be of 
89 
S o v i e t o r i g i n . 
Thus, t h e r e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e 1969-74 Defence P lan on 
a r o l l - o n b a s i s i n o r d e r to m i t i g a t e t h e drawbacks of defence 
p l a n n i n g and the d e c i s i o n a f t e r 19 72 t o i n t e g r a t e the defence 
p l a n wi th t h e f i v e - y e a r development p l a n (19 74-79) in o rder 
t o b r i ng abou t a ba l ance between defence and development were 
some of t h e s i g n i f i c a n t d e c i s i o n s taken by the Ind ian 
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Government and i t was of c o u r s e , suppor t ed by the Sovie t Union. 
A t t e n t i o n was a l s o g iven t o s t r e n g t h e n the Army^ Navy and 
Ai r f o r c e s of the c o u n t r y . As r e g a r d s t h e army, in 
a d d i t i o n t o t h e h igh budget a l l o c a t i o n s and improvements i n 
t h e t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s , c a r e was t a k e n t o r a i s e the i n f an t ry 
d i v i s i o n s from 13 t o 16 in 1972 onwards . The s t r e n g t h of 
independent armoured b r igade a l s o went up by 3 t o 5 during t h i s 
91 
p e r i o d . The s t r e n g t h of the Naval f o r c e went w?j frora 28,000 in 
8 9 . ^ n C la rk , "Autonomy and Dependence in Recent Ir .do-Soviet 
R e l a t i o n s " , A u s t r a l i a n Outlook (Melbourn) , <fipril 1973, 
Vol. 3 1 , no. 1, p . 154. 
9 0 . Raju Thomas, The Defence, of I n d i a t A Budgetary of S t r a t e g y 
and R 3 l i t i c s (New D e l h i , 19 78 ) , p p . 232-35. 
9 1 . K. Subrahmanyam, ' "Pak i s t an i C r e d i b i l i t y Gap", IPSA J o u r n a l , 
Vol. 14, no . 1, J u l y - S e p t ember 1981, p . 123. 
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19 7 2; and the submarine stxength from 4 to 6 during t h i s per iod. 
One of the marked fea tures was the replacement of the absolute 
B r i t i s h Sea Hawk by the Sea Harrier USTOC a i r c r a f t , the a i r c r a f t 
93 
c a r r i e r for INS Vikrant. In the Airforce# one noticeable aspect 
of the a i r defence programme was se t up a t 4 5 squadrons. The 
main f i r e power of the Indian Air force was b u i l t to improve 
MlG-21 and the Gnat and they were given new names as the MlG-21 M 
and the Ajeet. This continued amidst t h e importing of Soviet 
94 
Sukho-78 f i g h t e r s bombars. 
The major ob jec t ive of Indian foreign pol icy v^ as to 
e s t a b l i s h f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with a l l the West Asian count r ies . 
This po l icy a lso acted with e f fo r t s to make the Indian Ocean 
a zone of peace. The another major ob jec t ive of Indian foreign 
po l icy was to a t t a i n self r e l i ance in defence and to make i t 
known t h a t India was not prepared to accept discriminatory 
t rea tment a t t h e hands of nuclear power. Thus, India re jec ted 
t h e Nuclear Non-Prol if e r a t i on Treaty on the ground that i t was 
unequal/ and imposed one sided r e s t r i c t i o n s on the non nuclear 
weapons s t a t e s . India exploded a nuclear device in 19 74 and 
sought i t s pos i t i on in nuclear power s t a t e s . Although India 
emerged as a nuclear power s t a t e i t s t i l l needed Soviet svpport 
9 2 . I b i d . . p . 124. 
9 3 . Report 1977^78, Ministry of Defence/ Govt, of India, 
New Delhi/ p . 21. 
94 . ThomaS/ n. 90, pp. 232-35, 
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t o counterbalance U.S. and Chinese suppsr t to Pakistan. 
The normalisat ion of r e l a t i o n s with China and the 
95 
s t reng then ing of b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s with I r a n were a con t i -
nuat ion of the Indian e f fo r t s to improve i t s regional s t r a t e g i c 
environment. I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy appeared to have had 
t h e ob jec t ive of weakening Pak i s tan ' s s t r a t e g i c linkages with 
China and West Asian coun t r i e s . This decis ion of the Indian 
government, was a t imely need to reduce the seriousness of 
P a k i s t a n ' s chal lenge to I nd i a ' s s ecu r i t y and power pos i t ion in 
t h e region. 
Threat from In te rna l S i tua t ions : 
Meanwhile, t h e per iod 1973-74 was de te r io ra ted from 
i n t e r n a l economic c r i s i s due to the pressure lodged by the 
event of Bangladesh c r i s i s . The opposi t ion p a r t i e s became 
most revolu t ionary agains t the ru l ing pa r ty or the goveranent 
regarding f a i l u r e of ecoijomic system and hence the s i tua t ion 
tu rned in p o l i t i c a l turbulance . The economic s i tua t ion 
95« Shah of I ran s tayed away from the Lahore Islamic Cbnference 
of February 1974 because of Gaddafi 's presence in i t - the 
exchange of v i s i t s by Mrs. Gandhi had the Shah to each 
o ther c a p i t a l s , improved t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . For de ta i l see , 
Mohammad Ayoob, " Indo-Iranian Re la t ions" , India puarterj.v. 
Vol. 33 , no. 1, January-March 19 77, (New Delhi) p . 1-6. 
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posed a th rea t to the s t a b i l i t y of the whole system due to 
t h e p o l i t i c a l anarchy in the country. I t was the background 
t h a t Mrs. Gandhi declared a s t a t e of emergency in the country 
on 25 June 1975. 
Consequently/ the dec la ra t ion of emergency influenced 
t h e foreign pol icy and fore ign r e l a t i o n s . The Western countries 
e s p e c i a l l y the U.S.A. and U.K. c r i t i c i s e d i t , but the Soviet 
Union welcomed i t and f e l t t h a t i t was an act to prevent the 
r eac t iona ry forces in Ind i a , The Soviet Union said i t was 
" s t r u g g l e against Vfestern pol icy" regarding the Congress and 
a l s o agains t the r e a c t i o n a r y f o r c e s . 
Mrs. Gandhi r eac t ed t o Western c r i t i q u e to the emergency. 
She gave a c lear warning to them while addressinc, a sess ion 
of the AICC on December 29-30, in Chandigarh, She s a i d : . . . 
t h e s e were the count r i es t h a t were aga ins t India during the 
freedom movement and a t the time of independence. If we were 
96 
invaded/ they were on the s i d e of aggression. , As far as the 
Soviet support to t h e s t a t e of emergency was concerned the 
General Secretary of t he C.P.S. U, s t a t e d t h a t the Mrs. Gandhi 
Government's ac t ion a g a i n s t i n t e rna l and external reactions met 
97 
wi th fiiLl understanding in U.S.S.R. 
9 6, Congress Marches Ahe^d/ December 1^75-76/ New Delhi, 
AICC Publ ica t ions / istew Delhi , 19 76, 
9 7. Cited in Dileep Podgoankar/ **Mr. Desa i ' s Soviet Visi t : 
New Basis to Strengthen Old T ie s " , The Tiroes of lyidia 
(New Delhi) / 29 October 19 77; a l s o see Soviet Review, 
21 June 1976, (Moscow ) ; p . 14w.l8. 
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However• the Congress Party paid a heavy pr ice in 
e l e c t o r a l terms for the imposi t ion of t h e Emergency and for 
t h e excesses cotwnitted during Jxme 19 75 and December 1976. 
I n the General Elec t ion of 19 77, the Congress Party was 
defeated by the Janata Party and the r e s u l t was that Janata 
tJarty formed i t s own government i . e . the Janata Goveimroent. 
C H A P T E R - I I I 
Ind i a* s Fore ign P o l i c y During J a n a t a Government 
CHAPTSR - I I I 
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE JAt^vTA GOVERKMENT 
The f o r e i g n p o l i c y of a c o u n t r y becomes an amalgain of 
c o n t i n u i t y and c h a n g e s when t h e r e i s a c h a n g e in government 
o r l e a d e r s h i p of t h e c o u n t r y . ',-Jhen t h e J a n a t a P a r t y came t o 
power i n 1977, i t was e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y of 
I n d i a would a l s o c h a n g e . Hopes and f e a r s were e x p r e s s e d b o t h 
i n I n d i a and a b r o a d a b o u t t h e c h a n g e s i n I d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
by t h e new l e a d e r s h i p . T h i s was m a i n l y b e c a u s e some l e a d e r s 
of t h e o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s h a d i n t h e p a s t opposed some a s p e c t s 
of Mrs . Gandh i ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 
The d e f e a t of Mrs . Gandhi i n G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n of 1977 
was a s e t b a c k f o r S o v i e t p o l i c y . The e l e c t i o n r e s u l t ' w a s 
d i f f e r e n t l y i n t e r p r e t e d in V/ashington an^l B e i j i n g , The p r o c l a -
m a t i o n of emergency by Mrs . Gandhi i n 1975 was condemned in 
Wash ing ton w h i l e t h e Kreml in p e r s i s t e n t l y s u p p o r t e d h e r a c t i o n . 
A f t e r t h e r e s u l t of t h e e l e c t i o n _ , The Times w r o t e t h a t ' i n t h e 
U n i t e i S t a t e s a n d t h e ^ t h e r Wes te rn c o u n t r i e s t h e r e was f u l l 
s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e r e s u l t . The American A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e new gove rnmen t would t r y t o e s t a b l i s h b e t t e r 
1 . The Tjim.es (London) , 4 ' A p r i l 1977 , p . 3 . , 
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r e l a t i o n s with the U.S. and a lso hoped for t i l t of Ind i a ' s 
fore ign pol icy towards the U.S. The U.S. Newsweek wrote 
t h a t the new Prime Minister was "a staunch-anti-cominunist and 
was expected to t i l t his non-alignment towards the Western 
2 
b l o c . " The opinion of the Washington Post,was t ha t changes in 
I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy would represent "something of a windfall 
for Washington" and the defeat of the congress par ty had 
3 
of fered "fresh oppor tun i t i e s" for America. Arnold L. Korelick 
wrote tha t a f t e r the defeat of Mrs. Ind i ra Gandhi in the 
e l e c t i o n / India was l i k e l y t o enhance i t s e f fo r t s to maintain 
a "be t t e r balance between* the Soviet Union, China and the 
4 
United S t a t e s . " The American Administration expected more and 
more t i l t towards the United S ta tes by the new government in 
Ind ia . 
Beij ing Review regarded the e lec t ion r e s u l t as "a serious 
setback to Moscow's expansionis t scheme" in South Asian region. 
I t observed t h a t the banckruptcy of the in ternal and external 
p o l i c i e s pursued by Mrs. Gandhi who had t a i l e d af ter the 
2. See, Mifsas&h (^ew York), 
4 April 19 77, p . 6. 
3 . Washington Post . 22 March 1977. 
4 . Arnold Horelick, "Soviet Policy jiilcnt/ii.8- in Asia", 
Asian Survey, Vol. 17/ no. 6, 17 June 1975, p . 505. 
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Soviet Policy harined the country and brought suffering t o the 
people . 
In shor t , i t was expected both in Washington and in 
Beij ing tha t the Janata Governinent would in a l l p robabi l i ty t i l t -
away from the close r e l a t i o n s h i p with the Soviet Union established 
by Mrs. Gandhi and wcJLld t r y to improve I n d i a ' s r e l a t i ons with 
the United States and China. 
Genuine tton-Alignment; 
Morarji Desai/ a f t e r assuming the o f f ice of the Prime 
Minis te r of India on 24 March 1977, r e i t e r a t e d his firm commitment 
t o the po l icy of non-alignment. He c l a r i f i e d t h a t : 
I t w i l l be fu l l y non-al igned, no suspicion 
of any alignment with any country. We will 
not have any spec ia l r e l a t i o n s with any 
country. 
Obviously, he had the Soviet Union in his mind when he made 
t h i s statement because i t was of ten a s se r t ed tha t twenty years 
Trea ty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation between India and 
the Soviet Union signed in August 19 71 had es tab l i shed "special 
5. See,"Indian General Elec t ion and Soviet Setback in South 
Asia", Peking Reyiew, 8 April 19 77, p . 23, 
6, Ipdi^n Epcpress (New Delhi) , 25 March 1977. See also 
India and Foreign Review, 1 April 19 77, Nev Delhi, p . 16. 
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relations** between the two coun t r i e s . Commenting on tha t 
t r e a t y , the new Prime Minister sa id tha t if i t meant the 
spec ia l r e l a t i o n s h i p with a p a r t i c u l a r country/ then i t should 
be changed and no specia l r e l a t i o n s with any par t icu lar country, 
7 
and a t l e a s t we should not ac t L^ jon i t xn tha t manner. Four 
days l a t e r , address insj t h e f i r s t jo in t session of the Indian 
S ix th Parliament, t h e Acting Pres ident , B.D. J a t t i s ta ted tha t 
8 
t he new goverranent would follow a path of 'genuine' non-alignment, 
External Affairs Minis te r , Atal Beheri Vajpayee gave the c learcut 
meaning tc the pol icy of non-alignment. He said : 
When we decided t o use t h e word 'genuine ' , 
we had two th ings in mind. F i r s t l y , the 
e n t i r e non-aligned movement has to be 
developed on the bas is of fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e s which have guided the movement 
s ince i t s incep t ion . Secondly, the oasic 
philosophy of the movement i s tha t a l l 
i n t e rna t iona l i ssues should be judged on 
mer i t . The concept of n e u t r a l i t y has to 
be a p o s i t i v e one. The pol icy must be 
pursued in such a manner t h a t the countries 
of the world should feel tha t India is 
r e a l l y non-aligned. We not only have to 
be non-aligned, but we must a l so appear 
7. Sukhbir Chowdhry, "Can India Maintain Equidistance from 
the Super Powers", India Qv^arterlv, Vol. XXXVII, no. 4, 
October-December 1981, p . 588. 
8. I b i d . 
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to be non-aligxied. For t h a t , we have to 
avoid too much dependence on any big 
power. This would requ i re economic 
s t a b i l i t y , m i l i t a r y s t r eng th and the will 
9 to preserve independence of judgement . 
Although the Janata Government wanted to pursue the policy of 
non-alignment but not as a photocopy of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. 
The leaders of the Janata Party were fu l l y aware of the fac t 
t h a t I n d i a ' s foreign policy in the pas t had been based on the 
d o c t r i n e of nat ional s ecu r i t y . 
In pursuance of the pol icy of genuine non-alignment, the 
Jana ta Government welcomed-all the i nv i t a t i ons e i the r from 
Washington or Beij ing or Moscow. In f ac t , there was an 
improvement in American foreign po l icy towards India. The Janata 
Government was a l so expected to move towards the United S ta t e s . 
Therefore, the American Administration modified i t s 
po l i cy towards India and for tha t the U.S. t r i e d to persuade 
Pakis tan to accept an a l t e r n a t i v e weapons package tha t could 
be l e s s object ionable to India and disallowed the sa le of the 
10 
110 American A-7 f i g h t e r planes t o Pakis tan, The U.S. j u s t i f i e d 
t h i s on the ground t h a t t he addi t ion of A-7 to Pakistan would 
9 . Indian Express, 16 to 30 January 19 79 
10. The Statesman, 13 April 19 77. 
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be seen by India as a disr i :^t ion of the balance of power on 
t h e sub-cont inent . This motivation by Carter was to humour 
I n d i a on the one hand and to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear 
on the other hand. This s tep of Car te r Administration brought 
about an improvement in Indo-American r e l a t i o n s and led to 
exchange of v i s i t s between the heads of the two count r ies . 
The U.S. Pres ident , Jimmy Car ter paid a'good wil l v i s i t * 
to India in January 19 78 to r e g i s t e r American sympathy and 
amity for Ind ia . During h is t h r ee days s tay in New Delhi, he 
s t a t e d t h a t "India and the U.S.A. were bound together by common 
be l i e f in basic moral values and respect for the hunan s p i r i t 
In June 19 78, Desai a l so v i s i t e d the United S ta tes . In 
a j o i n t communique issued on 15 June 1978,Desai and Carter both 
expressed support for the l eg i t ima te a sp i r a t i ons of the African 
people for se l f -de te rmina t ion and condemned racial ism in any 
form. Prime Minis ter Desai took the opportunity to express 
the hope t h a t the greac power m i l i t a r y presence in Indian ocean 
13 
wi l l be soon withdrawn. 
11 . James Eari Car ter , "Address to Parliamentary Groi:^ 
New Delhi", Foreign Affairs R^coy.;^. Vol. 24, no. 1, 
January 19 78, pp. 42-76; and 50-52. 
12. The Hindustan Time^ (New Delhi) , 2 January 19 78. 
13. I n ^ a n Express, 16 June 19 78. 
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Consequently, on 26 August 19 78, America resumed 
development ass i s tance to India viith a commitment of $60 mill ion 
14 covered by three separate agreements signed m New Delhi. I t 
was for the nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n and shipment of enriched 
uraniiin for Tarapur Atomic P lan t . In March 1979, NRC approved 
16,8 tones of enriched uranium for Tarapur Atomic Plant . 
But the cordia l r e l a t i o n s between India and the U.S. did 
not continue for long. The U.S. within a shor t span of time 
decided to give to Pakistan about f ive squadrons of F-5E deep 
s t r i k e a i r c r a f t s . The U.S. a lso offered to s e l l to Pakistan 
f i g h t e r planes and to give help for the production of nuclear 
power "if Islamabad agreed to r e s t r i c t i o n s against the production 
17 
of nuclear weapons." The Car te r Administrat ion defended th i s 
move on the grounds t h a t they feared a nuclear arms race in 
1 3 t he Indian subcontinent . 
This na tura l ly caused grea t anxiety in India because 
the F-5E planes having a range of 400 naut ica l kilometres, 
could have a d i rec t run upto Delhi from Pakistani base. Therefore, 
14. Asj.an Recorder, 22-28 October 19 78, p . 14564 
15. 1^^., 30 April - 6 May 1979, p . 14859. 
16. The Tribune. 31 August 19 78. 
17. See for d e t a i l s Dawn. 19 April 19 79; Morning News,(Karachi) 
18 April 1979. 
18. The Hindu. 22 April 19 79. 
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the External Affa i r s Min i s te r of I n d i a Atal Behari Vajpayee 
warned the United S t a t e s t h a t any attempt to rearm Pakistan 
on the p r e t e x t t h a t something had happened in Afghanistan and 
I r an would be counter p roduc t ive , inc rease i n s t a b i l i t y and 
19 c r e a t e new t ens ions between the two coun t r i e s . He pro tes ted 
s t rongly agains t the U. S, b id to s e l l a i r c r a f t and other arms 
to Pakis tan on the b a s i s t h a t t h i s move had been made to 
20 p r e s s u r i s e Ind ia over the nuclear i s s u e . He also expressed 
the hope t h a t the U, S, would not make any attempt to equate 
Pakis tan and Ind i a as any arms supply to Pakistan would provoke 
21 
anti-U,-S, r eac t ion in I n d i a . 
Thus/ we see t h a t for a time when the Janata Government 
came to power, the p r o s p e c t s for b e t t e r Indo- U.S. r e la t ionsh ip 
became b r i g h t . Car te r was pre-d isposed to look to India as 
the l e a c e r of South Asia, but soon a f t e r differences cropped 
up on nuclear i s sue on the supply of enriched uranium to India 
for '^arapur Atomic P l a n t , 
The United S t a t e s has been p ress ing India to sign the 
Nuclear Non-pro l i f e ra t ion Treaty in 1977, The U, 3, has been 
i n s i s t i n g on " fu l l - scope" safeguards in respec t of a l l nuclear 
19, The P a t r i o t , 7 February 1979- The Statesman.(N-ne1hiL:)fi Feb. 
1979. 
20, The Hindu, 22 i ^ r i l 1979. 
21, Indian Express, 4 ; ^ r i l 1979, 
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p l a n t s i n I n d i a . At a p r e s s C o n f e r e n c e i n New D e l h i , o n 
1 S e p t e m b e r 19 7 7 , M o r a r j i D e s a i r e v e a l e d t h a t ' b o t h t h e S o v i e t 
Union and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of Amer ica wan ted t h a t we s h o u l d 
s i g n t h e NPT* a n d t h e y h a v e b e e n a p p l y i n g p r e s s u r e on t h i s 
22 
c o u n t r y f o r t h e l a s t few y e a r s . 
M o r a r j i D e s a i o n 24 March 19 7 7 , s a i d " i f i t was no t 
n e c e s s a r y t o h a v e n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n s f o r p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s , 
23 
t h e n i t s h o u l d n e v e r be d o n e . " On 15 May 1977, he s a i d t h a t 
i f a p e a c e f u l n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n was n e c e s s a r y I n d i a w i l l do 
i t , " b u t we w i l l n o t do i t i n h i d e and s e e k manner . We w i l l 
t e l l t h e p e o p l e t h a t we a r e do ing and l e t their come and 
24 
w i t n e s s , and t h e use w i l l a l s o be o p e n e q u a l l y t o o thers .** 
T h e r e was a l s o an e f f o r t t o d e m o n s t r a t e I n d i a ' s g e n u i n e 
i n t e n t i o n a b o u t t h e f u t u r e e x p l o s i o n , i f a n y , b e i n g f o r p u r e l y 
p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s . M o r a r j i D e s a i t o l d t h e Lok Sabha on 
13 J u l y 19 77 t h a t " f u r t h e r n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n s a r e n e c e s s a r y t o 
b e c a r r i e d o u t now by I n d i a f o r p u r p o s e of h a r n e s s i n g n u c l e a r 
e n e r g y f o r p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s . At t h e same t i m e he r e i t e r a t e d 
I n d i a ' s r e s o l v e n o t t o s i g n t h e NPT on a c c o u n t of i t s d i s c r i m i n a -
t o r y c h a r a c t e r . 
22. Indian and Foreign Reviey. l April 1977, p . 6. 
23. I b j ^ 
24. I b i ^ . , 1 June 1977. 
25. The Times of Ind ia , 14 Ju ly 1977, 
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In f ac t there was a big gap what the United States sa id 
and did. The United S ta tes de l i be r a t e ly t r i e d to promote an 
arms race in the Indian sijb-continent because i t did not want 
to see Ind ia as a nuclear power of the subcontinent . Although 
t h e Janata Government did i t s best to improve I n d i a ' s r e l a t ions 
with the United Sta tes but due t o d i f ferent percept ions , 
c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s and geo-»political factor they could not 
improve beyond a c e r t a i n po in t . 
China 's At t i tude Towards India; 
When the Janata Government came to power i t was expected 
t h a t I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with China wil l improve and the new 
Government wi l l t r y to e s t a b l i s h f r i end ly r e l a t ions with the 
People ' s Republic of China and will resolve the outstanding 
i ssues between the tvw coun t r i e s . The a t t i t u d e of the Janata 
Government on the boundry issue was more r i g i d than tha t of 
t he Congress Government. Prime Minis te r , Morarji Desai in 
November 19 77 to ld the Japanese News Reporters t h a t China had 
been in occ i^a t ion of over 14,000 square miles of Indian 
t e r r i t o r y s ince 1962 and tha t unless the boundry question was 
solved, " the re cannot be conplete understanding between the 
«26 
two c o u n t r i e s . 
China has been a permanent t h r e a t t o Ind ia ' s secur i ty 
s i nce 1962. Although China never repeated any mi l i ta ry action 
26. The Times of India (New Delhi) 1 December 19 77. 
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aga ins t India , nevertheless her h o s t i l i t y continued in the 
following years . I t was manifested in several world forums 
and major foreign pol icy s ta tements . 
In f ac t / the rea l problematic fac tor between India and 
China has been f i r s t Moscow and then Islamabad. Significantly 
as the Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s improved Sino-Indian re la t ions 
d e t e r i o r a t e d in p a r a l l e l s t ages . As Kulcip Nayar has aptly 
remarked, "China's h o s t i l i t y to India has been in proportion 
27 t o New Delh i ' s proximity to Moscow". ' In future too the main 
determining elements in Sino-Indian re la t ions was l ike ly to 
be China's percept ion of Indo-Soviet equation. There was a 
g e o - p o l i t i c a l i n e v i t a b i l i t y about a r i va l ry between the Soviet 
Union and China in the forseable fu ture . If on the one hand, 
India considered the Soviet Union i t s unfai l ing friend China 
regarded the l a t t e r as i t s implacable enemy. China suffered 
from an obsessive fear of Soviet conspiracy to encircle i t . 
This s t r a t e g i c encirclement was i t s constant nightmare. China 
thought t ha t India was a l i nk in the Soviet encirclanient of 
China. Besides/ Pakistan a lso occupied a high prioritr/ in China's 
28 
ca l cu la t ion because i t was in Russia 's gateway to India. This 
divergence of securi ty i n t e r e s t between India and China has been 
t h e main road block t o reconc i l i a t ion and rea l normalisation. 
27. Prakash Chandra, In te rna t iona l Relat ions. Vikas Publishing 
House, Pv t . , L t d . , New Delhi, 1983, p . 170, 
28. Ib id . 
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The S i n o - I n d i a n r e l a t i o n s were i n t e x t r i c a b l y mixed with 
h o s t i l e r e l a t i o n s between China and the Sov ie t Union, and with 
C h i n a ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e United S t a t e s . Hence, India 
c o u l d no t go ahead for enough t o c u l t i v a t e the f r i endsh ip of 
wors t enemy of i t s bes t f r i e n d . The enormity of t h e Soviet 
Pa rano ia about China made i t p o s s i b l e for Ind ia to proceed but 
s l owly on the road t o n o r m a l i s a t i o n . 
The S ino - Ind ian Nonna l i s a t i on : 
S i n o - P a k i s t a n i c l o s e f r i e n d s h i p has a l s o been an o b s t a c l e 
i n n o r m a l i s i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s . Following 
t h e debac le of 19 62, China and P a k i s t a n came c l o s e t o each o t h e r . 
Eve r s ince 1963 China has been supplying arms t o Pakis tan and has 
ga ined t e r r i t o r i a l advantages in Azad Kashmir. China gave i t s 
unequivocal suppor t t o Pak i s t an a g a i n s t Ind ia bo th in the war of 
1965 and 1971. S i n o - P a k i s t a n i f r i e n d s h i p f u r t h e r s t reng thened 
when Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao Ping and P a k i s t a n i 
A d m i n i s t r a t o r General Ziau l Haque inaugura ted t h e 50C miles 
Karakoram Highway on 18 June 19 78 completed with the Chinese he lp . 
At t h e same t ime Bei j ing agreed to a s s i s t Pak is tan to o u i l t a 
f a c t o r y in Karachi f o r manufac tur ing t anks and an t i - canks 
29 
m i s s i l e s * 
29 . Vijay Sen Ehudraj / "China as a F a c t o r in Indo-Soviet 
R e l a t i o n s i n Surendra Chopra, S tud ied i n I n d i a ' s Por^ian 
poXlev (ed.) , Department of P o l i t i c a l Sc ience , C3ND 
U n i v e r s i t y , A n r i t s a r , 1983, p . 139. 
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C h i n a ' s e x p a n s i o n i s t p o l i c y has been a permanent t h r e a t 
t o I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , China has always 
encouraged and he lped Naga and Mizo t r i b e s fo r t h e independence 
of Sikkim, and i n s t r u c t e d and h e l p e d I n d i a n P ro -Mao i s t s th rough 
t h e Communist P a r t y of I n d i a , ••to u n i t e p e a s a n t s and g u e r i l l a groups 
so a s t o l a u n c h a ' g r a n d i o s e people* war and consequen t ly s e i z e 
power i n t h e c o u n t r y , " 
I t was a g a i n s t t h e background of t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t 
r e l a t i o n between t h e two c o u n t r i e s c o u l d n o t be iinproved. The 
d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s suspended s ince 
1961/ were r e s t o r e d d u r i n g t h e I n d i r a Gandhi reg ime. Trade 
d e l e g a t i o n s were exchanged between t h e two c o u n t r i e s in 1978 
when t h e J a n a t a Government was i n power. I t was a l s o expected 
t h a t t h e two c o u n t r i e s w i l l be a b l e t o no rma l i s e r e l a t i o n s . 
I n February 1979, t h e I n d i a n Fore ign M i n i s t e r , Atal Behari 
Vajpayee v i s i t e d B e i j i n g on t h e e x p l o r a t o r y mis s ion with t h e 
view t o f u r t h e r n o r m a l i s a t i o n of b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . But 
t h e Chinese i n v a s i o n of Vietnam, whi l e I n d i a n External A f f a i r s 
M i n i s t e r was s t i l l a g u e s t i n China; caused a s e r i o u s setback 
i n I n d i a ' s e f f o r t s t owards n o r m a l i s a t i o n of I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with 
t h e P e o p l e ' s Republ ic of China. I n d i a open ly condemned 
32 t h e Chinese m i l i t a r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t Vietnam, 
30.V, Volodin , "Peking Manoeuvres i n South As ia" , I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
A f f a i r s , N o . 1 1 , November 1978, p p . 23-24 . 
3 1 , P rakash Chandra, n , 2 3 , p . 171 . 
32. I b i d . 
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Genuine Hon-Alignment and the Soviet Union; 
India came c lose to the Soviet Union because of i t s 
s ecu r i t y needs. I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y 
has always been th rea tened e i t h e r from t h e s ide of Pakistan 
o r from the side of China or by a combination of the two 
coun t r i e s supported by the U.S.A. Therefore, I nd i a es tab l i shed 
c lose r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet Union i n order to n e u t r a l i s e 
Sino-U,s. m i l i t a r y support t o Pak i s tan . The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship o: .3 71 was continvied between the two countries 
to p r o t e c t I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y from ou t s ide a t t ack , 
Buc the statement 'no spec ia l r e l a t i o n s h i p ' with any 
country given by the Prime Minis te r Morarji Desai and the use 
of 'genuine ' before non-alignment by him had caused some alarm 
33 i n Moscow. The Soviet Union f e l t t h a t the J ana ta Government 
may t i l t away from the c lose r e l a t i o n s h i p e s t ab l i shed by Indo-
Soviet Treaty of Peace and Fr iendship . The Soviet Union needed 
I n d i a ' s f r iendship as much as Ind ia needed S o v i e t ' s fr iendship. 
But they hasrened to overcome the embarassment of dealings with 
the new government in Ind i a so much so t h a t within five weeks 
of the e l e c t i o n ' s r e s u l t , the Soviet Foreign Minis ter A.A, 
Gromyko came to Ind i a on 25 April 1977 in order to assess the 
33. Vijay Sea Bhudraj, "The J ana t a Par ty and Indo-Soviet 
Rela t ions" , i n K.P. Misra, J a n a t a ' s Poreicm pol icy (ed.) 
Vikas Publ ishing House, P v t . , Ltd. , New Delhi , 1979,p. 180, 
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a t t i t u d e of t h e J a n a t a Government t owards t h e Sovie t Union. 
He was welcomed wi th open h e a r t and he found t h e atmosphere 
" g o o d " , " c o n s t r u c t i v e " and " f r i e n d l y " t owards t h e Sovie t Union 
and t h e two c o u n t r i e s s i g n e d t h r e e ag reemen t s , one for long 
term c r e d i t t o I n d i a , a n o t h e r f o r t r a d e and t h e t h i r d for Soviet 
T e c h n i c a l A s s i s t a n c e fo r Tashkent S r i n a g a r T r o p o - s c a t t e r Link 
34 t o improve t e l e - communica t i on between t h e two c o u n t r i e s . At the 
end of Gromyko v i s i t , t h e J o i n t I n d o - S o v i e t Communique was 
s igned on 27 Apr i l 1977 i n which t h e two c o u n t r i e s reaf f i rmed 
t h e i r f a i t h i n t h e s p i r i t o f t h e 1971 t r e a t y and no ted with 
" f u l l s a t i s f a c t i o n " t h e i r " i d e n t i c a l " o r " c l o s e " p o s i t i o n on 
35 
many i m p o r t a n t wor ld problems* 
Thus, we see t h a t w h i l e t h e J a n a t a Government continued 
t o t a l k about t h e ' genu ine* non-a l ig runent p o l i c y but i n ac tual 
p r a c t i c e t hey fo l lowed t h e same p o l i c y t owards t h e Soviet 
Union t h a t had been p u r s u e d by t h e Congress Government i n the 
p a s t . The J a n a t a e r a c o u l d n o t u s h e r e d i n any r a d i c a l innovat ion 
i n I n d i a ' s f o r e ign p o l i c y because t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n 
t h a t had fo rced t h e two c o u n t r i e s t o e s t a b l i s h s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n -
sh ip was more o r l e s s t h e same and any r a d i c a l change by 
34, Asian Recorder , Vol . XXIII , no . 22, 28 May-3 June 1977, (N.Delhi) 
p . 13757. 
35 . For t h e f u l l Text of t h e J o i n t I n d o - S o v i e t Communique 
See Sov ie t Review, Vol . XIV, n o s . 21 -22 , 5 Kay 1977, (Moscow) 
p p . 14-18 . 
36. M.S. Raj an, " I n d i a ' s Fo re ign P o l i c y : Problems and 
P r o s p e c t s " , i n K.P. M i s r a , n . 33 , p p . 1 9 - 2 6 . 
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the Janata Government in I n d i a ' s re la t ions with the Soviet 
Union would have proved to be injurious to i t s national 
i n t e r e s t s . I t was for the same reason tha t Morarji Desai 
readi ly accepted inv i ta t ion to v i s i t Moscow, which indicated 
the p r io r i t y ,the Janata Government gave to the Soviet Union 
in i t s re la t ions with the other countries. The importance of the 
Soviet Union attached to i t s friendship with India was 
demonstrated from the fact tha t President L . I . Brezhnev himself 
in disregard of the Protocol turned up at the Moscow airport on 
21 October with the en t i r e top leaders of the C.P.S.U and the 
Soviet Government, to welcome the Indian frime Minister, The 
Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, in h is speech in Moscow, 
acknowledged that the Indo-soviet re la t ions were not based on 
persona l i t i e s or ideologies but on equal i ty, national in teres ts 
37 and common purposes. Not only tha t but the jo in t Indo-Soviet 
Declaration signed on 26 October 1977, indicated various 
issues on which India had received and would continue to receive 
the Soviet support. I t also revealed the common purposes of 
the two countries. One of the most important common purposes 
38 was to prevent the Chinese influence in South Asia. Soviet 
also needed the help of India to encircle China, In th i s way, 
they decided to maintain the special re la t ions with each other 
to meet the Chinese th rea t to tneir national security 
and to protect t he i r national i n t e r e s t s , 
37. Soviet Review. Vol. XIV, nos. 51-52, (3 November 1977),p.ll, 
38. Ibid. 
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Secondly , one of t h e coirunon p u r p o s e s of t h e fo re ign 
p o l i c i e s of t h e two c o u n t r i e s was t o reduce t h e U .S . i n f l u e n c e 
i n P a k i s t a n and t o p e r s u a d e P a k i s t a n t o e s t a b l i s h "good 
n e i g h b o u r l y " r e l a t i o n s w i t h I n d i a . I n d i a e s t a b l i s h e d s p e c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union dur ing t h e Bangladesh c r i s i s 
i n 1971 i n o r d e r t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t h e S ino-U.S , suppor t to 
P a k i s t a n , I n t h e p a s t (50* s and 60* s) I n d i a moved towards t h e 
Sov i e t Union t o c o u n t e r a c t t h e U . S . suppor t t o P a k i s t a n as well 
a s Chinese t h r e a t t o I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . The Sov i e t i n t e r e s t s t o 
improve I n d i a ' s defence c a p a b i l i t i e s made I n d i a able t o s t and 
up t o China and m a i n t a i n t h e ba lance of power i n t h e r e g i o n . 
T h i r d l y , one of t h e common p u r p o s e s of t h e Sovie t and 
I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y which was i n t h e i n t e r e s t of t he s e c u r i t y 
of I n d i a , was t o c u r t a i l t h e m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s of t h e o u t s i d e 
powers i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean. Both I n d i a and t h e Sovie t Union 
s t r o n g l y opposed t h e U . S . nava l b a s e s i n t h e Ind ian Ocean, 
During t h e J a n a t a Government e r a , t h e l e a d e r s of the Sovie t 
Union e x p r e s s e d t h e i r suppo r t " fo r s t r i v i n g of t h e peop le s of 
t h e a r e a t o make t h e I n d i a n Ocean a zone of p e a c e " . In t h e 
J o i n t I n d o - S o v i e t D e c l a r a t i o n both c o u n t r i e s u rged the removal 
of a l l f o r e i g n ^ m i l i t a r y b a s e s e x i s t i n g i n t h e Ind i an Ocean 
39 
and t h e p r e v e n t i o n o f e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e new ones . 
39. S o v i e t Review, n , 37, p . 2 1 - 2 2 
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I n d i a ' c, RP>«T;^ onsf> t o i^he -DeYe],opment;3 in the Sub-gont^JLnent;; 
The re -emergence of super power p o l i t i c s i n South and 
South West As ia , w i th t h e Sov i e t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i n 
Afghan i s t an and t h e U . S . d e c i s i o n t o rearm P a k i s t a n had once 
aga in c r e a t e d i n s e c u r i t y t o I n d i a . The super powers r i v a l r y 
had come t o I n d i a ' s d o o r s t e p a s South West Asia become a 
t h e a t r e fo r g l o b a l r i v a l r y between t h e two super powers, 
I n d i a p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t t h e superpowers involvement i n Afghanistan 
which had i n c r e a s e d t e n s i o n and i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e r e g i o n , I n d i a 
be ing a major power o f t h e r e g i o n , p l a y e d an a c t i v e r o l e t o 
subdue and d e - e s c a l a t e t h e Afghan c r i s i s and t o keep t h e a r ea 
40 f r e e from super power r i v a l r y . 
I t was on 27 December 1979, t h a t Sov i e t t r o o p s e n t e r e d 
i n Afghanis tan on t h e r e q u e s t of A f g h a n i s t a n ' s new p r e s i d e n t , 
41 Babrak Karmal. The S o v i e t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n o c c u r r e d due 
t o t h e U, S, involvement i n t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Afghanis tan , 
Before t h e Sov ie t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Afghanis tan , t h e 
U . S . had been p r o v i d i n g a l l s o r t s of a s s i s t a n c e t o Afghan r e v o -
l u t i o n a r i e s and a f t e r t h e Sov i e t m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i t began to 
a s s i s t them wi th mass ive arms v i a P a k i s t a n , 
40, B.N, Sakkar , "The Super Powers As Arms Salesmen", 
^ r i t a Bazar P a t r i k a , 8 February 1980, 
4 1 , The Tr ibune , 29 December 1979, 
105 
I n d i a was i n t h e m i d s t of f i e r c e General E l e c t i o n 
campaign. The i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n of t h e c o u n t r y was i n tu rm-
o i l on t h e one hand and t h e s i t u a t i o n of t h e I n d i a n s u b - c o n t i -
n e n t was t o o much f i e r c e due t o t h e a r m s - r a c e between t h e two 
super powers on t h e o t h e r hand. The p r a c t i c a l chances of U . S . 
m i l i t a r y involvement was r u l e d o u t on t h e b a s i s of t h e 
e jqjer ience and l e s s o n from Vietnam war. However, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
of U .S . m o t i v e s t o i n c r e a s e i t s i n f l u e n c e and hold over t h e 
42 
a r e a by s t r e n g t h e n i n g P a k i s t a n v i a i t s m i l i t a r y a id posed 
s e r i o u s t h r e a t t o I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . 
I n such a s i t u a t i o n , I n d i a ' s p r i m a r y concern was t o 
meet i t s s e c u r i t y needs by de fus ing t h e super power r i v a l r y i n 
t h e r e g i o n on t h e one hand and by n e u t r a l i s i n g P a k i s t a n ' s 
m i l i t a r y a m b i t i o n s , on t h e o t h e r hand, I n a i a d isapproved of t h e 
super powers ' moves t o seek m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p rob l ems . The c a r e t a k e r Government of Chowdhry Charan Singh 
e x p r e s s e d i t s concern on 31 December 1979 t o t h e U.S . resumption 
of arms supply t o P a k i s t a n which had posed a s e r i o u s t h r e a t 
43 t o I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and t o t h e peace of t h e r e g i o n . 
Charan Singh a l s o d i s a p p r o v e d of t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n 
44 i n Afghan i s t an , because I n d i a ' s c l o s e l i n k w i th non-a l igned 
Afghan i s t an was deep r o o t e d i n h i s t o r y , 
42 , The Super Power Game, I n d i a TodaV, Vol . V, n o . 3 , 1 - 5 
February 1980,p , 12, 
43 , I n d i a n E x p r e s s , 1 J a n u a r y 1980, 
44, See fo r d e t a i l s , Lok Sabha Deba te s , Vo l , 1, No. 3 , 
2 J a n u a r y 1980, c o l s , 41-54 , Also see. The H i n d u s t ^ Times, 
7 J a n u a r y 1980. 
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However, the Prime Minis ter Charan Singh did not condemn 
t h e Soviet i n t e rven t ion and urged, immediate withdrawal of the 
Soviet t roops . He i n d i r e c t l y expressed h i s disapproval of the 
Soviet ac t ion when he reminded Moscow of the June 1979's J o i n t 
Indo-Soviet statement which opposed any in te r fe rence by outs ide 
45 forces in the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Afghanistan, He rea l i zed 
the importance of h i s t o r i c Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship of 1971 which met the t h r e a t to I n d i a ' s secur i ty 
posed by the U, S, and i t s a l l y - P a k i s t a n , Therefore, the Caretaker 
Government of Charan Singh did not d i sp lease the Soviet Union 
by i t s condemnation of the Soviet m i l i t a r y ac t ion in Afghanistan 
because t he Soviet help was abso lu te ly necessary a t tha t t ime. 
45. The J o i n t Indo-Soviet Statement was signed during Prime 
Min i s t r , Morarji Desai v i s i t to Moscow, 10-14 June 1979, 
For fu l l t e x t see Soviet Review, Vol. 16, No.28, 
18 June 1979, pp, 16-19. 
C H A P T E R - IV 
S o v i e t I n t e r v e n t i o n i n Afghan i s t an 
and I t s Impact on I n d i a ' s S e c u r i t y 
CHAPTER - IV 
SOVIET INTSRV3NTI0N IN AFGHANISTAN I^W 
ITS IMPACT ON INDIA' S SECURITY 
The J a n a t a Governinent e n d e d i n December 1979 f a c i n g 
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s i n I n d i a n s u b - c o n t i n e n t due t o t h e S o v i e t 
m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n . The i m m e d i a t e impac t 
of S o v i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n was t h a t t h e Afghan 
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s began t o r e c e i v e arms a s s i s t a n c e d i r e c t l y 
from P a k i s t a n and i n d i r e c t l y from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and 
C h i n a . The U . S . l i f t e d t h e ban on t h e s u p p l y of weapons t o 
P a k i s t a n and p r o v i d e d m a s s i v e arms a i d t o P a k i s t a n . T h e r e -
f o r e , t h e U . S . d e c i s i o n t o r e a r m P a k i s t a n c r e a t e d g e n u i n e 
f e e l i n g of c o n c e r n :*.n I n d i a r e g a r d i n g t h e s e c u r i t y , s t a b i -
l i t y and p e a c e of t h e r e g i o n . The c a r e t a k e r Government of 
Chowdhry Cha ran S ingh d i s a p p r o v e d of t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n and b o l d l y r e a c t e d a g a i n s t t h e 
U . S . move t o r e a r m P a k i s t a n . But t h e J a n a t a Government 
was t o o b r i e f t o w a r r a n t a c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n of i t s f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y and t o t a k e a b o l d s t e p t o s a f e g u a r d I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l 
s e c u r i t y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t s i g n e d i m p o r t a n t economic a g r e e -
men t s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union t o s t a b i l i s e t h e economic p o s i t i o n 
1 . T.nv .q^hha Dgbatgc! » V o l . 1 , N o . 3 , 23 J a n u a r y 1980 
c o l s . 4 1 - 4 5 , 
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of the country. I t was also c red i t ad with the softer 
pol icy towards neighbours. 
I t may be pointed out t h a t , grave developments had 
taken place in Afghanistan due to the revolution in Afgha-
n i s t a n . And on the o ther hand, there was a struggle going 
on between Khalq and Parcham. The Government of Afghanistan 
headed by Babrak Karmal inv i t ed the Soviet troops into Afgha-
n i s t a n . The Soviet m i l i t a ry action in Afghanistan was 
prompted by the alarming s i t u a t i o n bui lding-up in Iran, where 
an American invasion to f ree the hostages captured by the 
I ranians from the U.S. Embassy appeared to be iireninent with 
2 
a l l i t s d r a s t i c impl ica t ions . On the o ther hand, Pakistan 
affirmed to defend Afghanistan's Islamic s p i r i t , so i t become 
a ' f r o n t l i n e ' s t a t e in the eyes of the U.S. Administration 
and US-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s h i p became s t rong. These develop-
ments posed a ser ious t h r ea t to India ' s t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty 
and nat ional s ecu r i t y , 
U.S. Mil i tary Assistance to Pakistan ; 
Following these developments, the American Administra-
t ion l i f t e d the embargo on the supply of arms to Pakistan 
2. Ci ted in V.P. Dis t t India ' s Foreign Policy, Vikas 
Publishing House, (New Delhi, 1984) , p . 372. 
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which was used to help the Afghan revolu t ionar ies to fight 
the Russian Rei Army and to capture the power. President 
Jimmy Car t e r expressed h i s readiness to provide al l kinds of 
a s s i s t ance to Pakis tan . The arms supplied by the United 
S ta tes to Pakistan were 230 armoured personnel c a r r i e r s , a i r -
combat and an t i - t ank miss i l e s communication equipments, 105 mm 
a r t i l l e r y p ieces , arm.s and ammunitions and spare par ts worth 
3 150 mil l ion d o l l a r s . The United S ta tes gave assurance to 
India tha t i t s m i l i t a r y aid to Pakistan was only to defend 
Pakis tan ' s North-Westem border and was not a threa t to India, 
President Ca r t e r announced h i s decision to provide 
m i l i t a r y and economic ass i s tance to Pakistan to meet the 
s i t ua t i on , which he described as "the g rea tes t threat to 
4 
world peace." The American White House issued a clear 
warning to the Soviet Union tha t "the U3 was prepared to use 
force to prevent any fu r the r Soviet mi l i t a ry moves in South 
5 Asia." I t made i t c l e a r tha t the US move to build-up i t s 
m i l i t a r y bases in Pakistan was to counterweigh the Soviet 
arms sale to Ind ia . Washington's plans were already in the 
3 . Bhupinder Singh, Indo-Pak Confl ict Over Kashmir, 3.C. 
Publ i shers , P a t i a l a , Punjab, 1984, p . 64. 
4. T.V. Parasuram, "U3 Decides to Arm Pakistani Sequel to 
Soviet Action in Kabul," Indian Express, 31 December, 
1979. 
5 . The Tribune , 16,February 198C. 
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offing in South West Asia even before the -\fghani3tar. c r i s i s . 
From i t s point of view Pakistan has a key place in Washington's 
plans for a Rapid Deployment Force in the iMlddle Sast, In 
t he U.3, c a l cu l a t i ons , Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were the 
two e s sen t i a l p i l l a r s of the American response to =ry West 
Asian c r i s i s . Therefore, Washington decided to move fast 
for a fresh mi l i t a ry re la t ionsh ip with Pakistan and 
offered l a rge - sca l e mi l i t a ry and economic assis tance tc 
Islamabad. 
Thus, the s i tua t ion in the sub-continent was compli-
cated by the subs tan t ia l ass i s tance of arms and materials 
provided to the revolutionary forces from Pakistan. It created 
a more dangerous s i tua t ion to Ind i a ' s secur i ty than th^t faced 
by India in the preceding years a f t e r independence. 
Returning of Mrs. Gandh±.tL°-P9W£rX 
I t was under such condit ion tha t Mrs. Indira 3^dhi 
assumed the off ice of the Prime Minister of India on 
14 January 19 80 Soon af te r assuming the o'tfice, the new 
Prime Minister decided to frame-up India ' s foreign policy in 
new dimensions. She began to understand the s i tuat ion tha t 
was very dangerous to Ind ia ' s secur i ty as well as threat 
H i 
t o the ragional peace. She s t a r t e d to bui ld up the mind 
of her col leagues and reminded them the events of the pas t . 
Under her i n s t r u c t i o n s , the Indian envoy at the United 
Nations, Brajesh C. Mishra, in a speech c l ea r ly ani catego-
r i c a l l y s t a t ed India ' s policy towards the Acghan issue, he 
sa id : 
1. Moscow sent t roops to Afghanistan at the request of 
the government in Kabul. 
2 . India was opposed to the presence of foreign troops 
and mi l i t a ry bases in any country, 
3 . But the Soviet Union had assured India that i t v/ould 
withdraw i t s t roops when asked to do so by the Afghan 
Government and New Delhi had "no reason to doubt 
assurances, p a r t i c u l a r l y from a fr iendly country l i k e 
the Soviet Union" with whom India had "m.any close 
t i e s . " 
4 . "India hopes tha t the Soviet Union will not v io la te 
the independence of Afghanistan and tha t the Soviet 
forces wi l l not remain there a day longer than 
necessary, 
5 . India disapproved of attemps made by ce r t a in "out-
side powers'* in encouraging disturbances and subver-
sion ins ide Afghanistan, 
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6. C o n s t r j c t i o n of m i l i t a r y ba se s and pumping of arms 
i n t o c o u n t r i e s of t h e ragion posed a t h r e a t t o 
Ind i a ' s own s e c u r i t y . 
Ind ia ' s s t and at t h e UK General Assembly r e f l e c t e d 
t h e swi tch in t h e Indi.an Government 's s t a n d on Afghan i s s u e 
and a l so r e f l e c t e d t h e de t e rmina t ion of t h e new government 
t o g i v e a d e f i n i t e d i r e c t i o n t o Indian fo re ign policy^ k e e p -
ing in mind I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . 
Sin o - Ama r i c an - P ak_ Axi s_ i 
Ind ia ' s s e c u r i t y has always been t h r e a t e n e d e i t h e r 
by P a k i s t a n o r China o r by a combinat ion of both supported 
by Uni t ed S t a t e s of America. The Sino American axis t o 
a s s i s t Pak i s t an wi th massive arms once again posed a s e r i o u s 
t h r e a t t o I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . On 13 January 198D, i t was 
d i s c l o s e d t h a t t h e US had approved $ 400 m i l l i o n '^rarth 
m i l i t a r y and economic a id to P a k i s t a n . P r e s i d e n t Jimmy C a r t e r 
a l so l i f t e d the ban on t h e supply of arms t o Pakis tan and 
announced h i s dec i s ion t o e x p e d i t e t h e s a l e of about $ 150 
7 
m i l l i o n worth arms s u p p l i e s t o P a k i s t a n . The weapons were 
6. " I n d i a and Afghanistan : Change S t a n c e , " Sconomic and 
P o l i t i c a l VJeeklv, v o l . 1 5 . No.3 , 19 January 1980. ~New 
Delh i , p . "88. 
"^' The Tr ibune , 22 January and see a l so The Hindustan 
Times "(New D e l h i ) , 31 December 1979. 
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defensive including a n t i - a i r c r a f t equipments — 130 cargo 
t r anspor t p lanes . Meanwhile Brezezinski ( the US Presidential 
Advisor of Security ) v i s i t e d Pakistan in February 1980 and 
offered $ 400 mil l ion mi l i t a ry and economic aid to Pakistan 
g 
fo r next two years . 
I t may be pointed out here t ha t a f t e r the Soviet 
m i l i t a r y in te r fe rence in Afghanistan, the Indian ocean so 
f a r described as "neglected ocean" and as an "out lying 
one" became the hub of a c t i v i t i e s and turned into a zone 
Q 
of i n t e rna t iona l exchange of mi l i t a ry goods. The US 
Administration es tab l i shed the Rapid Deployjnent Force in 
the Indian Ocean. The Pentagon had posi t ioned nuclear 
weapons on Diego Gracia which i n t ens i f i ed the impact of 
super-powers r i v a l r y in the Indian Ocean and threatened 
I n d i a ' s na t ional s ecu r i t y . 
One of the main objec t ives of the United States in 
e s t ab l i sh ing i t s bases in Indian Ocean was to seek the help 
of l i t t o r a l s t a t e s to e s t a b l i s h i t s sphere of influence in 
these s t a t e s and to get the supply of o i l t o i t s a l l i e s from 
these s t a t e s and to support Pakistan in case of future war 
8 . The Dawn (Karachi), 5 February 1980. 
9 . Bhupindar Singh, ^ - 3 , p . 19 2. 
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betwaen I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . These devalopments in -'ne 
Indian s u b - c o n t i n e n t e n c i r c l e d t h e e n t i r e r eg ion . Bes ides , 
China resumed i t s supply of arms t o P a k i s t a n . In .^gus t 
1980, China showed i t s r e a d i n e s s to p rov ide a i r m i s s i l e s , 
l i g h t t a n k s , Ml-4 Hound h e l i c o p t e r s and TU-lo and ^ - 4 
medium bombers. China a l s o provided T-59 m i s s i l e s , T-'50 
amphibious, T-62 l i g h t t a n k s and MIG-20 and R-9 f i g h t a r to 
Pak i s t an under defence agreement with P re s iden t Ziaul Haque. 
According t o a r e p o r t , China equiped Pak is tan with 12C mm 
and 160 mm mor ta r s as well as 37 mm, 57 mm, 85 mr and 
1000 mm a n t i c r a f t guns . All t h e s e arms and ammunitions 
were taken mainly due t o t h e f e a r t h a t t h e Soviet Unicn 
cou ld t a k e advantage of t h e North-West F r o n t i e r P r o v i r c e . 
China a l s o i n s t a l l e d ground and a i r m i s s i l e s in t h e G i l g i t 
r e g i o n . In t h i s way, Pak i s tan enjoyed the support of 
China in a l l f i e l d s and t h e r e was no ques t ion of any change 
in t h i s p o l i c y . 
The Hindu r e p o r t e d t h a t China had supp l ied MI3-9 
p l a n e s , T-52 t a n k s , a r t i l l e r y medium and small arms ar.i 
ammunitions t o P a k i s t a n . China a l so b u i l t i t s na\'al 
b a s e s in P a k i s t a n . A High Level Chinese Defence Delegation 
10. The Tr ibune (Chandigarh) , 14 May, 1980. 
1 1 . The .Hin,du,. (Madras) , 29 May, 1980. 
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arr ived in Karachi and Islamabad to t a lk Pakistani Defance 
Secretary Maj. General Rahim Khan for going around defence 
12 establishment in Pakis tan , 
Bejing wanted to put i t s hand over Kashmir as there 
was an agreement with Pakistan in 19 63 according to which 
Pakistan had promised to give 5,000 km, of land of Kashmir 
13 t o China. Hence Chinese army's u n i t s es tabl ished i t s 
cont ro l over the Karakoram Highway running through the 
Northern par t of Kashmir, set up ammunition and fuel depots 
and deployed miss i l e s launchers along with the highway. 
Special camps were se t up in Pakistan to control t h i s part 
of Kashmir and saboteurs were t r a ined and despatched to 
14 India to d i s tu rb the peace in Indian t e r r i t o r y . China 
also a s s i s t ed Pakistan with $ 21,000million for Pakistani 
nuclear programme and sent i t s nuclear s c i e n t i s t s to 
Pakistan to guide Pakis tan i expe r t s . 
Thus, China' s d i r ec t ions of mi l i t a ry penetration in 
Pakistan caused concern in India . China exploited the 
12. China Report, vol.XVII, No.5, September-October 1980, 
UN Documents SWB/FS, 6630, pp. 63-4. 
13. The Times of India (New Delhi) , 15 March, 1981. 
14. Indian 3xpress (New Delhi) , 12 August, 1980. 
15. Pa t r i o t (New Delhi) , 28 ^ r i l 1980. 
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s i t ua t i on and ra ised i t s h o s t i l i t y with India posing grave 
t h r e a t to Ind ia ' s s ecu r i t y , Chinese t h r e a t to India v/as 
mora serious than the U3 involvement in the region. 
Pakistan too claimed a th rea t to i t s secur i ty posed 
by the Russian mi l i t a ry in tervent ion in Afghanistan. This 
s i t ua t i on provided a good opportunity to Pakistan for taking 
the American as well as Chinase he lp . Pakistan once again 
became an a l ly of the United Sta tes of America and t h i s 
r e l a t ionsh ip crea ted a t h r ea t to Ind i a ' s s ecu r i t y . 
The massive US aid programme to Pakistan came in 
the background of the mi l i t a ry and p o l i t i c a l understanding 
reached e a r l i e r between Washington and Islamabad. The US 
had made no secret of d'aclaring Pakistan as i t s a l ly and all 
the s t r a t eg i c plans and ca lcu la t ions of the US Government 
began from that premise. In an interview with News Week, 
General Ziaj l Hague gave the impression tha t the question 
of g ran t in j to che US bases in Pakistan was not to ta l ly ruled out. 
He to ld t ha t USA had not asked for m i l i t a r y bases . Yet we 
feel f ree to extend the hand of f r iendship to the United 
Sta tes even though we are non-aligned. He defended the 
American aids which were being provided to Pakistan and 
j u s t i f i e d his above statement on the ground tha t if India, 
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a founder marubar of t h s non-aligned movemant, could purch ase 
weapons from the Soviet Union then why sould not Pakistan 
1 6 
purchase i t from USA and remain non-aligned. However, 
General Ziaul Haque emphasized the r e l a t i onsh ip between the two 
count r ies c a l l i n g i t - a " re la t ionsh ip of confidence". 
Thus, the US-Pakistan a l l i ance threatened India as 
much as the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan threa-
tened Pakis tan . The new axis of US-Pakistan and China 
se r ious ly undermined the i n t e r e s t s of India in South Asia. 
The US claimed tha t i t s m i l i t a ry aids to Pakistan did PO-; 
th rea tened India and t h a t i t was not i n t e r e s t ed in creating tension 
and conf l i c t between the two coun t r i e s . But the US policy 
of maintaining an a r t i f i c i a l pa r i t y between India and Pakistan 
inev i t ab ly weakened the process of normalizing the re la t ions 
between India and Pakistan and dis turbed the exist ing balance 
in the region. 
India ' s Res-conse : 
Mrs. Gandhi's re turn to powers had an immediate impact 
on the external domain. The Afghan c r i s i s d i rec t ly affected 
I n d i a ' s na t ional i n t e r e s t s and threatened i t s national secu-
r i t y . India* s dilemma was how to bring about a vacation of 
16. Quoted in Indian Sxpress, 9 June 1981. 
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foreign t roops from Afghanistan and alongwith i t cessat ion 
of foreign in te r fe rence from other quar te rs too, l i k e the 
supply of arms and amiriU n i t ions to Afghan revo lu t ionar ies . 
Mrs. Gandhi indica ted the environment in which the Soviet 
t roops entered in Afghanistan. In p a r t i c u l a r , she ca l led 
a t t en t ion to poss ib le Sino-American col labora t ion against 
the USSR, to the bu i ld up of Pak is tan ' s mi l i t a ry capabi l i ty 
and the ass i s tance given to Afghan revo lu t ionar ies and to 
the esca la t ion of western mi l i t a ry presence in the Indian 
ocean. She disapproved of the Soviet intervent ion in 
Afghanistan because i t had adversed consequences on the 
e n t i r e region. 
India also s t rongly opposed the US and Chinese move 
t o rearm Pakis tan . India wanted tha t Pakistan chould c u t -
off the economic and mi l i t a ry aids to the Afghan revolu-
tionaries. The US and China, too, should refra in from provid-
ing l a rge sca le armaments to Pakistan which could c rea te 
m i l i t a r y imbalance in the sub-continent . These conditions 
would f a c i l i t a t e the Soviet withdrawl, help in reducing the 
tension and possibly would check the outs ide interference in 
the region . 
17. Cited in Sur j i t Man Singh, India' s Search for Power : 
Indi ra Gandhi Foreign Policy 19 66-1982, Sage Publica-
t i o n s , New Delhi, 1984, pp. 4-5; and see the ed i to r i a l 
Indian Nation (Patna) 4 January 1980. 
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Tha developments in Afghanistan ca l l ed £or d ip lora t ic 
dialogue with the two big powers as well as v/ith the naigh-
bouring c o u n t r i e s . Regarding diplomatic dialogue the f i r s t 
option before New Delhi was to convince o ther neighbouring 
count r ies which could provide a regional defence system 
18 
against the in te r ference of any super power. Secondly^ 
s ince India and the Soviet Union highly valued each o the r ' s 
fr iendship^ India could persuade i t to withdraw i t s troops 
from Afghanistan. This would not only help t o mit igate the 
opposi t ion within Afghanistan against bhe repress ive 
government in Kabul, but would also d ive r t U3A of an e:xcus& 
t o pour more arms in the sub-cont inent , i^d l a s t l y , India 
i t s e l f needed to take a hard look at i t s nuclear pol icy. In 
the context of a grave th rea t to i t s secur i ty and national 
i n t e r e s t , India might have to ser ious ly weighed the corrpulsion 
19 of exercis ing i t s option in t h i s f i e l d , 
India made various e f f o r t s to involve Pakistan in a 
p o l i t i c a l dialogue to prevent the creat ion of new tensions/ 
and the beginning of a new arms race in the region and to 
promote normalcy and harmony between the two count r ies , 
A number of s taps were taken to st«m the d r i f t towards a 
18. See for d e t a i l s , Z.A. Zuberi ; wher« Do We Go Prom 
Here", Pakistan Times (Karachi) , 2 February, -1980. 
19. The Statesman (New Delhi) , 14 March 1980. 
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new w a r - l i k e s i t u a t i o n . P o r a i g n S e c r e t a r y , Ram S a t h e was 
s e n t t o I s l a r r a b a d in F e b r u a r y t o s t a r t t h s p r o c e s s of a 
f ra i rework £ o r b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i t i o n s and f o r a "mee t ing of 
t h e m i n d s , " a s he p u t i t . A l though h i s v i s i t d i d no t 
p r o d u c e any such m e e t i n g of t h e minds and t h e two s i d e s 
r e s t a t e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , bu t h e p r o c e s s of d i a l o g u e was 
c o n t i n u e d . P a k i s t a n F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y had t o exchange t h e 
20 
v i s i t t o c o n t i n u e t h e d i a l o g u e . 
An a n o t h e r e f f o r t made by Mrs . I n d i r a Gandh i was 
t h a t s h e s e n t Swaran S i n g h , t h e Defence M i n i s t e r of I n d i a t o 
I s l a m a b a d in A p r i l 1 9 8 0 . H i s v i s i t was w i t h " t h e s p e c i f i c p r o -
p o s a l " f o r d e f u s i n g t e n s i o n in Sou th A s i a a s w e l l as between 
I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . He c l a r i f i e d t h a t "we a r e p r o c e e d i n g 
on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e s t o r y of t h e c o n f l i c t and t h e c o n f r o n -
t a t i o n be twen t h e two c o u n t r i e s t h a t g r i p p e d o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p 
f o r a q u a r t e r of a c e n t u r y came t o an end when t h e Simla 
»^  21 Agreement was s i g n e d . Swaran S ingh c l e a r e d t h e m i s u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g be tween I n d i a and P a k i s t a n r e g a r d i n g t h e Afghan 
i s s u e . He c l a r i f i e d t o t h e P a k i s t a n i Government t h a t 
I n d i a d i d n o t e n d o r s e t h e p r e s e n c e of S o v i e t t r o o p s in Afgha-
n i s t a n and f a v o u r e d t h e i r e a r l y w i t h d r a w l , b u t d i d no t s h a r e 
2 0 . The Times of I n d i a (New Delh i ) , 8 F e b r u a r y 1980. 
2 1 . The S ta t e sman ( D e l h i ) , 11 A p r i l 1980 . 
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I s l a m a b a d ' s v i ew t h a t a g r a v e and immed ia t e t h r e a t t o 
P a k i s t a n ' s s e c u r i t y had a r i s e n due t o che S o v i e t m i l i t a r y i n t e r -
22 
v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n . 
However, t h e r e was no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on t h e 
d i . a logue on t h e p o l i c y of P a k i s t a n , A d a r k sha.dcw on Indo-Pak 
r e l a t i o n s h i p was r e p o r t e d p r o g r e s s in a c q u i s i t i o n of n u c l e a r 
weapons c a p a b i l i t y by P a k i s t a n . I s l a m a b a d had r e l i e v e d 
f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e from some --/estem c o u n t r i e s as wel l as 
23 
from L i b y a and S a u d i A r a b i a f o r a c q u i r i n g n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y . 
The I n d i a n P r i m e M i n i s t e r , Mrs . I n d i r a Gandhi f e l t t h a t such 
a d e v e l o p m e n t would b e g r a v e and i r r e v e r s i b l e consequences f o r 
t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t and would r a d i c a l l y a l t e r t h e s t r a t e g i c 
24 
e n v i r o n m e n t i n t h e r e g i o n . 
The e f f o r t s t o d i f f u s e t e n s i o n s went o n . P a k i s t a n ' s 
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , Agha S h a h i came t o I n d i a in J u l y 1980 and 
exchanged v i e w s w i t h t h e Pr ime M i n i s t e r and Fore ign M i n i s t e r 
o f I n d i a . He a s k e d f o r a " j u s t and a m i c a b l e s e t t l e m e n t " of 
t h e d i s p u t e o v e r K a s h m i r . He p r o p o s e d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
a r a t i o in t h e armed f o r c e s of t h e tvTO c o u n t r i e s . He p o i n t e d 
o u t t h a t t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons by I n d i a 
was c a u s i n g c o n c e r n among a l l n e i g h b o u r s of I n d i a . I n d i a 
2 2 . See I n d e r M a l h o t r a ' s " D i a l o g u e w i t h P a k i s t a n " The Times 
of I n d i a (New Delhi ) , 17 ; ^ r i l 1980 . 
2 3 . I n d i a n S x p r e s s (New De lh i ) , 6 O c t o b e r 1980. 
2 4 . P a t r i o t (New Delh i ) , 10 A p r i l 1980 . 
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objected to such publ ic racking up of the Kashmir issue in 
t h a t manner and s t rongly opposed the suggestion about armed 
forces t ha t was u n r e a l i s t i c as tha s ize , population and 
requirements o£ the two countr ies were so d ive r se . India 
also resented g ra tu i tous reference to the apprehensions of 
India ' s neighbours as Pakistan was not a spokesman of the 
25 
neighbouring coun t r i e s . 
However, the dialogue was continued and a jo in t statement 
was issued by the two Foreign Ministers on 17 July 1980.^^ 
But in the nieantime Pakistan worried India when the U.S. 
m i l i t a r y ass i s tance including P-16 were being supplied to 27 Pakis tan . India s t rongly opposed the supply of such weapons 
t o Pakistan by the U.S.A. 
I t was under such condition t h a t the siplomatic d ia -
logue were exchanged between India and the Soviet Union 
regarding the development in South Asia and ef for t s were 
made by the count r ies to diffuse the arms race in the region. 
And for t h i s purpose^ Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arr ived 
in New Delhi on 12 February eulogising Indo-Soviet fr iendship 
but without a t ime- tab le for the withdrawl of t roops . Mrs. 
Gandhi t o ld him tha t she found the Soviet intervent ion unaccept-
28 
ab le . Narasimha ^^O/ the Indian Foreign Minister conveyed 
25. Asian Recorder, 12-18 August 19S0, p, 15595. 
26. Ib id . 
27. The Times of India (New Delhi) , 16 August 1980. 
28. The Times (fiondon ,) , 14 February 1980, 
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t o him Ind ia ' s ^inbarrassrrent and i n a b i l i t y to support 
Soviet ac t ion . ' They both reminded him, tha t re la t ionship 
in the region should be based on non-interference and peaceful 
co-ex i s tence , Gromyko appreciated Ind i a ' s pos i t i on , and 
in a discussion with Indian leaders emphasised two things. 
One was an assurance tha t Soviet action in Afghanistan was 
not aimed against any adjacent countr ies , and i t did net hanr 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , and surely did not c o n s t i t u t e any danger fo r 
the secur i ty and s t a b i l i t y of South Asian region. The o ther 
th ing was a warning to Pakistan, t ha t i f i t would ^ =long 
with China and the US, i t would get nothing good and under-
mine i t s pos i t ion as an independent s t a t e . 
In New Delh i ' s eye ' s both Super-powers were obviously 
using Afghanistan as an excuse to esca la te the airms race to 
entrench t h e i r respec t ive mi l i t a ry presence in the region, 
and to increase t h e i r influence on non-aligned s t a t e s . The 
precondit ions demanded by the Soviet Union to withdraw i t s 
forces from Afghnaistan were as impossible to f u l f i l as the 
outs ide ass i s tance to anti-Karmal f igh te r s was guaranteed to 
prolong con f l i c t without resolut ion on the side o r the o ther . 
29. The Times of India (New Delhi) , 13 February 1980. 
30. Ib id . , 12 February 1980. 
3 1 . Ibid. See also Sur j i t Man Singh, n,. 17, p . 154. 
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I n d i a ' s demand t h a t bo th d e s i s t from a c t i o n s e rod ing the 
independence and l i v e s of t h e indigenous people of the 
32 
r eg ion met wi th no re sponse from e i t h e r . 
Ind ia acknowledged t h e Sovie t a s s e r t i o n t h a t T'oscow 
had been r eques t ed by t h e Kabul Government t o sand Soviat 
t r o o p s f o r a s s i s t a n c e t o c rush t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y fo rce s in Kabul 
and i t i s t he r i g h t or a coun t ry to i n v i t e such a s s i s t a n c e . 
However, Ind ia ' s p o s i t i o n on t h e u n d e s i r a b i l i t y o£ Soviet 
t r o o p s remaining in Afghanistan was made r e p e a t e d l y c l a a r . 
But I n d i a was e q u a l l y i n s i s t e n t t h a t a l l o t h e r forr^s of 
i n t e r v e n t i o n from o u t s i d e must a l s o end. "mis was why the 
Indian ?ore ign M i n i s t e r , Narasimha ^^o v i s i t e d Moscow in June 
33 1980 t o convey I n d i a ' s p o s i t i o n very s t r o n g l y . Narasimha 
Rao p r e s e n t e d a r e p o r t t o Par l i ament on h i s r e t u r n froir. 
Moscow. He s a i d 'We a re opposed to t h e p resence of fore ign 
t r o o p s in any c o u n t r y . He r e f e r r e d t o Soviet statem.ents 
t h a t t h e i r p re sence was l i m i t e d in t ime , purpose , and sca le 
and did not r e p r e s e n t a t h r e a t t o t h e s e c u r i t y and s t a b i l i t y 
of t he r eg ion ' and remarked t h a t hope of t h i s be ing so 'was 
34 
n o t very s t r o n g . ' He f u r t h e r remarked t h a t Afghanistan 
should mainta in i t s sove re ign , independent and non-a l igned 
3 2 . I b i d . , p . 155 
3 3 . I b i d . 
3 4 . The Times of Ind ia , (New Delhi) , 8 June 1980. 
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s t a t u s . Afghanistan should also be assured of cessation 
and non-continuance of external in te r fe rence against i t . 
The Soviet President^ Brezhnev ^arrived in New Delhi in 
December 1980. His v i s i t to India indicated tha t he wanted 
t o prevent India from opposing Soviet p o l i c i e s more openly, 
Mrs, Indira Gandhi very d i r e c t l y expressed to Brezhnev 
India* s opposition to a l l forms of ou t s ide interference in 
the in te rna l a f f a i r s of o ther coun t r i e s , and pointed out 
tha t India' s recognition of Kampuchea was a decision reached 
outs ide the context of i t s r e l a t ions with the Soviet Union, 
but she hoped tha t the President would advise Vietnam to 
withdraw i t s forces from Kampuchea, The Soviet President 
Brezhnev emphasized the conjtancy and r e l i a b i l i t y in Indo-
Soviet f r iendship, "The Soviet people and t h e i r leaders 
are friends of I n d i a . . . . " he asser ted ' f r i ends in times 
37 
both good and bad, fr iends in rain or shine. The Soviet 
President conveyed to Mrs, Gandhi h i s appreciation that she 
could not endorse a l l Soviet ac t ions . He also indicated 
h i s e>^ec-ation t h a t India would not become a source of 
embarrassment or an object of d i sp leasure to the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet f r iendship with India was absolutely 
35. Foreign Affairs Record, June 1980, p . 120 
3 6, The Times of India (New Delhi) , 10 December 1980. 
37, Ib id , , See also Sur j i t Man Singh, n., 12, p . 157, 
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necessary to prevent a t h r ea t to India' s secur i ty from the 
s ide of Pakis tan . 
Cont inui ty in Indb-Soviet Friendship : 
The Afghanistan i ssue did not c r e a t e differences of 
opinion between India and the Soviet Union. The friendship 
between the two count r i es was s t i l l the same. India was 
not in favour of the presence of foreign troops and stood for 
an overa l l p o l i t i c a l set t lement tha t would ensure withdrawl 
of Soviet troops as well as an end to arms assis tance to 
revolut ionary f o r c e s . For Ind ia , the Afghan issue was some-
what overshadowed by the v i r t u a l mi l i t a ry a l l i ance between 
Islamabad and Washington. 
The impact of the massive US m i l i t a r y aid to Pakistan, 
as in the 50 's on Indo-Soviet r e l a t i onsh ip was probably 
s t rong . The fee l ing tha t both USA and China had deep 
committment to buildup the mi l i t a ry regime in Pakistan^rein-
forced the acknowledgement of shared concern in both New 
Delhi and ^foscow and the d e s i r a b i l i t y of retaining a counter-
balancing f r iendsh ip , so t ha t n e i t h e r of them was isola ted 
38 i nd iv idua l ly . Therefore, India continued to subscribe to 
t h e view and p r i n c i p l e tha t the foreign t roops should withdraw 
38. V.P. Dutt, n.. 2, p . 416. 
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and a l l forms of foreign in tar ferenca rnu3t cease in 
Afghanistan. In t h i s way, Indo-3oviet f r iendshir and 
co-operat ion mul t ip l i ed in various d i r e c t i o n s . 
In 1980, India and the Soviet Union concluded t h e i r 
l a r g e s t s ing le package of arms t r a n s f e r s . The most important 
items were eighty MIG-23 f igh te r s a i r c r a f t and eight MIG-25 
reconnaissance a i r c r a f t , some of the lOOT-7? and the MIG-23 
in India were also obtained. ' A t o l l ' and 'Saggar' miss i les 
as well as 'Petya* c l a s s f r i g r a t e s were par t of the same 
package. Meanwhile, th ree 'Kashin' c l a s s destroyers and 
eight 'Nanuchaka' c l a s s corve t t es were on order for the Indian 
Navy. To a l l appearances^the Indo-Soviet l i nk in defence 
39 equipment had been strengthened. And the Indo-Soviet l ink 
const ructed on convergences could survive the s t r a ins of 
several divergences in foreign policy of India. 
Mrs. Gandhi c a l l ed a t ten t ion to poss ib le Sino-i^erican 
co l labora t ion against the USSR, to bui ld up of Pakis tan 's 
m i l i t a ry c a p a b i l i t y and the ass i s tance given to Afghan 
revo lu t ionar ies and to the concentrat ion of the US mil i ta ry 
bases in the Indian Ocean as well as s e t t i ng up the Rapid 
Deployment force in the Persian Gulf. In short,Mrs. Indira 
39. Sur j i t Man Singh, n. 17, p . 164. 
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Gandhi t r ea t ed the Afghan c r i s i s a par t of genaral ir.tar-
nat ional syndrome in which both super powers, pursuing t h e i r 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t s , offended the peace and secur i ty of the en t i r e 
region. 
In such a s i tua t ion Ind i a ' s immediate and sustained 
objec t ive was to reduce the danger of a super power confl ic t 
in her neighbourhood, in o ther words ' t o defuse the Afghan 
c r i s i s ' . The main objec t ive of Ind ia ' s foreign policy at 
t h a t time was i t s nat ional i n t e r ^ ^ t s to be c lose ly i d ^ t i f y 
with the absence of super power r i v a l r y . She £ollov.-ed three 
t racks to meet the challenges to Ind i a ' s s ecu r i t y . F i r s t ly , 
she dissuaded the US from provoking poss ib le Soviet r e t a l i a -
t ion by rearming Pakistan and intensifying verbal attacks on 
the Soviet Union. Secondly, she made c l e a r to Moscow that , 
India was disturbed by the Soviet mi l i t a ry presence In 
Afghanistan and India would prefer t h e i r withdrawl ins r i t e of 
f r iendly r e l a t i ons betv/een the two coun t r i e s . Thirdly, she 
wanted a regional solution of the Afghan c r i s i s and ccr-sensus 
among the neighbouring s t a t e s of South and West Asia, includ-
ing Pakistan, so as to prevent the Afghan c r i s i s from 
s p i l l i n g outwards. By pursuing these p a r a l l e l effor ts , 
India hoped to c r e a t e a face-saving device of a ' su i table 
environment' in which withdrawl of Scoviet t roops could 
12^ 
40 t a k e p l a c e . 
T h u s , t h e Afghan c r i s i s shows t h e c o n s i s t e n c y of 
Mrs . G a n d h i ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . Her o b j e c t i v e was 
t o reciuce t h e d a n g e r of a s u p e r pov;er c o n f l i c t i n I n i i a ' s 
n e i g h b o u r h o o d . Her o b j e c t i v e was c o n s t a n t t o p r o t e c t I n d i a ' s 
i n t e r e s t s in a c o m b u s t i b l e s i t u a t i o n . She r e g a r d e d f o r e i g n 
m i l i t a r y i n v e s t m e n t i n P a k i s t a n as a d i r e c t t h r e a t t c I n d i a ' s 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t as w e l l as n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . Ari h e r 
d i p l o m a c y w i t h r e s p e c t t o A f g h a n i s t a n was d i r e c t e d towards 
p r o t e c t i n g I n d i a ' s i n t e r e s t s . 
4 0 . Times of I n d i a (New Delhi ) , 19 F e b r u a r y 1980 
See a l s o S u r j i t Man S ingh , n^. 17 , p . 5 . 
C O N C L U S I O N 
CONCLUSION 
When Ind ia go t independence t h e World had a l ready been 
d i v i d e d between t h e US and t h e Sov ie t Power b l o c s . In a World 
of power b l o c s Ind ia needed t o fo rmula te i t s fo re ign p o l i c y . 
Thus Ind ia was conf ron ted wi th t h e d i f f i c u l t t a s k of evolving a 
f o r e i g n po l i cy c o n s i s t a n t with i t s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s in the 
c o n t e x t of t h e world d i v i d e d between t h e US and t h e Soviet Union. 
The co ld war wi th i t s b l o c p o l i t i c s t h r e a t e n e d t o take away I n d i a ' s 
independence. The cho ice be fo re Ind ia was e i t h e r t o accept a po l i cy 
of a l ignment , and j o i n one of t h e power-b locs and thus be under 
i t s p r o t e c t i v e umbrel la o r adopt an independen t non-al igned fore ign 
p o l i c y and s t a y away from b l o c - p o l i t i c s . 
The f i r s t Prime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a , t h e founder of the po l i cy 
of non-a l ignment , J awaha r l a l Nehru f e l t t h a t independence and 
s e c u r i t y were i n s e p a r a b l e . According t o Nehru, I n d i a ' s p o l i c y of 
non-al ignment was meant t o keep away from t h e power-s t rugg le . 
Nehru b e l i e v e d t h a t I n d i a ' s s i z e , g e o s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n , and 
h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n s e n t i t l e d i t t o p lay a l e ad ing r o l e i n world 
a f f a i r s . He was aware t h a t I nd i a could r e t a i n i t s inf luence and 
p l a y a meaningful r o l e i n m a i n t a i n i n g world peace not by a l ign ing 
w i t h any power b loc , b u t , by fo l lowing an independent fore ign 
p o l i c y . 
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Nehru bel ieved t h a t India was not to be undully worried about 
external t h r e a t s to i t s s e c u r i t y . This was a perception whicii 
governed h is s ecu r i t y th inking even before independence. He a l so 
bel ieved t h a t big power r i v a l r y would in i t s e l f ac t as an effect ive 
guarantor of I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . IhUs Nehru pursued an independent 
non-aligned po l i cy of judging every issue on the merits of the case# 
to safegxiard i t s na t ional s ecu r i ty , nat ional i n t e r e s t s and to 
maintain i t s independent pos i t ion in wor ld -po l i t i c s . 
I nd i a ' s pol icy of nc«i-alignment was based on the pr inc ip les 
of balance of power,Non-alignment was not the foreign policy of 
India as such but a means or framework o r s t ra tegy for the achievement 
of the goals of I n d i a ' s foreign po l icy . India sought through non-
alignment t o maintain the defensive balance of power through f r iendly 
r e l a t i o n s with big powers# to ensure the continuance of the balance 
of power as fa r as poss ib le and t o prevent the influence of big 
powers in Asian s t a t e s t h a t had achieved statehood. These aspects 
of non-alignment were c lose ly in tegra ted with t h e main objectives of 
I n d i a ' s foreign po l i cy namely the pro tec t ion of national secur i ty 
and national i n t e r e s t s . National secur i ty in Nehru ideas could be 
safeguarded not merely by mi l i t a ry power or armies but a lso by an 
e f f ec t ive foreign po l i cy . 
India s ince independence followed the pol icy of non-alignment 
and kept i t s e l f away from power b locs . On the other hand* Pakistan 
jo ined mi l i t a ry a l l i a n c e s with the USA and others in order to make 
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i t s e l f s t ronger m i l i t a r i l y and p o l i t i c a l l y . India adopted non-
alignment as a general foreign policy s t r a t egy t o meet a l l kinds 
of t h r e a t s t o i t s nat ional s ecur i ty . 
I nd i a ' s foreign policy ac t ions , since the beginning of 
independence show t h a t Ind ia ' s foreign pol icy makers h. ve always been 
concerned about two kinds of t h r e a t to Ind i a ' s secur i ty viz; t h r e a t 
from side of Pakistan and th rea t from the s ide of China. 
The most important aspect of foreign policy of India has been 
i t s r e l a t i onsh ip with Pakistan. Pakistan has been one of the major 
sources of t h r e a t to India secur i ty since 194 7. The t r i v i a l 
invasion of Kashmir in 1947-48 marked the beginning of conf l ic t 
between the two coun t r i e s . Pakis tan ' s entry in to Western bloc and 
i t s membership of SEATO and CENTO threa tened Ind ia ' s national 
secur i ty because Pakistan has joined these a l l i ances in order to solve 
the Kashmir issue with the pos i t ion of s t r eng th . 
The supply of massive m i l i t a r y ass i s tance by United States of 
America to Pakistan not only threatened the secur i ty but also the 
independence in foreign a f f a i r s and the policy of non-alignment. 
In such a s i t ua t i on India had no other way except to move 
towards the Soviet Union for i t s support on Kashmir issue. The 
Soviet Union wanted t o e s tab l i sh i t s influence in South Asia and 
i t had a l so no o ther way except to become c lose to India. Therefore/ 
the leaders of the two countr ies - Nehru and Khruschev made exchange 
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of v i s i t s in 19 55. They resolved tha t the r e l a t i ons between the 
tvio countr ies would continue t o be guided by the pr inciples o£ 
Panchsheel. 
The Soviet Union supported India on Kashmir issue. I t gave 
an imperative assurance of the Soviet recogni t ion of India ' s 
independent st.atias and i t s pol icy of non-alignment. The open 
support to India by the Soviet Union on Kashmir issue was a lancSnark 
in Indo-Soviet r e l a t i ons because the diplomatic linkages which 
Pakistan had sought t o achieve b"/ the United States of Anierica were 
counterbalanced by the Soviet p o l i t i c a l and economic support t o 
Ind ia . 
Onina has been the other major source of t h rea t to Ind ia ' s 
na t ional s ecu r i ty s ince 1949. The Chinese occupation of Tibet 
i n 19 50, i t s possession of 50,000 sq. miles of Indian t e r r i t o r y 
in 19 53 and i t s aggression of 1962 posed a serious threat t o 
I n d i a ' s nat ional s ecu r i t y as well as Ind ia ' s policy of non-alignment, 
Nehru rea l i zed t h a t Indian foreign policy should be defence oriented 
po l i cy . He was forced by the ex i s t i ng s i t ua t i on to make cer ta in 
changes in I n d i a ' s foreign policy not in the sense of alignment in 
place of non-alignment but non-alignment with adequate defence of the 
country . Thea. Nehru followed the course of non-alignment more 
cons i s t en t l y and simultaneously decided to build up the country 's 
defence capacity by u t i l i s i n g in te rna l resources as well as ge t t ing 
a i d without m i l i t a r y or p o l i t i c a l s t r i n g s . 
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I t was aga ins t t h i s background tha t India looked around for 
he lp . Since Soviet Union too was a victim of Chinese s t i f fened 
a t t i t u d e , India and the Soviet Union came close to each other and 
the sov ie t Union began taking more i n t e r e s t in Ind i a ' s economic 
and secu r i t y needs. 
The signing of the Moscow Treaty of Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Test by the Indian Government and the MIG - deal in 1963 were the 
major sources of s trengthening the r e l a t ionsh ip between the two 
c o u n t r i e s . 
The f r iendship between the two countr ies was further 
s t rengthened in April 1964 a f t e r Jakar ta Conference of Afro-Asian 
c o u n t r i e s . Indian r ep resen ta t ive to the Conference, Sardar Swaran 
Singh s ided with the Soviet Union because i c was an Asian power and 
which even s ince the Banding Conference had supported the policy of 
non-al ignnent pursued ty Afro-Asian count r ies and given economic 
a s s i s t a n c e t o survive as sovereign independent s t a t e s . 
The Chinese nuclear explosion of 1964 once again h e i ^ t e n e d 
I n d i a ' s percept ion of threa t from China. The NPT aggravated t h i s 
concern by not imposing any r e s t r i c t i o n on p ro l i f e r a t ion by the 
nuclear weapon s t a t e s while denying nuclear s t a tus to i t s signa-
t o r i e s . The Indian policy makers feared t h a t in such a dispensation, 
China could r e so r t to nuclear blackmail, if not a d i rec t use of 
nuclear weapons agains t India . I n d i a ' s re jec t ion of Npr and i t s 
13 5 
d e c i s i o n to pursue a p o l i c y of n u c l e a r o p t i o n thus has a dominant 
s e c u r i t y r a t i o n a l e behind i t « in a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , ob jec t ion t o 
t h e uneqiial and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c h a r a c t e r of t h e T rea ty . 
Thus, t h e Chinese i n v a s i o n of 1962 and i t s nuclear explosion 
of 1964 l e d India t o s e a r c h f o r e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y gua ran tees . This 
was why I n d i a adopted s o f t p o l i c y towards Indian Ocean t h a t the US 
Seventh F l e e t i n t o I n d i a n Ocean would be d e t e r r e n c e aga ins t pos s ib l e 
f u t u r e a t t a c k by China. But the sea rch f o r s e c u r i t y guarantee 
c e a s e d unsucces s fu l l y i n 1967 and Indian l e a d e r s f e l t f r ee to t ake 
a f i rm s t e p on t h i s q u e s t i o n . 
Pak i s t an s i gned t h e boundary agreement with China in 1963 
on ly t o e a r n C h i n a ' s su^sport t o i t s s t a n d on Kashmir i s s u e . The 
v i s i t of Chou-Enlai t o P a k i s t a n i n 1964 and Ayub Khan's v i s i t t o 
B e i j i n g in 1S65 were d i r e c t e d towards a new s t r a t e g i c - l i n k a g e s 
between t h e twO c o u n t r i e s . Meanwhile Pak i s t an a t t acked India in 
mid 1965 with t h e he lp of Chir^a. China no t only provided arms t o 
P a k i s t a n t o be used a g a i n s t I n d i a bu t a l s o t h r e a t e n e d t o open 
ano the r f r o n t in t h e n o r t h - e a s t a c r o s s Sikkim. The US a l s o suppor-
t e d Pak i s t an with mass ive arms a s s i s t a n c e dur ing and a f t e r t h i s war. 
The supply of arms t o P a k i s t a n by t h e USA and China, pointed 
t o t h e degree of t h e i r s t r a t e g i c c o l l u s i o n a g a i n s t India . 
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After 19 65, the dominant object ive of India*s foreign 
po l i cy vas t o s e t t l e i t s disputes by peaceful means. The Tashkent 
agreement of 19 66 was signed in order to e s t ab l i sh b i l a t e ra l 
r e l a t i o n s bet-ween India and Pakis tan. On the other hand India 
decided to r e o r i e n t i t s defences in order to face a dual th rea t 
t o i t s s e c u r i t y . A well-arranged diplomatic campaign by India 
h igh l igh ted the dangers of Pakistan using outside arms in 1965 was 
aga ins t Ind ia . This made India so conscious of i t s defence that 
an e f fo r t was made in India to remain prepared even for a war 
simultaneously on two fronts with Pakistan and with China. This 
defence or ien ted foreign pol icy made i t more pragmatic and less 
d o c t r i n a i r e . I n d i a ' s defence or ien ted foreign policy brought i t . 
much c l o s e r to the Soviet Union than ever before. Considerable 
importance was given t o the bui lding up of the defence forces of 
t h e country with the help of the Soviet Union. 
The East Pakistan c r i s i s of 197i put heavy economic burden on 
India due to the inf lux of refugees from East Pakistan. Not only 
t h a t but Sine-American support t o Pakistan threatened the secuirity 
of t he country. Pakistan succeeded in winning the svjpport of both 
China and United S ta tes during the c r i s i s . 
I t was agains t such condit ions t h a t India and the Soviet 
Union, found th^nselves c loser and decided to strengthen and 
formalise t h e i r own p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c l inkages . The Indo-Soviet 
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of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of 9 August 19 71 was conclu-
ded between tiie two countr ies in order t o defend India ' s t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y and t o preserve peace which was threatened by the war 
launched by the Pakis tani Mi l i t a ry Junta with the support of US 
and China. The t r e a ty was not aga ins t the policy of non-alignment, 
India continued t o follow t h i s pol icy and in f a c t the policy of 
non-alignment found specia l mention in the t r ea ty i t s e l f . 
The East Pakistan c r i s i s of 19 71 escala ted into a war 
between India and Pakistan and ul t imate ly Bangladesh came i n to 
ex i s t ence . After the war India emerged as a major power in South 
Asia, The per iod of 19 71 became a landmark in Ind ia ' s foreign 
pol icy and i t s secur i ty environment. The Incto-Soviet Treaty of 
August 19 71 provided to India the necessary- s t r a t e g i c reassurance 
a t a time when a s t r a t e g i c t r i a n g l e cons i s t ing of China, the 
United S ta tes of America and Pakistan posed a serious threat t o 
i t s s e c u r i t y . 
The Soviet sv:pport t o India was in the context of the 
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship which was within the 
framework of the po l icy of non-alignment. 
The crea t ion of Bangladesh became a s t r a t e g i c asset for 
India in nor th -eas te rn pairt of India , India did i t s best to 
u t i l i s e the opportunity to shape the sub-continental balance of 
power in i t s favour. The T r i p a r t i t e agreement envisaged by the 
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Defence Minis ter , Jagjivan Ram v/as to promote Ind i a ' s securi ty 
environment in the sub-cont inent . 
'Th'^  Simla Agreement of 19 72 was a pa r t of the Indian 
s t r a t e g y of keeping the externa l povjers out of the sub-continental 
a f f a i r s . This was a necessi ty in view of the perception tha t i t was 
a Pakistan but t ressed m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l l y by external powers 
which cons t i t u t ed the main t h r e a t to I n d i a ' s secur i ty . 
The nature of t h r e a t t o I nd i a ' s secur i ty was changed a f te r 
19 72 when India emerged as a pre-eminent power in South Asia. After 
the emergence of Bangladesh there s t a r t e d a process of reapproach-
ment between USA and the People 's Republic of China with the help 
of Pakis tan. India t r i e d i t s best to normalise i t s re la t ions with 
China but China was c r i t i c a l of Ind i a ' s Pokhran Atomic Explosition 
of 19 74. 
China launched a programme t o modernize i t s defence forces 
which caused concerned to I n d i a ' s secur i ty planners . And th i s 
c e r t a i n l y hightened I n d i a ' s t h rea t perception from China. India 
i n response t o Qiinese defence modernization, took several s teps to 
p r o t e c t i t s national s ecu r i t y . The in tegra t ion of Sikkim to Indian 
Union was one of them. 
China's refusal to accept the in t eg ra t ion of Sikkira with 
India in 19 75 and the building \xp of the Karakoraro Highway by China 
which could be used fo r m i l i t a r y purposes were two major i ssue 
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during 19 75-76 before I n d i a ' s foreign and secur i ty policy makers. 
Besides these issxoes much of the s t ing of Chinese s ^ p o r t e d 
insurgency in North-east India was taken out with the creat ion of 
Arunachal Pradesh, the Shillong Accord and the announcement by 
Laldenga tha t Mizoram was an in tegra l p a r t of India and t h a t the 
Mizo National Front would accept a se t t lement within the 
framework of the Indian Const i tu t ion. In the l i g h t of a l l these 
p o s i t i v e developments in favour of Ind i a ' s in te rna l s t a b i l i t y in 
add i t i on to the not iceable Improvement in Ind i a ' s securi ty and 
s t a t u s p o s i t i o n , the Chinese f e l t t h a t they could no longer 
engineer Moist-led revolut ion in India . 
China a l s o advised Pakistan to seek a peaceful set t lement 
of the Kashmir dispute within the framework of the Sirela Agreement. 
On the v i s i t of Pakis tani leaders to Beijing a f te r 19 72, China 
re f ra ined from re f e r r i ng the Kashmir, d ispute in the jo in t 
communiques issued by Beijing. 
After the emergence of Bangladesh a new t r iangular balance 
of power cons i s t ing of Pakistan, China and USA changed the nature , 
of t h r e a t to I n d i a ' s national s ecu r i t y . Pakistan insp i te of i t s 
af f i rmat ion and canmitment to ensure peace and co-operation in the 
sub-cont inent pursued the policy of reannanent. Pakistan s t a r t e d 
t o get arms from West Asian coun t r i e s . China and United States 
heightened India* s perception of t h r e a t from Pakistan. 
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•nie decision of Z.A. Bhutto t o continue Pakis tan 's membership 
of CENTO and Pak i s t an ' s I s l an i c connection for his idea of the 
Islamic Bomb were the Pak i s t an ' s p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g y against India, 
But the refusal of Shah of Iran t o a t tend the Lahore Islamic 
Conference in 19 74 l e d t o an improvement in Indo-Iranian r e l a t i o n s . 
In t h i s way* the Pakis tan- I ran l inkages v i s - a - v i s India reduced 
cons iderably . 
The U.S. decision t o l i f t the arms embargo t o Pakistan in 
19 75 was t o a l t e r the balance of power in i t s favour. Ind ia ' s 
nuclear explosion of 19 74 was a lso c i t ed as a major reason for 
t he US pol icy towards Pakis tan. All t h i s caused concern to India. 
Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Foreign Minister Swaran 
Singh reacted t o the US pol icy towards Pakistan because the 
resumption of arms suppl ies t o Pakistan posed a grave threa t to 
I n d i a ' s s ecu r i t y . 
Pakis tani nuc lea r i sa t ion programme caused concern to Ind i a ' s 
pol icy makers because the consequences of the possessicc of bomb 
by Pakistan would be a sense of psychological insecur i ty to India. 
I t would make i t d i f f i c u l t for India to p r o t e c t i t s secur i ty against 
any poss ib le \xse of nuclear weapons by Pakis tan. Pakistan might 
use to get more concession from India fo r i t s nuclear programme. 
I n d i a ' s response t o these developments or the Sino-US-Pak 
ax i s was t o prepare i t s e l f with the help of the Soviet Union for 
t h e defence of t he country. I t was agains t t h i s backgroimd tha t 
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India had t o s t rengthen i t s fr iendship with the Soviet Union. 
The r e l a t ionsh ip between India and the Soviet Union have always 
been dominated by Ind i a ' s secur i ty needs. 
In such in te rna t iona l s i t u a t i o n , Brezhnev v i s i t t o India 
was to s t rengthen f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with India and t o assure 
the Government and People of India t h a t i n case of any th rea t t o 
the s ecu r i t y of the country, Russia wi l l be on the s ide of India. 
India highly appreciated the Moscow proposal for a plan for an 
Asian c o l l e c t i v e Secur i ty . 
But a t the same time India eit^jhasized the independence of 
Asian count r ies t o aacourage b i l a t e r a l and mutual cooperation 
among them. The j o i n t dec lara t ion i ssued a t the end of v i s i t 
r e f l e c t e d I n d i a ' s p r inc ip l e s and norms for governing re la t ionship 
betweoi Asian count r ies . I t s t r e s sed detente ra the r than secur i ty 
and freedom of Asian countr ies ra ther than any mi l i t a ry arrangement. 
They a l s o affirmed t o find a f a i r so lu t ion of making the Indian 
Ocean a zone of Peace. 
The Indian policy makers r ea l i zed the defence need and 
c o n s t i t u t e d a defence p lan which was in teg ra ted with the f ive 
year plan (1974-79) in order t o strengthen I n d i a ' s defence capabi l i ty 
with the help of the Soviet Union. At tent ion was given to 
s t rengthen the a l l t h ree p a r t s of defence forces viz; Army, Navy 
and Airforce of the country. 
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The major object ive of I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy vas to 
improve I n d i a ' s secur i ty environment by weakening Pakistan 's 
s t r a t e g i c l inkages with US and China and the West ^ i a n 
c o u n t r i e s . The Government of India did i t s best t o face the 
Pak i s t an i chal lenges t o i t s s ecu r i ty and to maintain i t s power 
but i t s t i l l needed Soviet support for i t s securi ty and to 
counterbalance US-China sv^port t o Pakis tan. 
Ind ia a l so faced a t h r e a t t o i t s secur i ty by Internal 
f i e r ced s i t u a t i o n a f te r the Bangladesh c r i s i s . The opposition 
p a r t i e s became most revolutionary aga ins t the ruling par ty . I t 
was aga ins t t h a t background t h a t Mrs. Ind i ra Gandhi declared a 
s t a t e of emergency in July 1975. 
When the Janata Government was formed in January 1977, 
the Prime Minister of India* Morarji Desai r e i t e r a t e d his firm 
commitment t o the pol icy of non-alignment/ but he added that 
i t wi l l be a genuine non-alignment po l i cy . He said that we w i l l 
not have any specia l r e l a t i ons with any country. While the 
Jana ta Government spoke about genuine non-alignment policy but 
in the ac tua l p r a c t i c e i t followed more or less the same pol icy 
as followed by the Congress Government in the pas t . The Janata 
Governnent did not scrap or even did not modify the Indo-Soviat 
Treaty of 19 71 because i t no way compromised Ind ia ' s policy of 
non-cLLignment. I nd i a ' s policy non-alignment then continued t o be 
based on pragmatism and strong determination to safeguard Ind ia ' s 
secur i ty and i t s v i t a l i n t e r e s t s . 
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Ind i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with two h o s t i l e neighbours - Pakistan 
and Qiina was s l i g h t l y improved during the Janata Government. 
MOrarji Desai and General Ziaul Haque did t h e i r best to improve 
r e l a t i o n s between the two coun t r i e s . India did i t best to weaken 
the p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c challanges from Pakistan. Atte-:ipts were 
made t o improve r e l a t i o n s with China. An improvement in r e l a t i o n s 
with China manifested i t s e l f i n the resumption of t rade and 
exchange of t r a d e de lega t ions . The two countr ies also cooperated 
in c u l t u r a l and spor t s a c t i v i t i e s , AS a r e s u l t of th i s the 
t ens ion between t h e two countr ies was g r e a t l y relaxed. The Janata 
Government wished to normalise i t s r e l a t i ons with China but the 
two countr ies d i f fered on Vietnam i s sue . That i s why 'he 
r e l a t i o n s between the two countr ies could not be improved beyond a 
c e r t a i n point* 
The American Aiminis t ra t ion modified i t s pol icy cowards 
Ind ia . Ihe leaders of the two countr ies made an exchange of 
v i s i t s in 19 78. The leaders of the two countries expressed t h e i r 
support for se l f determination of African people and committed 
for making the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. But the re la t ions 
between India and USA were s t r a ined on the US refusal to sv^ply 
nuclear fuel t o India for Tarapur Power Sta t ion because India had 
not signed NPT and refused t o accept fu l l scope safeguard. 
India during the per iod of Caretaker Government of Choudhry 
Charan Singh faced a se r ious t h r e a t to i t s secur i ty froa Pakistan 
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because of t h e supply of soph i s t i ca ted weapon from United Sta tes 
of America/ a f t e r the Soviet in tervent ion in Afghanistan. 
Choudhry Charan Singh expressed his concern t o US arms supply 
to Pakis tan and a lso disapproved of the Soviet m i l i t a r y interven-
t ion in Afghanistan because Afghanistan wan a non-aligned s t a t e . 
He did not d i r e c t l y condemned the Soviet act ion but i n d i r e c t l y 
expressed h i s disapproval of the Soviet act ion in Afghanistan, 
He r e a l i z e d the importance of Indo-Soviet Friendship which was 
absolute ly necessary to counter balance Sino-US stqpport to 
Pakis tan , Therefore/ he did not d isplease the Soviet Union 
because the Soviet help was necessary a t t h a t time to pro tec t 
coun t ry ' s s ecu r i t y . 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi again came t o power in 1980. On 
assuming the off ice of Prime Minister Mrs. CBndfii decided t o 
frame vp I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy in new dimensions. She began to 
understand the s i t u a t i o n t h a t was very dangerous t o Ind ia ' s 
s e c u r i t y as well as a t h r ea t to the regional peace due to arms 
and mater ial provided t o the revolut ionary forces of Afghanistan 
through Pakis tan . 
India s t rong ly opposed the US and Chinese move to rearm 
Pak is tan , I n d i a ' s dilemma was how t o bring about a vacation of 
t he Soviet troops from Afghanistan which was poss ib le if the 
US and China would r e f ra in from providing la rge arms ass i s tance 
t o r evo lu t iona r i e s through Pakis tan . 
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The Afc^an i s s u e d id n o t c r e a t e d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion 
between I n d i a and t h e Sov ie t Union. The f r i e n d s h i p between t h e 
two c o u n t r i e s was s t i l l t h e same. I n d i a was n o t in flavour of 
t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e Sov i e t t r oop i n Afghanis tan f o r a long p e r i o d 
bu t i t s t o o d f o r an o v e r a l l p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t of t he p r o b l ^ u . 
Dur ing t h i s p e r i o d I n d i a and t h e Sov ie t Ifaion concluded t h e i r 
l a r g e s t s i n g l e package of arms t r a n s f e r s . The Indo-Sovia t l i n k 
i n defence equipment had been s t r e n g t h e n e d . And t h e Indo-Sovie t 
l i n k c o n s t r u c t e d on convergences t h a t cou ld su rv ive the s t r a i n s 
of s e v e r a l d ivergences in f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 
The main o b j e c t i v e of I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y a t t ha t t ime 
was t o p r o t e c t i t s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . Mrs. Gandhi very c a r e f u l l y 
hand led t h e c h a l l a n g e s t o I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . Her o b j e c t i v e was t o 
r educe t h e danger of s i p e r power c o n f l i c t i n I n d i a ' s neighbourhood. 
This o b j e c t i v e was c o n s t a n t t o p r o t e c t I n d i a ' s i n t e r e s t s in a 
ve ry f i e r c e d s i t u a t i o n , I n d i a under t h e l e a d e r s h i p of Mrs. I n d i r a 
Gandhi c o n t i n u e d t o main ta in f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s wi th t h e S o v i e t 
Union f o r i t s s e c u r i t y need whi le d i sapprov ing t h e Soviet m i l i t a r y 
a c t i o n in Afghan i s t an . 
Thus , we see t h a t P a k i s t a n and China have been two major 
f a c t o r s i n Indo -Sov ie t c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s a b s o l u t e l y 
based on t h e framework of t h e p o l i c y of non-al ignment . Non-
a l i gnmen t has proved t o be a s e r v i c e a b l e framework because i t 
has s e r v e d t h e c o u n t r y ' s v i t a l i n t e r e s t s * safeguarded i t s n a t i o n a l 
s e c u r i t y and he lp t o c o n s o l i d a t e I n d i a ' s independence* unity and 
i n t e g r i t y . 
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The following suggestions are offered to the Government of 
India with a view of making India 's policy of non-alignment more 
effective and pragmatic and also to f a c i l i t a t e Q bet ter 
arrangement of the security problem of the country. 
F i r s t ly , in the po l i t i ca l f ie ld India being a leader of the 
non-aligned countries should take the i n i t i a t i ve by having a network 
of t r ea t i e s of peace, cooperation and friendship among the non-
aligned countries. India should make an i n i t i a t i ve by offering such 
t r ea t i e s to such countries in Asia l ike Nepal* Bhutan, Maldives, 
Bangladesh, Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan. India should offer 
such t rea ty to ASEAN countries a lso. India should act as a l ink 
between regional or sub-regional t r ea t i e s of this nature, for 
instance, between South-East Asia and South-West Asia. 
Secondly, India should take an i n i t i a t i ve for a collective 
securi ty plan in the Indian-sub-continent. I am confident that 
the Soviet Union would be favourable for such a proposal because 
i t did so in the past . I hope that America and the West will 
a l so response favourably if they want to ensuie peace, s t ab i l i ty , 
security and progress in Indian Ocean area. India has to play an 
important role in global problem viz a holocaust of war, and 
should play an even more iitportant role in cooperation with other 
non-aligned and friendly countries l ike the Soviet Union because 
friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union are an integral 
pa r t of India 's foreign policy. 
147 
Ihirdly, there should be a creation of Inst i tut ion for the 
security of the country which could make the assessment of the 
threa ts e i ther internal or external to the country's security. The 
Defence and External Ministries would be responsible to such 
in s t i t u t ion . 
Lastly, I vould l ike to suggest Government Publications 
Division that i t should publish more vi ta l issues on national 
securi ty . There should be an arrangement a£ seminar and conference 
from time to time in which Ministers, Members of Parliament, 
Defence experts and the Scholars from iftiiversities and Research 
Ins t i tu t ions shoxald par t ic ipate and suggestions should be made 
to the Government of India to f rame up the security policy to meet 
any threat to the national security. Overall, India should go in 
a long way in preparing the nation as a whole to meet the challanges 
t o India ' s foreign policy and i t s national securi ty. 
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